反省の問題は本当に問題なのか

フッサール初期時間論の再検討

抄録

Are we able to capture just the working consciousness by reflection?

Several Husserl researchers to date have answered no to this question. This is serious for Husserl phenomenology. This is because Husserl phenomenology is an academic discipline to analyze the workings of consciousness, using reflection as the basic method. If it is impossible to capture just the working consciousness by reflection, the phenomenological approach will leave unknown the most crucial data. In this way, the problem of the discrepancy between the method and purpose of Husserl phenomenology has been repeatedly pointed out and widely shared in Husserl research since Klaus Held was first discussed. This problem is “the problem of reflection”.

However, as some of the previous studies have acknowledged, Husserl himself does not explicitly address the problem of reflection. This seems strange. It is extremely natural to ask whether or not it is possible to capture just the working consciousness by reflection since it is the methodological core of Husserl phenomenology. So did Husserl adopt it as the basic method for phenomenology without carefully examining it? Given the fact that Husserl dealt with phenomenological methods thematically many times, that is hard to believe.

Rather, I suppose that Husserl phenomenology has an argument that answers yes to the above question. In this paper, unlike many previous studies, I discuss Husserl’s early theory of time up to the early 1910’s, not the late theory of the 1930’s. Because there seems to be something overlooked or misunderstood in the opinion of the previous studies on Husserl’s early theory of time. They consider that just a working consciousness can be captured only by a subsequent reflection. However, Husserl insists that the working consciousness is captured by reflection now. In this case “now” is not a momentary “now”, but a “wide range” now.