Abstract
This paper explores the effects of solidarity group upon collective dilemma using game theory, and investigates the conditions and mechanism on which this dilemma is resolved. This dilemmatic situation means that rational and self-interested individuals in a group may not achieve their common goal even if all of them would be better off. Although social theories based on rationality pay attention to solidarity group, it is not enough to capture its effect through micro-macro level linkage. This study formulates such a problematic situation as a game theoretic model called an “n-person chicken game”. Surveying previous Nash equilibrium analysis, this paper analyzes the “n-person chicken game” using the strong Nash equilibrium that considers not only individual deviations but also the possibility of coalitional deviations. The result implies that the coalitional corporations achieved by communication between members of solidarity group resolve the dilemma. This implication supports the importance of solidarity group emphasized by Resource Mobilization Theory.
