抄録
In the process of reorganizing welfare states since the Oil Shocks, the priorities have shifted towards employment-oriented social policies. In fact, a number of countries have adopted the return to work policies for the welfare recipients, especially those of working age. These policies are better known under the names of "Workfare Policies" or "Activation Policies". France has adopted similar measures especially since the late 1990s when Workfare Policies were extended to recipients of the RMI in an attempt to tackle the problem of "inactivity traps". This paper examines the effects and consequences of Workfare Policies in France, especially as far as the financial incentive schemes are concerned. The examination yielded the following findings and interpretations. The purpose of the French financial incentive schemes is to increase the disposable income for the welfare recipients who find jobs by allowing them to receive benefits within a limited period after being employed. Those incentive schemes include the exemption of income tax and resident tax, and the housing allowance. However, those financial incentive schemes failed to induce the welfare recipients to return to work to become independent of welfare. According to previous studies, for the welfare recipients the return to work did not imply job security. Most jobs found by welfare recipients were lower-wage, short-term, and low-skilled ones. Finally, the financial incentive schemes contributed to reduce income inequalities in limited ways. Some studies have pointed out that these incentive schemes may result in expanding the labor market for lower-wage workers and an increase in the working poor.
