2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 278-288
In a metaphysical or ontological context in general, the word “world” or “universe” is used in two different meanings. One means a relative whole, beyond or out of which something else (e. g. “God”, “things in themselves”) can exist, and another means an absolute whole, beyond or out of which nothing whatsoever can exist. In this paper, I treat the latter, and ask whether such a World as an absolute whole (abbreviated as “W”) exists.
There are two major problems about the existence of W. The first is a logical problem usually appeared in Set Theories as a Cantorian Paradox, caused by supposing an unconditional totality of which everything is a part. And the second is a problem whether the alleged possible way W exists is compatible with certain philosophical standpoints like Quinian “Ontological Relativism”.
I discuss both problems and conclude that neither is a threat to the existence of W, and it can be safely established.