産業予備軍創出効果を考慮したカレツキアン・モデル

抄録

This paper presents a Kaleckian model of growth in which income distribution and technological progress are endogenously determined through class conflict between workers and capitalists. Using the model, we analyze the short-run and the long-run equilibrium. In the analysis we consider two kinds of effects caused by a rise in the employment rate. First, a rise in the employment rate exerts an upward pressure on wages (i.e., a reserve army effect). Second, a rise in the employment leads capitalists to adopt labor saving technology in order to intentionally create reserve armies of labor (i.e., a reserve army creation effect). These two effects are based on the idea of Karl Marx. The stability of the long-run equilibrium depends on the reserve army effect, the reserve army creation effect, and the relative bargaining power between workers and capitalists. In addition, the stability and results of comparative statics analysis depend on which regime is realized in the short-run equilibrium. If the short-run equilibrium is the wage-led growth and stagnationist regime, the long-run equilibrium is likely to be unstable with the strong reserve army effects, the weak reserve army creation effect, and the weak bargaining power of capitalists. These factors, on the other hand, lead the long-run equilibrium to be stable if the short-run equilibrium is the profitled growth and exhilarationist regime. If the short-run equilibrium is the profit-led growth and stagnationist regime, the long-run equilibrium is stable irrespective of the size of such effects. We investigate the relationship between bargaining power and unemployment in the long run. In the wage-led growth regime an increase in the bargaining power of workers lowers the unemployment rate while in the profit-led growth regime a decrease in the bargaining power of workers lowers the unemployment rate. In this way the relationship between bargaining power and unemployment depends on the regime which realizes in the goods market.