企業理論との対比でみた官僚制の分析

抄録

This paper aims to analyze the behavior and the role of bureaucrats in political system, comparing with those of managers in modern corporation. We can say the managers in the theory of the firm correspond to the bureaucrats in political system and stockholders also correspond to political party or legislature. There are various arguments concerning to the nature of managers. Should they be regarded as an agent of stockholders or as a utility maximizer of themselves under the constraints of stockholders wealth maximizing requirements? Recently many books have been published in Japan. Aoki's book is very excellent above all. Aoki showed a new viewpoint on the manager. He regarded the manager as a coordinator of bargaining game between stockholders and employees. The manager maximize organizational revenue, and the organization is composed by the stockholders, the managers and the employees. He named the theory as corporative managerial theory of the firm distinct from usual managerial theory of the firm. If the managers behave discretionarily and maximize the utility of themselves, Pareto optimality might not be realized, different from neoclassical case.
If the bureaucrats can also behave discretionarily the regulation by legislature is required. Many public choice studies suggest that the regulation is difficult and the budget maximizing behavior of bureaucrats has a tendency to increase a size of government.
However, it can not be said that an improvement of the situation is impossible.
If the bureaucrats utility function includes not only budget but also other variables which reflect the performance of private sector, the situation may be improved.