Philosophy (Tetsugaku)

This or That ?

Causal Theory of Actions and Anomalism of Mind

Masayoshi SHIBATA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 1-16
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.1

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The crisis of Davidson's anomalous monism means a turning point for theories of actions because it is supposed to show that we have a strong incompatibility when we insist both the causal efficacy of mental properties and the anomalism of the mental. Therefore it seems that we can take only one of the following two ways ; (a) a causal theory of actions in view of reduction of rationality to causality or (b) interpretivism of rationalization of actions at the cost of giving up belief/desire action explanations as causal ones.
This paper tries to show that the two elements irreducibly reside in our folk psychology, which have to be treated as a kind of data by philosophy and science of actions. In order to secure a space for both causality and rationality in action explanations, I rebut Nobuhara's comprehensive rationalization thesis as a new brand of radically anti-causalist theory.
On the other hand, the usual causalist strategy to appeal to supervenience (following Kim), which aims to endow mental properties with the causal power, is hopeless because, as Baker pointed out, the supervenience relation is neither sufficient nor necessary to the causal efficacy of the mental. I suggest that we should dismiss the idea of reducing every kinds of explanation to the ultimate physical one and find a proper account of causal explanation as our everyday practice if we want to have a deeper understanding of human actions and action explanations.

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Handlung und Erfahrung

die Aktualität der heutigen Handlungstheorie

Mahito KIYOSHI

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 17-32
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.17

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Der Simmels Begriff >>das persönliche Apriori<<, der sich eng mit seiner Kritik an Kant verbindet, drückt einen bedeutsamen Wendepunkt in der Geschichte der Handlungstheorie aus. Nach ihm muß die Handlung des Individuums jetzt nicht in der Dimension des reflexiven vernünftigen Willens, wie bei Kant, sondern in der tieferen das ganze Sein des Individuums umfassenden existentiellen Dimension problematisiert werden. Solch einer Gesichtspunkt wird bei Sartres Versuch der >>existentiellen Psychoanalyses<< vertieft. In dieser Gedankensentwicklung handelt es sich schließlich um den Zusammenhang zwischen der Handlung des Individuums und seinen Grunderfahrungen, aus den seine existentielle Probleme stammen. Die Aktualität der heutigen Handlungstheorie entsteht gerade von der in diesem Zusammenhang liegenden Krise aus. Und diese Krise fordert uns die kommunikationstheoretische Entwicklung der Handlungstheorie.

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The Philosophy of Action, the Past and the Present

Intentionality and Causation

Tsutomu OKABE

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 33-46
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.33

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The origins of the current philosophy of action, it might be said, are G. E. M. Anscombe (Intention, 1957) and D. Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes, 1963). But I suspect we are now in a dark forest, not to say desert, remote from those origins. From the 1980s, philosophers have accumulated books and papers on intentionality and on causation. I contend that the philosophy of action must be appropriately connected with the philosophy of mind, on the one hand, and with the philosophy of language, on the other. I make enquiries in this paper whether arguments about intentionality, which is said about action, consciousness, and language likewise by philosophers, can give a basis for the connection expected among those; and whether arguments about causation can contribute towards giving such a basis.

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The Task of the Teachers of Philosophy at Reformed Universities

Satoshi MUNAKATA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 47-60
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.47

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The recent reformation of universities in Japan, which has specifically targeted the general education faculties in order to break them up, has radically reduced the number of posts of professors of philosophy. Moreover, in reformed universities, where the history of western philosophy as a subject of general education seems to have lost its place in the curriculum, many professors of philosophy who once belonged to general education faculties have been obliged to shift their research subjects in order to adapt themselves to these new conditions. My view is based on lessons drawn from my personal experience as one of these professors. In this difficult situation, I propose that one should listen to the voices of students more attentively to find out philosophical problems latent in the difficulties they find themselves in, so that one can estimate the importance of philosophy in the university educational system from their viewpoint. This kind of practice may benefit not only the students, but also, it seems to me, the future of Japanese philosophy. This is because it will draw the attention of professional philosophers more forcefully to actual problems and open the way to an applied philosophy for which there is a need in our society.

