Abstract
This paper introduces four specific materials to discuss the complex and difficult negotiations of the United States and Japan during the London Naval Conference of 1930. The first is a telegram sent by Stimson, head of the American delegation, to President Hoover which shows that before the conference opened Stimson had resisted the Japanese firm claim for a 10:7 ratio in auxiliary vessels because the United States Senate would not accept it when it was submitted. As the conference went on, however, Stimson received a telegram from William R. Castle, the American Ambassador to Japan, reporting about the current situation in Japan and Castle's impression on how the Japanese leaders like Shidehara Kijuro were thinking. Stimson sent a confidential letter to President on February, 17 to give him some background information about the progress made in the conference so far. Furthermore, he expressed his expectation that Wakatsuki Reijiro, head of the Japanese delegation, would make a decision to accept the American proposition. Stimson explained the benefits of the three-power agreement for the United States in the hearings before the United States Foreign Relations Committee on May 12, 13, and 14. Ultimately, the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was ratified by a vote of 58 to 9.
