経済学における価値判断の2つの位置 : センとロビンズの比較から

抄録

This paper aims to reexamine the positions on the value judgment in economics, by using the classification of the "value judgment of the subject" and the "value judgment of the object". The former is the value judgment of the researcher of economics, while the latter is the value judgment of the object of research, namely the motivation of the actor in economic studies. This classification can clarify the point of the contrast between Amartya Sen and Lionel Robbins about economic methodology. It is well known that Robbins eliminated any value judgments from economics, and strictly separated economics from ethics. However, in fact, he eliminated value judgments only in the field of economic science, and he explicitly needed value judgments in his field of political economy. So, the contrast between Sen, who emphasizes the interaction between economics and ethics, and Robbins is not about whether economists should consider value judgments. (Both of them would say "yes" in response to this question.) It must be about whether economists can ignore value judgments in some fields of study in economics. (Only Sen would deny this possibility.) Robbins based his proposition about the objectivity of economics on that of Max Weber. Robbins regarded Weber's Wertfreiheit as an attitude that considered people's value judgments as matters of fact. Robbins believed that we can treat people's value judgments as fact without our own value judgment (namely the value judgment of the subject). This means that Robbins eliminated value judgments of the subject from economic science but took account of value judgments of the object as fact. However, Robbins's understanding is not correct. Surely, Weber insisted that we could treat value judgments of the object as fact. However, in addition, Weber also insisted that in social sciences we cannot eliminate value judgments of the subject; therefore, we must use some Idealtypus in studies. From the perspective of Weber, social science cannot be wertfrei by merely taking the value judgments of the object as fact. In contrast to Robbins, Sen regards both value judgments of the subject and of the object as being inescapable in economics. His proposition about the inescapability of value is based on the philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Putnam points out the collapse of the fact-value dichotomy. He insisted that not only normative analyses but also descriptions and prescriptions are entangled with values (Putnam calls it "the entanglement of fact and value".) All descriptions premise some epistemic values, for example "coherence". Moreover, some descriptions, for example "cruel", essentially involve ethical values. From the perspective of Putnam, Sen concludes that we cannot ignore value judgments in any fields of study in economics. Both welfare economics and descriptive economics need to consider value judgments, not only of the object but also of the subject. In economic studies, we must investigate the way in which description and normative analysis are studied at the same time.