Combining Weber and Bergson: On Alfred Schütz’s Theory of Freedom

Abstract

  This paper aims to clarify Alfred Schütz’s theory of freedom in The Meaningful Construction of the Social World with a focus on the moment of “decision” and by examining the influence of Weber and Bergson, whose concepts of freedom are diametrically opposed. How can Schütz reconcile their theories? In the first section, we examine Weber’s theory of freedom, which argues that when we clearly recognize an end and the means to achieve it, we “must” rationally decide what to do. For Weber, such a rational choice is free. Therefore, we call this “rational freedom theory.” Yet, as we show in the second section, Bergson says the opposite, arguing that our decision “emanates” from the totality of our mind, which is “duration.” Thus, we do not know why we decide what we decide. For Bergson, free acts occur accordingly. Therefore, we call this “irrational freedom theory.” In the third section, we interpret how Schütz reconciles these two opposing theories. Schütz builds on Weber’s rational freedom theory and constructs a rational theory of projects, but he also applies Bergson’s irrational freedom theory to the moment the project is chosen, contending that the choice itself involves some irrational factors. Thus, Schütz combines these two theories into a single theory of freedom.