Abstract
This paper considers social and educational implications suggested by the discussions in the philosophy of language concerning the subject of the affinity between using language and keeping the rule of performance. Using language requires keeping the rule of performance, and keeping the rule enforces the assimilation to community on persons. Thus community is seen as consisting in those members who share, voluntarily or involuntarily, the same rule of performance. Such social implications presumably extend not only to philosophy of politics but also to philosophy of education.
Rousseau's speculation on the origin of language, Wittgenstein's assumption of logical form and language game, Kripke's justification of rule by community and Karatani's shift of stance from telling to teaching are analyzed to draw social implications from them, and finally Derrida' s deconstruction of rule and his social philosophy of justice are considered. According to Derrida justice is accompanied with the other in the society and demands us to show him/her hospitality even if he/she does not share the same rule with us. We do dwell in the society where we can not discern friends from enemies so clearly as a German political scientist Schmitt used to do. Derrida's deconstruction of rule in terms of justice destabilizes our dichotomy of the same and the other, and to make the community ready to be open to the other. In this openness his social philosophy of justice presents an alternative version of public philosophy.
In conclusion educational judgment, namely the educational assessment of various practices, is formulated in contrast to the formula of empirical, logical, ethical, political and economical judgments. Educational judgment, if any, can not be justified without being combined with other kinds of judgment since education is a kind of social goods to be distributed according to its various functions in the society and is at same time a social vehicle to distribute social goods themselves.