An Examination of the Rawlsian Critique of Meritocracy: Toward a Transformation of Arguments on Equality of Opportunity

Abstract

 As Michael Young described in The Rise of Meritocracy, while the realization of meritocracy appears to liberate people’s life prospects from the fetters of their birth and heritage, the formal equality of opportunity as an element of meritocracy does not necessary lead to their social and economic equality. Indeed, meritocracy possibly even widens the gaps between people. Thus, methods of securing equality of opportunity and educational opportunity have been a serious and controversial topic in educational debates.
 In this paper, I consider John Rawls’ theory of justice and clarify its implications for problems concerning meritocracy and equality of opportunity. In examining Rawls’ critical view on meritocracy, I focus on the moral reasoning in order to discuss and explore the rationale for pursuing the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity. By doing so, I will try to propose a way to transform a certain kind of schema often assumed within arguments on equality of opportunity.
 Although some debaters insist that solely guaranteeing the formal equality of opportunity is insufficient, their arguments are usually strongly opposed when they proceed to more substantive or egalitarian conceptions of equal opportunity. In such cases, it is often emphasized that the idea of equality conflicts with that of liberty, and the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity is taken up as a representative of the egalitarian side.
 I, however, avoid both stressing this conflict and defending the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity from a standpoint of egalitarianism. As Derek Parfit points out, some kinds of egalitarianism have intrinsic difficulties such as ‘leveling down.’ Therefore, I take a negative stance on using such egalitarian reasoning, especially within debates on equality of opportunity without relation to its conflict with liberty. Does this mean, then, that we should give up holding a Rawlsian substantive rather than formal view on equal opportunity? My answer is no.
 Reinterpreting Rawls’ text, I find that there is a different reason to support his arguments on equality of opportunity. When he makes a case for the principle of fair equality of opportunity and prior distribution of educational resources for people in a less favorable position, he emphasizes that their role consists of, for example, enabling people to experience the realization of self and to take part in social affairs. Thus, I define these roles as promoting effective freedom, which cannot be reduced to the logic of equalization. In conclusion, we can say that merely securing the formal equality of opportunity is insufficient not because it results in inequality but because it still undeservedly places restrictions on less favored people’s effective freedom from a Rawlsian perspective. In addition, the Rawlsian conception of equal opportunity can be considered as further pursuing the liberation of people’ life prospects, which is indicated in meritocracy.