権威主義体制における一票の格差と財政配分：マレーシアを事例に

抄録

　Although existing studies often find a distributive bias for overrepresented areas, they fail to explain when such a bias becomes salient. The bottleneck is partially the result of their assumption that targeting overrepresented areas is a cost-efficient strategy. However, this is not always the case, because voters in such areas do not necessarily respond to money. This study argues that risk-averse parties invest in overrepresented areas only when they can avoid the risk of freeriding by opposition supporters. Specifically, hegemonic parties are supposedly risk-averse, because their survival depends on the credibility in rewarding supporters and punishing opponents. Through a systematic analysis of the Malaysian ruling party (BN), this study demonstrates that the BN targets overrepresented areas only with a risk-immune item. This holds true even after controlling the latent endogeneity of malapportionment.