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L'Autrui déjà passé

(Im-) possibilité de parler d' <<absolument Autre>>

Sumihiko KUMANO

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 61-75
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.61

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On donne un nom à ce qui n'est pas encore un Moi, en l'appellant sans cesse par son nom propre. Autant qu'un Moi se constitue dans les relations avec les autres, celles-ci se rattachent nécessairement à celui-là. Comme l'a écrit Lévinas, <<je suis noué aux autres avant d'être noué à mon corps>>.
<<Les autres>> sont si proches que <<je>> ne peut pas être sans rapports avec eux. Mais, d'autre côté étant donné que <<les autres>> sont effectivement autres pour <<moi>>, ils ne sont que les êtres qui doivent s'éloigner absolument de <<moi>>. Les expressions paradoxales, comme <<le désir infini>>, <<le passé immémorable>>, <<la trace d'elle-même>>, ne sont que des tentatives de parler des êtres si extraordinaires.

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Words for Otherness

Sigeki NOYA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 75-86
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.75

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It seems that there is no saying about 'otherness', because it is just what we can't say about in the sense of Tractatus. Otherness I will discuss does not stand outside my consciousness, but outside my language. At first I can't translate others' words into my language; to understand them I have to change my language. Tractatus did not argue about any problem of language-change in front of otherness. But I will try to place Tractatus at such a non-solipsistic position. I will be ableto say about what I now can't say about, and otherness comes out at the very critical point of this language-change of mine.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japanese], [in Japane ...

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 87-159
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.87

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The Analogy between Physis and Techne in Aristotle's Natural Teleology

Naoto CHATANI

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 160-169
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.160

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In the Physics II 8, Aristotle attempts to explain the teleological character of natural organisms by analogy with production of artefacts. As this attempt is related to human activities, it has been often criticised for erroneous personification of natural things. This paper shows the following through analysing this analogy. First, his thesis, “art imitates nature”, is grounds for the validity of analogical scheme. Second, in this analogy Aristotle stresses that the teleological character of existence and generation of natural organisms, whose end is the acquisition and maintenance of the specific form of each living thing, differs from the teleological character of human intentional action.

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On the Scope of Chance in Aristotle

Atsushi KAWATANI

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 170-179
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.170

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Aristotle analyses chance (tyche) in terms of three conditions : (a) exceptional, (b) accidental and (c) for something (heneka tou). Some scholars deduce the statistical interpretation of chance from the condition a, and some conclude the subjectivity-interpretation of chance from the condition b. Moreover, the condition c at face value has been thought to raise the puzzle : the condition c contradicts the fact that chance events are not for agents' purposes. In this paper I shall try to resolve this puzzle, through rejecting the two above-mentioned interpretations, from the viewpoint of modality or modes of being.

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A Reconsideration of Abaelards' “dictum”

Tetsuya NAGASHIMA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 180-189
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.180

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Peter Abaelards distinguishes between two senses of truth, that is, (i) the truth of proposition (expressed in “verus/falsus”), and (ii) the truth of term (expressed in “sanus/vanus, cassus”). In spite of this, many scholars consider his truth theory in terms of propositions only, and not in terms of nouns and verbs. I, in this paper, discuss his theory of truth in both contexts, and through this analysis attempt to clarify the ontological status of Abaelards' “dictum” which is the bearer of truth as well as the criterion of truth.

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Les sciences naturelles et la conception de la science au dix-septième siècle

Kazuto ARIYASU

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 190-199
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.190

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Plusieurs philosophes naturels du dix-septième siècle ont souligné l'importance des mathématiques pour la méthode.Ils se sont opposés au contenu de la physique aristotélicienne, mais avaient les activités scientifiques dans le même cadre que l'aristotélicien, c'est-à-dire la même conception de la science.Mon propos est d'analyser cette philosophie naturelle sous le rapport de la conception de la science.

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De la relation entre les deux discours de la substance et le vinculum substantiale chez Leibniz.

