Objectivity and Inter-subjectivity of Scientific Knowledge

Abstract

Recently, a controversy occuered in the United States between scientists on the one hand, and researchers of science studies (sociologists of science and cultural theorists., etc.) on the other hand. In these so-called "Science Wars", Bruno Latour was criticized by scientists as a "relativist", who tried to reduce scientific knowledge to inter-subjective construction.
This criticism was due to misunderstanding, because his books only describe how scientific facts are confirmed. But he was, in part, responsible for this misunderstanding, because he didn't consider what the facts are and denied the importance of scientific theory.
To supplement his argument, I consider scientific theory as a summary of nature and a system of operations. I distinguish four kinds of scientific facts: "the fact explained", "the fact that explains", "the fact that explains the fact that explains" and "the fact predicted". Scientists would also agree that the latter three facts were constructed in the history of science. But was "the fact explained" constructed?
This is a subtle question. The first facts explained are everyday facts. And all sciences, including humanities like philosophy, are constructed on the basis of everyday facts. On the other hand, everyday facts can be also modified as a result of scientific research or philosophical reflection.
This reciprocity between everyday facts and sciences poses a difficult question about the basis of sciences. We philosophers must challenge it.