イギリス哲学研究
Online ISSN : 2433-4731
Print ISSN : 0387-7450
論文
ロックの物そのもの
―ヨルトン説の批判的検討―
青木 滋之
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ジャーナル フリー

2003 年 26 巻 p. 21-38

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It has been debated whether Locke holds direct realism or representative theory of perception. This paper examines the key concept, things themselves, to help determine that Locke is really a supporter of representative theory of perception. Yolton's view of things themselves — its emphasis on natural history of the day — is criticized for not adequately dealing with another decisive feature of things themselves — the corpuscular structure of the body. With this latter concept considered, Locke's idea should be seen as immediate object of mind, indicating that things themselves cannot be perceived in a direct way.

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© 2003 日本イギリス哲学会
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