Takashi SAKUMA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 200-209
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.200

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Chez Leibniz <<vinculum substantiale>> est une notion très importante. Ce terme ne prèsente que dans son oeuvre particulière et tradive. Et lorsqu'on sépare le discours sur la substance en deux selon Leibniz et des remarques des recherches, c'est que d'une part sur substace simple, et que, d'autre part, sur substace complex, I'on considère que ce notion cencerne celle-ci. Mais nous cosidérons que ce notion traverse toute la theorie de la substance de leibniz, et que le lien substantial concerne ces deux discours. Car ce lien qui d'une mulutipliplicité de substances se léve une nouvelle, fonctionne comme la relation de la position parmi des plusieurs substances, sans aucune distinction de la substance.

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Die Verwandlung des Begriffs>>Subreption<<, bei Kant

Zur Genese der Auflösungsstruktur der Antinomien

Atsushi KIDO

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 210-219
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.210

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“Subreption” ist ein aus der Logik stammender Terminus und bedeutet “Erschleichung”, Unterschiebung eines Begriffs für einen anderen. In der Inaugural-Dissertation von 1770 hat Kant diesen logischen Terminus gebraucht und die antinomischen Gegensätze aufgelöst durch eine Methode, “vitium subreptionis metaphysicae” zu entdecken und es zu reduzieren. Auch in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (¹1781) ist diesel Begriff als “transzendentale Subreption” übernommen worden die erne wichtige Rolle bei der Auflösung der drei dialektischen Themen gespielt hat. Aber ihr Inhalt ist von jener “subreptio” der Inaugural-Dissertation wesentlich verschieden.
Der Prozaß dieser Verwandlung des Begriffs kann aufgrund des Nachlasses, der Briefe usw. als Kants philosophische Entwicklung in den siebziger Jahren aufgezeigt werden und dadurch wild often-bar, wie die Auflösungsstrategien der Dialektik, und zwar der Antinomien der Kritik gebildet worden sind. Also ist die Absicht dieser Abhandlung, die Genese der Auflösungsstruktur der Antinomien durch das Nachfolgen der Verwandlung des Begriffs “Subreption” von einem neuen Gesichtspunkt aus an den Tag zu bringen.

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Der Begriff der ewigen Freiheit beim späten Schelling

Jun SUGAWARA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 220-229
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.220

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In der Erlanger Vorlesung legt Schelling die Aufhebung der prädikativen Tätigkeit selbst vor. Denn er sieht sich genotigt, die Wiederholung der Scheidung von der abgründlichen Freiheit in den Weltaltern, durch welche gewisse Prädikate empfangen werden, anzuerkennen. Diese Aufgabe der Suche nach Prädikaten besagt die Ekstase, die ewige Freiheit, Prädikate anzunehmen und nicht anzunehmen, führt Das persönliche Bewußtsein Gottes wird als eine Tat dieser Freiheit betrachtet, eine endliche Gestalt zu wählen. Diese Kehre des späten Schelling bedeutet nicht den übergang zum Irrationalismus, sondern den Versuch, den Ermöglichungsgrund einer neuen Vermittlung zwischen Gott und Vernunft durch die Entwicklung der Endlichkeit der Vernunft von innen heraus anzubieten.

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Blochs Objektivierung des Novum

Tomoharu ODA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 230-239
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.230

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Der jünge Bloch erfaßt das Fragen und die Sehnsucht als echt menschliche Affekte, die nach etwas nicht Zuhandenem streben. Nach ihm hat das Fragen eine affekthafte Entsprechung, nähmlich die Antwort, und die Sehnsucht auch. Sie kann zwar nicht sagen, was ihre Ersehntes ist, aber das bedeutet ihre Unzulänglichkeit nicht. Ihre affekthafte Entsprechung ist ein noch nicht Seiendes, das man zuerst höchstens nur ein Neues nennen kann. Die Aufgabe des jüngen Blochs besteht darin, das Novum in Begriffe zu fassen. Dazu paßt aber die Fragestellung “ Was ist S ? ” nicht, weil man dadurch nur eine Prädikat zu einem vorhandenen en Subjekt suchen kann. Bloch kritisiert also die traditionelle Logik, um die Problematik vom Novum zu finden.

