Political leadership of a paramount prime minister

The case of internal Army dispute during the 1st Ito Hirobumi Cabinet

Abstract

The Japanese cabinet system, which was instituted on 22 December 1885, was invested with strong powers of authority through a legislative stipulation that the prime minister must cosign all acts and all imperial edicts, thus making him the central, paramount figure in Japanese politics. These cabinet powers were further substantiated by the enactment of an official document style protocol, which stipulated that it was the cabinet which was solely responsible for drafting all legislation, thus clearly delineating the responsibilities of cabinet ministers and the monarchical infallibility of the emperor in the affairs of governance.
　 As such powers of the prime minister were being formally institutionalized, the issue of the selection of ministers of military affairs arose around what scale of military preparation should be undertaken under the new cabinet system, resulting in a difference of opinion between civilian ministers headed by Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru and Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, and the Imperial Army main faction represented by Minister of War Oyama Iwao. That is to say, in response to legislative proposals to reform commissioned officer promotions and the Army’s oversight of military affairs put forth by the main faction, the opposing faction led by four field generals expressed strong opposition to the proposed introduction of mandatory retirement and the dissolution of the Army’s Office of Military Oversight.
　Although Prime Minister Ito was apparently partial to the position of the four generals, he adopted a neutral stand in the dispute, by delaying his legislative cosigning authority to block Oyama’s demand for quick action on the two reform proposals, then after evaluating the actions of the main faction and civilian ministers, exercised his ultimate prerogative by consolidating the demands of both factions with the opinion of Emperor Meiji, who was on friendly terms with the four generals faction.
　 In the end Ito and civilian ministers took the side of the Army’s main faction in the military preparedness dispute, and Ito also continued to regard the Army as a top priority. Furthermore, through reconciling the Emperor with the Ministry of War and gaining the Emperor’s consent to his decisions, Ito succeeded in clarifying the function of cabinet minister authority and the role of the Emperor’s monarchical infallibility.
　 The author concludes that the resolution of this internal Army dispute was made possible by the prime minister’s paramount authority to cosign all acts and imperial edicts under the stipulations of cabinet responsibilities and the official documentary style protocol, while at the same time exemplifying the political leadership style of Ito Hirobumi: namely, firmly ascertaining who were the important stakeholders involved before making any political decision.