公共選択の研究
Online ISSN : 1884-6483
Print ISSN : 0286-9624
ISSN-L : 0286-9624
日本型官僚組織の公共選択モデル
飯島 大邦
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ジャーナル フリー

1999 年 1999 巻 32 号 p. 17-31

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The structure of bureaucracy is investigated in terms of public-choice perspective. In addition, the concept of efficiency concerning the supply of public services is extended in order to consider the change of structure of bureaucracy.
Bureaucrats are roughly classified into two classes. The first bureaucratic class consists of elite bureaucrats whose positions rank a manager. The second bureaucratic class consists of elite bureaucrats who are not promoted to higher positions than manager and non-elite bureaucrats. The second bureaucratic class is supervised by the first bureaucratic class.
In existing literature on bureaucracy, the output of public services and fiscal surplus are considered to be political resources for bureaucrats in budgeting process. In this paper, it is assumed that the second bureaucratic class determine the output of public services in order to maximize net benefit derived from the output of public services. The net benefit is defined as benefit from the output of public services minus the cost of advocating the increase in the output of public services. The objective of the first bureaucratic class is assumed to maximize fiscal surplus. Moreover, the first bureaucratic class assesses bureaucrats who belong to the second bureaucratic class according to their contribution to the efficiency concerning the supply of public services. In order to maximize fiscal surplus, the first bureaucratic class can change the out-put and cost of public services by manipulating the strength of assessment.
In order to achieve the efficiency concerning the public services, the following policies are needed. First of all, the cost of advocacy should be raised by the achievement of political reform. Particularly, it is important to control the activities of Diet members who belong to a specific interest group or clique. At the same time, non-elite bureaucrats should be assessed more severely according to their contribution to the efficiency concerning the supply of public services. Secondly, the mid-term hiring of officials should be promoted.

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