Pre-Electoral Coalition, Politics of Blame, and Going Public

Abstract

This article examines how “going public” strategy, by which the governors promote themselves or their bills to voters, works for executive-legislative relations in Japanese local government. Although some case studies suggest that by going public Japanese governors can pressure the assembly to accept their offer, this article reveals that, ceteris paribus, public appeal can lead to institutional gridlock. Hence when the chief executives are supported by a large pre-electoral coalition in the previous election, they will not go public too often, that is, remain silent or “stay private” on their policy agenda to keep the coalition stable.

The “politics of blame” framework enables us to explain why some governors dare to go public despite this negative effect of the strategy. Introducing the constituents as a third-party audience into the governor-assembly veto bargaining, under some conditions amending or rejecting the proposals will result in less popular support for incumbent assembly members. This article tests these propositions empirically, measuring going public by the number of press conferences.