Supply Chain Coordination with Asymmetric Information Based on Time-Based Price Discounts

Abstract

　In this paper, we discuss a problem to expand Heydari Jafar’s model. We consider an inventory control model consisting of a seller and a buyer in a supply chain. Demand is random variable. In particular, the demand during lead time is a random variable with N(λ, ξ²). The buyer uses the inventory system while keeping safety inventory larger and filling customers’ request better. On the other hand, we consider asymmetric information in our model. There are some different properties in the seller and buyer. Then, each of members must take in account how one’s own behavior is important. When we propose the seller for a replacement cycle inventory model with time-based price discount and give the buyer the requirement quantity in our model, we show that both members are win-win relationship. We can show that our model is modified to screening game problem.