ピュロン主義とアカデメイア派との相違について 「把握不可能性」の主張と「探求」概念を手掛かりに

田中 龍山

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2002.177

Scepticism as inquiry

Pyrrhonism and the New Academy

Ryuzan TANAKA

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2002 Volume 2002 Issue 53 Pages 177-187,244

DOI https://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2002.177

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Published: April 01, 2002 Received: - Available on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009 Accepted: - Advance online publication: - Revised: -
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Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: ABSTRACT Details: Wrong : The New Academy is characterized by two features: a thesis, viz. that all things are incognitive (henceforth I), and a recommendation, viz. that we should suspend judgement about them (henceforth S).
According to Sextus, New Academics make the affirmation, whereas Pyrrhonists only announce I as their own state of mind. But Sextus does not include Arcesilaus in New Academy and says "Arcesilaus certainly seems to me to have something in common with what the Pyrrhonists say" (PH 1. 232). Moreover, Sextus does not argue against Arcesilaus' notion "eulogon(the reasonable)". The point I want to make is that Carneades' notion "pithanon(the plausible)" played an important role in weakening Scepticism. Through this notion, I was affirmed as the New Academics' own position and S was modified. The pithanon as "supremely perfect judgement" (M 7. 181)ruled out persisting in inquiry, which is a definitive feature of Pyrrhonism.
Right : The New Academy is characterized by two features: a thesis, viz. that all things are incognitive (henceforth I), and a recommendation, viz. that we should suspend judgement about them (henceforth S).
According to Sextus, New Academics make the affirmation, whereas Pyrrhonists only announce I as their own state of mind. But Sextus does not include Arcesilaus in New Academy and says "Arcesilaus certainly seems to me to have something in common with what the Pyrrhonists say" (PH 1. 232). Moreover, Sextus does not argue against Arcesilaus' notion "eulogon(the reasonable)". The point I want to make is that Carneades' notion "pithanon(the plausible)" played an important role in weakening Scepticism. Through this notion, I was affirmed as the New Academics' own position and S was modified. The pithanon as "supremely perfect judgement" (M 7. 181)ruled out persisting in inquiry, which is a definitive feature of Pyrrhonism.

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: CITATION Details: Wrong : Annas, J., "The Heirs of Socrates" Phronesis 33 (1988)
Burnayeat, M., "Can the Sceptic live his Scepticism?", in Schofield, M., et al. eds., Doubt and Dogmatism, (Oxford 1980)
Bett. R., "Carneades' Pithanon" Oxford Studies in ancient Philosophy. 7 (1989)
Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics, (London/New York 1995)
Ioppolo, A. M., Opinione e Scienza (Bibliopolis 1986)
Janacek, K, Sextus Empiricus' Secptical Methods, (Prague 1972)
Long, A. A. & Sedly, D. N., The Hellenistic Philodopers, (Cambridge 1987)
McPherran, M. L., "Atraxia and Eudaimonia in ancient Pyrrhonism" Proceeding of Boston Area Colloquium in ancient Philosophy, 5 (1989)
Maconi, H., "Nova non philosophandi philosophia" Oxford Studies in ancient Philosophy 6 (1988)
Mate, B., The Skeptic Way, (Oxford 1996)

Right : Annas, J., "The Heirs of Socrates" Phronesis 33 (1988)
Burnayeat, M., "Can the Sceptic live his Scepticism?", in Schofield, M., et al. eds., Doubt and Dogmatism, (Oxford 1980)
Bett. R., "Carneades' Pithanon" Oxford Studies in ancient Philosophy. 7 (1989)
Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics, (London/New York 1995)
Ioppolo, A. M., Opinione e Scienza (Bibliopolis 1986)
Janacek, K, Sextus Empiricus' Secptical Methods, (Prague 1972)
Long, A. A. & Sedly, D. N., The Hellenistic Philodopers, (Cambridge 1987)
McPherran, M. L., "Atraxia and Eudaimonia in ancient Pyrrhonism" Proceeding of Boston Area Colloquium in ancient Philosophy, 5 (1989)
Maconi, H., "Nova non philosophandi philosophia" Oxford Studies in ancient Philosophy 6 (1988)
Mate, B., The Skeptic Way, (Oxford 1996)

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: PDF FILE Details: -

Abstract

The New Academy is characterized by two features: a thesis, viz. that all things are incognitive (henceforth I), and a recommendation, viz. that we should suspend judgement about them (henceforth S).
According to Sextus, New Academics make the affirmation, whereas Pyrrhonists only announce I as their own state of mind. But Sextus does not include Arcesilaus in New Academy and says "Arcesilaus certainly seems to me to have something in common with what the Pyrrhonists say" (PH 1. 232). Moreover, Sextus does not argue against Arcesilaus' notion "eulogon(the reasonable)". The point I want to make is that Carneades' notion "pithanon(the plausible)" played an important role in weakening Scepticism. Through this notion, I was affirmed as the New Academics' own position and S was modified. The pithanon as "supremely perfect judgement" (M 7. 181)ruled out persisting in inquiry, which is a definitive feature of Pyrrhonism.

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