交渉ゲーム理論の実証的側面

抄録

　This paper provides a brief introduction to an empirical comparison of cooperative and non-cooperative game formulations in the context of bargaining games. More specifically, after discussing the preliminary basics of cooperative and non-cooperative frameworks for a bargaining situation, I explain the setting, the methodology, and the results in Adachi and Watanabe (2008) and Mitsutsune and Adachi (2014), both of which study the cabinet formation in Japan in the period of 1958 to 1993. In terms of empirical contents, the main difference between a cooperative and a non-cooperative settings is that in the latter, the "first-mover advantage" can be incorporated. In the specific context of the two studies, the non-cooperative framework performs better than the cooperative framework in explaining the data, although in other contexts such as vertical transactions in product distributions systems, the opposite may be true. Overall, I argue that empirical comparisons of cooperative and non-cooperative games enriches our understanding of strategic aspects of the real world.