Constitutional Political Economy: Its Departure, Development and Future

Abstract

　Constitutional political economy (CPE) is a subprogram of public choice. As Buchanan (2003) formulated, it has three hard core of presuppositions that impose limits on the domain of scientific inquiry. Those are (1) methodological individualism, (2) rational choice, and (3) politics - as - exchange. Based on these three presuppositions, this paper reviews the departure, development and future of CPE.

　The idea of a two - stage social contract and a veil of uncertainty, as well as the three presuppositions, are point of departure for CPE from the benevolent despot (BD) model of the mainstream economics. Development of CPE saw Leviathan modelling of governments, the expressive voting concept as a reply for the paradox of not - voting. Reformulating the concept of uncertainty, the rational choice concept and variations of preference from the homo - economics model of an individual actor are examined. Grants and exploitation as well as exchange can be incorporated in the future of CPE research. Brief prospects on the deflation equilibrium and irrational choice of economic agents, a voter model in a super aging society and CPE under the forth industrial revolution are given.