抄録
This paper aim to scrutinize the fiscal influence on local government with respect to the nuclear plant locating. The local districts on which the nuclear plants are located are made compensation for the potential risks. The central government should obey relevant act to allot this compensation to them. In this paper systematic compensatory subsidy like this is defined as the direct fiscal effect on local finance. Meanwhile we define asset tax revenue that local government imposes to the nuclear plants as the indirect fiscal effect. The asset tax seems to be more straightforward revenue to the local government. Nevertheless they take into account the compensatory subsidy first because of the its size. For instance, Rokkasyo county in Aomori prefecture that allows to locate it there ends up receipting the compensatory subsidy of 8 billion Yen (\110=$1), but the each size of annual expenditure of the other same size counties based on population is only around 5 billion. Because of my understanding above, I define the subsidy as the direct fiscal effect derived from nuclear plants locating.
Two interesting facts this paper finds are following:
1) In order to decrease the asset value at a time, the asset tax revenue of nuclear plants should decrease. Therefore the asset tax for nuclear plants do support the local finance in the short term.
2) The local districts on which the nuclear plants are located did not expend more than others did, even if the size of the compensatory subsidy is huge. Because the local finance treatment act (Tihou Zaisei Tyousei Seido) works for keeping local fiscal size level.
The first fact implies that if the increasing asset tax makes local district expend more, they will starve for maintenance cost and others because of asset tax revenue reducing. This is a typical ratchet effect problem. Unfortunately we don't hope that the myopic governors manage well rather than live from hand to mouth. In the result they might call for other undesirable plants to them in order to manage their finance. This fact teaches us that we should install the fiscal rule that makes fiscal wave calmer in such cases.
Second fact make us notice that because the local finance treatment act diminish the fiscal privilege, the local government accepted the nuclear plant developing could not expend the local revenue more than others with respect to per capita. Rather as long as comparing per capita value, special reserve districts as geographically disadvantaged districts expended more than others did. These facts are statistically significance. This second facts tell us that statistical research let us know not only the how much the cost of nuclear plant developing is but also who are the true rent-seeker and/or stake holders.
