The Shifting and Diversifying Legal Bases of the Use of Force in Libya: From Civilian Protection to Counter-Terrorism

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors contributing to the prolonged Libyan civil war with military interventions since 2011 from the perspective of shifts and diversification in the international legal bases asserted by the intervening states for their use of force. While previous research has pointed out various domestic and international issues contributing to the prolongation of the Libyan civil war, there has been a division of perspectives regarding international factors. Some argue that major powers did not commit sufficient military force to address the conflict, while others point to the problem of the provision of weapons and mercenaries by major powers and relevant countries to factions in the Libyan civil war.

The issue at hand is that even if major powers were to decide on a full-scale commitment of military force or a complete cessation of military support, as suggested in the preceding research, it is not easy for them to persuade a wide array of relevant countries to act consistently with such decisions. This paper investigates why it is difficult for major powers to persuasively control the use of force by relevant countries, whose legality is not necessarily clear. It does so by focusing on the “unwilling or unable” criteria [doctrine; formula; standard; test; theory], which is a feature of the justification for the use of force under international laws commonly employed by relevant countries, including major powers.

This paper highlights the issue of relevant countries using the “unwilling or unable” criteria to shift and diversify the international legal bases for the use of force in Libya. It then discusses why this shifts and diversification should be scrutinized as a significant factor contributing to the prolonged use of force in Libya.