Abstract
Numerous attempts have been made by scholars to show the decline of educational performance. And it is the main cause of the default of educational con-tents. However, only few attempts have so far been made at incentives of a supervisor and an agent.
The purpose of this paper is lo explain the cause of the decline of educational performance and to describe policy prospecting for promoting the quality of school. This research borrows a considerable amount from Tirole (1986). Added to this, I use “multi-stage games” to solve the previous problems.
The main results are the following:
1 The minimum level of educational performance is achieved if a salary is paid independent of his effort or educational performance.
2 The optimal level of educational performance is achieved under symmetric information if a salary is depended on an agency's effort (First Best).
3 The optimal level of educational performance is achieved under asymmetric information if a salary is depended on educational performance (Second Best).
4 If a supervisor colludes with an agency， a principal must make a contract coalition-proof.
