Why do Some Religions Call for Justification Based on Science? : An Analytic Philosophical Study with the Case of Creationism

Abstract

This paper deals with the entangled situation between religion and science at the present day from the viewpoint of Analytic Philosophy. I especially take up the case of Creationism, that is, why its science-oriented offshoots, Creation Science and Intelligent Design, call for justification based on science. These are good examples to represent the tendency in some religious ideas to take for granted the dominant authority of science over all others. The analysis of this problem demands two notions, "conceptual scheme" as represented by Analytic Philosopher W. V. O. Quine, and "language-game" by L. Wittgenstein. First of all, when understanding religion and science as conceptual schemes or language-games, their distinction becomes obvious. Then I assume a "meta-conceptual-scheme" that chooses appropriate conceptual schemes / language-games according to the situation. There is also supposed to be an interaction between meta-conceptual-scheme and conceptual schemes / language-games. This is the "Double Conceptual Scheme Theory" that I suggest. When this is applied to the problem of Creationism, the complication of religion and science can be dissolved. Furthermore, this theory overcomes the drawbacks of conceptual relativism like Wittgensteinian Fideism.