Abstract
In this paper, we examine the Schelling's criticism on the evil in Augustinus and define Schelling's evil (in Freiheitsschrift) by comparing with Augustinus' concept of the evil. The evil in Augustinus is not understood just as privation and differs from Schelling's castigation. The acts of human that cause such privation are the matter of ultimate importance for Augustinus, because the genuine reality of the evil lies one's inside, who acts against the personality of God and falls into Nothing (nihil). The Nothing gives us the basis (possibility) of the evil although God itself is a pure being. Augustinus distinguishes the evil from God, therefore, the evil is real for us but not for God.
On the contrary, in Schelling, the basis of the evil comes from Grund of God itself and that is the nature in God (Natur-in-Gott) and the real thing. Accordingly, while the evil is caused by human, it becomes so powerful that human could not control and it pours out into the world to be against to the love which is God itself.
On the evil subject, both Augustinus and Schelling understand the evil as real, whereas they take difference of viewpoints for the reality of the evil. Especially in Schelling, the evil is comprehended as the other confronting the personality of God. The system in Freiheitsschrift is formed by including the other
