特別交付税における官僚の影響に関する分析^*

抄録

Recently Japanese government carries out the structural reforms on relation between central and local government. The reconsideration of local allocation tax grants is one of the most important themes in Japan.
Local allocation tax grants, which contain“ordinary local allocation tax grants”and“special local allocation tax grants”, are required to operate objectively. Ordinary local allocation tax grants have rigorous formula of determining the amount of grants, so it is considered that there are no interventions from any participant, such as politicians or bureaucrats.
However when it comes to special local allocation tax grants, there has less rigorous formu-las than ordinary grants, it is wondered that bureaucrats are able to control the amount of the grants.
First, we construct a theoretical model which describes the bureaucrat's behavior. There are two type bureaucrats, incumbent and retiree, who are over lapped in the economy. We show that both incumbent and retired bureaucrats choose a trigger strategy which supports positive transfers from incumbent bureaucrats to their seniors.
Second we estimate the regression model that formulates the structure of grants. The empirical results support our theoretical model; there are positive transfers from present bureaucrats to senior ones who become now local governors. We also find the positive correlation between the grants and intergovernmental personnel exchanges. In other words the increase in the number of central government officers admitted to the local government leads to the increment of special local allocation tax grants. With using the estimators and explanatory variables, we calculate the amount of the influences of bureaucrats on special local allocation tax grants. It is estimated that about 50% of total amount of special local allocation tax grants are determined by influences of bureaucrats.