Improvement of usage efficiency on Free-floating car sharing by introducing flexible contract form

Abstract

In this paper, we study a vehicle allocation method based on a flexible contract form to improve the usage efficiency of free-floating car sharing. Free-floating car sharing allows users to start and end use anywhere within the area. It is convenient in that one-way use is possible, but it causes car imbalance. To solve this problem, we have proposed a distributed regulation method in which users negotiate the transit position. However, in a situation where users' negotiating requests are generated dynamically, it is important to decide when to participate in the negotiation. If users take a cautious participation attitude, they decrease negotiation success rate. To solve this problem, we introduce a flexible contract form referring to the leveled-commitment contract, which allows a contract cancellation by paying a penalty. In the context of car sharing, we investigate how penalties changes users' behavior and utility using simulations.