Civil servants of Tokyo city government in the late Meiji era : an analysis of personnel management

Abstract

This paper examines the personnel management problems of Tokyo city government and the measures taken to counteract them. And, based on Shinji SUGAYAMA's theory of employees and the case of Tokyo city, this paper presents a hypothesis for the labour market of public officials. Tokyo city needed to improve the employment stability of its staff. Salaries were therefore raised regularly, and pension rules were revised favorably. However, the number of poorly paid civil servants kept increasing because the rate of salary raises was lower than that of prices and the average wages in Tokyo. And they had no job security. The staff turnover decreased but did not disappear. The city needed to eliminate employment through favoritism. An employment rule was therefore established, providing that that only those who passed the city employment test or had proper educational background were qualified. But this rule was not applied rigorously, and employment through favoritism continued rampant. The labour market of public officials in the late Meiji era was characterized by frequent job-hopping, an oversupply of labour, and poor working conditions. Educational background was not considered an important qualification.