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Vom Wechsel der Beziehung zwischen >>Menschen<< und >>Sein<< in Heideggers Denken

Zenichi ARIMA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 240-248
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: January 20, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.240

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Dieser Aufsatz zielt darauf ab, durch den Vergleich der drei 'epochemachende' Sätze im Denkweg Heideggers den Wechsel der Beziehung zwischen >>Menschen<< und >>Sein<< zu erörtern. Die erste Satz redet vom Dasein als dem ontischen Grund der Ontologie ; die zweite vom Problem vom Seiendes als solches, oder Seiendes im Ganzen ; die dritte von der zueinandergehorige Beziehung zwischen >>Menschen<< und >>Sein<< im Ereignis. Die metaphysische Analyse der Angst (und der Langeweile) durchbricht die Grenze der erste Satz. Aber dem Übergang von der zweite Satz zur dritte entspricht der Verzicht der Metaphysik und die Begegnung mit Hölderins Dichtung.

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Wittgenstein on Situation-dependence of the Use of Words for Sensations

Akira HAJI

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 249-258
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.249

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The thesis that the use of words for sensations is dependent on its situations provides us two crucial insights into Wittgenstein's philosophy ; one is explicable and the other critical.
It has long been a matter of controversy what his Private Language Argument really means. The argument has been understood wrongly as a proof of the impossibility of private language. But it should be interpreted as an attempt to establish the above thesis that without determinations of situations surrounding the uses of sensation-words one cannot tell whether those words are meaningful.
The same thesis also highlights a limitation of Wittgenstein's thought. He excludes speaker's neurophysiological situations from upon what his usage of sensation-words depends. This exclusion seems me untenable. It is possible and necessary to pursue determinations of the situations thoroughly into speaker's neurophysiological aspects. This move gives a way to naturalize his philosophy which is regarded as antinaturalistic.

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La machine jouante

Le jeu d'imitation de Sartre

Jun NAGANO

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 259-267
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.259

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<<Est-ce que les machines peuvent penser ?>>. demande Alan Turing dans son article sur <<la machine comptante>>. En proposant <<l'examen de Turing>> (le jeu d'imitation), il affirme que l'on peut considérer la machine comme intelligente dans le cas où elle serait capable d'imiter l'homme.
Or Sartre parie de <<l'homme comptant>> dans l'Etre et le neant. Selon lui, pour compter, il fault avoir conscience de compter, -conscience (non-thetique) de soi. Et pourtant la réalité humaine se définit par le jeu.
Nous montrons que la conscience de soi, chez Sartre, est le jeu d'imitation et que, dans cesens, sa philosophie surmonte l'humanisme.

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Communication and Rule

Masafumi ISHII

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 268-277
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.268

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In this paper, I'll consider the problem about, “Communication and Convention” given by Davidson and Wittgenstein. In considering this problem, Davidson distinguish “literal meaning (what words means)” and “what speakers means”. And He says that we have to interpret a speaker to know the latter but the way of interpreting a speaker depends on no rule stated in advance. If that so, the significance of rule or convention in our linguistic communication would disappear. Through considering “Our form of life”, I'll discuss this problem.

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Does a World as a Whole Exist ?

Satoshi SUGANUMA

2000 Volume 2000 Issue 51 Pages 278-288
Published: May 01, 2000
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2000.278

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In a metaphysical or ontological context in general, the word “world” or “universe” is used in two different meanings. One means a relative whole, beyond or out of which something else (e. g. “God”, “things in themselves”) can exist, and another means an absolute whole, beyond or out of which nothing whatsoever can exist. In this paper, I treat the latter, and ask whether such a World as an absolute whole (abbreviated as “W”) exists.
There are two major problems about the existence of W. The first is a logical problem usually appeared in Set Theories as a Cantorian Paradox, caused by supposing an unconditional totality of which everything is a part. And the second is a problem whether the alleged possible way W exists is compatible with certain philosophical standpoints like Quinian “Ontological Relativism”.
I discuss both problems and conclude that neither is a threat to the existence of W, and it can be safely established.

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