When studying the history of the Qin and Han Dynasties, the clarification of personal relationships in village society will not only elucidate one of the unique characteristics of the period, but also offer an important topic related to the formation of the ancient Chinese state. While following the conventional research focus on martial arts-related chivalry （renxia 任侠） and peerage system, as well as regional and kinship ties, this article analyzes the existing documentation （both excavated and compiled） in order to identify what constituted breaking the law and the principles by which relationships between lawbreakers and those saving them to justice were formed.
　 The author begins with an examination of legal codes recorded in the bamboo document collections Shuihude Qinmu Zujian 睡虎地秦墓竹簡， unearthed from a Qin period tomb in Hubei in 1975, Yuelushuyuanzang Qinjian 嶽麓書院藏秦簡， Qin period sources held by the Hunan University Yuelu Library, and Ernian Luling 二年律令， which contains early Han period legal codes, in order to confirm that those relationships were indeed personal, either kinship or other types of affiliation （suozhi 所知）, meaning that lawbreakers were closely tied to their relatives and acquaintances.
Next the author ascertains from the legal sources that the state entrusted only kin and acquaintances with the precarious tasks of apprehending lawbreakers, confirming that the structure of kinship and other forms of affiliation in the Yuelu collection can also be observed in the writings of Mozi 墨子．
The author then turns to such Mohist influenced works as the Lushi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋 compendium of pre-Qin philosophy and Sima Qian’s Shiji 史記， which extols the art of chivalry, in order to confirm that the personal bond involving risking one’s life in repayment of gratitude was an indispensable element of acquaintanceship （zhi 知）. He concludes that the Yuelu collection shows the impact of the Qin Dynasty’s incursion into regions heavily influenced by Mohist and chivalry motifs.
Finally, the author confirms from the Qin legal sources that policy directions pursued in state governance fully embraced interhuman relationships based on zhi acquaintanceship, showing that small groups organized in eastern and southern rural communities according to kinship and chivalry-based affiliation were perceived by the state as the foundation of society and providers of its legitimization to rule.

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The Japanese cabinet system, which was instituted on 22 December 1885, was invested with strong powers of authority through a legislative stipulation that the prime minister must cosign all acts and all imperial edicts, thus making him the central, paramount figure in Japanese politics. These cabinet powers were further substantiated by the enactment of an official document style protocol, which stipulated that it was the cabinet which was solely responsible for drafting all legislation, thus clearly delineating the responsibilities of cabinet ministers and the monarchical infallibility of the emperor in the affairs of governance.
　 As such powers of the prime minister were being formally institutionalized, the issue of the selection of ministers of military affairs arose around what scale of military preparation should be undertaken under the new cabinet system, resulting in a difference of opinion between civilian ministers headed by Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru and Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, and the Imperial Army main faction represented by Minister of War Oyama Iwao. That is to say, in response to legislative proposals to reform commissioned officer promotions and the Army’s oversight of military affairs put forth by the main faction, the opposing faction led by four field generals expressed strong opposition to the proposed introduction of mandatory retirement and the dissolution of the Army’s Office of Military Oversight.
　Although Prime Minister Ito was apparently partial to the position of the four generals, he adopted a neutral stand in the dispute, by delaying his legislative cosigning authority to block Oyama’s demand for quick action on the two reform proposals, then after evaluating the actions of the main faction and civilian ministers, exercised his ultimate prerogative by consolidating the demands of both factions with the opinion of Emperor Meiji, who was on friendly terms with the four generals faction.
　 In the end Ito and civilian ministers took the side of the Army’s main faction in the military preparedness dispute, and Ito also continued to regard the Army as a top priority. Furthermore, through reconciling the Emperor with the Ministry of War and gaining the Emperor’s consent to his decisions, Ito succeeded in clarifying the function of cabinet minister authority and the role of the Emperor’s monarchical infallibility.
　 The author concludes that the resolution of this internal Army dispute was made possible by the prime minister’s paramount authority to cosign all acts and imperial edicts under the stipulations of cabinet responsibilities and the official documentary style protocol, while at the same time exemplifying the political leadership style of Ito Hirobumi: namely, firmly ascertaining who were the important stakeholders involved before making any political decision.

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While analogies have been drawn in terms of political culture between Bonapartism and Boulangism, little historical research has been conducted on the activities of the Bonapartists during the Boulanger Affair of 1886―89. This article focuses on the group known as the Victoriens （also known as the Imperialistes）, the conservative wing of the Bonapartist party during the 1880s, which demanded the imperial succession of Prince Victor over Prince Napoléon-Jérôme. The author’s aim is to analyze the group’s attitudes toward Boulangism, which is widely recognized as a turning point in the history of the French right.
　The author begins with an analysis of the present situation facing the Victoriens at the time, characterized by an intense conflict between Paul de Cassagnac and Robert Mitchell as to whether to support or oppose the Union des Droites, a conservative parliamentary group of monarchists and imperialists. This confrontation caused an upsurge in the number of imperialist committees in the Seine Department, all divided into Cassagnaquist right and Mitchellist left wingers. It was while Prince Victor and the central committee were trying to bring this internal Victorien conflict under control in the spring of 1888 that a new crisis arose in the heightening of Boulangism.
　 While the various imperialist factions could be found expressing different opinions ranging from criticism to advocacy of Boulanger’s call for republican reform and revenge against Germany （revanchment） during his political ascendancy of 1886―7, beginning in 1888, when funding by monarchists and support by dissident radical republicans clearly delineated Boulangism as an anti-parliamentary republic movement, most of the Victoriens were indeed espousing this constitutional revision movement and shelving their ideals regarding the reconstruction of the Empire. To the contrary, the author’s analysis of the opinions of the its leaders and the activities of the imperialist committees in the Seine department shows that there was no consistent policy or movement within the Victoriens to deal with Boulangism.
　After the fall of Boulangism and in the process of reorganizing the Party during the early 1890s, the Bonapartists changed their slogan from “imperialist” to “plebiscite”, as their ralliement to the cause of the republic progressed, while their fundamental purpose of reestablishing the Empire receded into the background. In the light of such events, the author concludes that the Boulanger Affair accelerated the dismantling of Bonapartism, which had already been crumbling since the early 1880s.

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