This paper attempts to defend liberal theories of multiculturalism by engaging in a re-examination of the ideal of exits proposed by various critics of liberal multiculturalism. It begins by outlining the prototype of liberal multicultural theories in reference to early works of Will Kymlicka. It then attempts to respond to the libertarian theory of exit presented by Chandran Kukathas, which sticks to the unrealistic idea that all oppressed people within minority cultures can exercise the right to exit without any further state assistance. It also attempts to respond to the liberal egalitarian theory of exit presented by Susan Okin, which states that multicultural rights should be nullified due to the oppressive tendencies against women. Finally, it responds to the idea of exit across borders and concludes that even this version of exit exercised across borders requires decent state power that protects citizens and non-citizens alike.

  This article seeks to identify the fundamental weaknesses of Locke’s theory of toleration, and argues that we can overcome them by adopting the theories of liberty of conscience which were developed in America by Roger Williams and James Madison among others. The author begins by showing that Locke concentrates on establishing the magistrate’s duty of toleration (in the sense of his duty to refrain from using force in religious matters), without adequately defending the value of each person’s liberty of conscience, or the equal protection of it. He examines Locke’s view that liberty of conscience undermines a stable social order, and contrasts it with the view, held by Williams, that conscience is a precious, inviolable moral power possessed by all human beings. The author further claims that Williams’s introduction of the device of ‘accommodation’ reveals his stronger commitment to the equal protection of liberty of conscience, while arguing that Madison’s refusal to accept the states fthe state’s financial support for Christianity, as well as his general anti-establishmentarianism, shows a firmer commitment to the equal protection of liberty of conscience than Locke’s theory. Thus, the author argues towards the conclusion that a viable theory of liberty of conscience should be so formulated as to incorporate the insights and arguments of the two American thinkers.

  Manchurians established the Qing empire, which contained various ethnic groups such as Mongolians, Han Chinese, Tibetans, and Turkic Muslims, in the 17th century. In the late 19th century, modern Western thoughts were extensively introduced into the Qing empire. The idea of nationalism spread among the Han Chinese, the majority in the population, who overthrew the Qing and established the Republic of China.

  The Chinese Nationalist Party came to power in the late 1920s. It was based on Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles of the People, aiming to build a homogeneous nation and implement a constitutional government. However, in 1949, the Nationalists were defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan.

  The CCP initially had a negative attitude toward nationalism. However, when Mao Zedong took over leadership in 1930s, he began to advocate for the Sinicization of Marxism and affirm patriotism. The People’s Republic of China, established by the CCP, officially recognized “ethnic minorities” within the country and implemented a regional ethnic autonomy system. However, the scope of such autonomy was extremely limited. Furthermore, liberalism and “ethnic minority” cultures were thoroughly destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.

  In modern China, nationalism and liberalism have often been in conflict. Furthermore, the Han Chinese, including liberalists, with their overwhelming population and cultural pride, have been generally less concerned about the problems of non-Han ethnic groups. However, the extent to which these factors are unique to China requires further studies and comparison with cases in other regions.

  The role of commentator of this panel consists in finding links between actual debate on multiculturalism in United States, development of the notion of tolerance in England and in North America of 17th and 18th centuries, and difficult conciliation of liberalism with nationalism in modern China. Because of his specialty and the locality of the colloquium, French and Japanese contexts also are considered.

  If liberal social praxis today in United States sometimes attempts to solve contradictions between multiculturalism and feminism by means of accommodation, the genealogy of this device goes back to the efforts of Roger Williams, who tried to assure the equal right to freedom of conscience to all members of different religious or ethnic communities in his American plantation in 17th century. Thus, he expanded and deepened Locke’s notion of toleration. In its resistance to Anglo-Saxon model of multiculturalism, France is not eager to call for accommodation to attenuate conflictual religious matters.

  Recently the notion of hospitality tends to replace that of tolerance in French philosophical context. While the latter is a geographically and historically limited experience linked to Christian Reform, the former designates an ethos inherent to any cultural entity. While capital punishment is currently in force in China, United States and Japan, one wonders how to justify its abolishment as praxis of tolerance and/or hospitality.

  This paper intends to reveal the influence of the acceptance of Neo-Kantian philosophy in Japan, especially during the 1910’s to 20’s. The acceptance of Neo-Kantian philosophy in Japan has played a significant role not only as the translation of and the introduction of Western philosophy but also in the generation of Japanese philosophy. In Japan, Neo-Kantian philosophy tends to be grasped as the current of thought which had been introduced enthusiastically in the Taisho period and which had been replaced later by the philosophy of life and ontological philosophy of Heidegger. However, on the other hand, it cultivated the philosophical environment for the younger generation such as Miki Kiyoshi, Kosaka Masaaki and Shimomura Torataro.

  I attempt to compare the interpretation of Neo-Kantianism by Nishida, Tanabe, Souda and Miki, focusing on the concept of individual causality. This concept, which Souda treated under the influence of Heinrich Rickert, provoked the disputation between Souda and Tanabe. It seemed to be the point of divergence of the later transition of them.

  Miki tried to adopt the concept of individual causality in his own concept of historical causality. After studying in Germany, however, he turned his standpoint to Heidegger’s ontology. His study of comparing Rickert and Weber over scientific methods has been critically inherited by post-war study on Weber.

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 20J40206.

  This paper clarifies that the postwar enlightenment activities conceived and practiced by “The Foundation 20th Century Research Institute,” a group of intellectuals established just after the end of the war, that not only sought to reintroduce prewar ideas and theories that had regressed during wartime, but also aimed to appreciate them once again in harmony with the intellectual climate that prevailed immediately after the end of the war. The institute also sought to engage in detailed explanation and criticism of these ideas and theories from the standpoint of the members’ specializations. In the analysis, in addition to the results of the author’s recent survey of materials, particular attention is paid to the official documents related to the 20th Century Research Institute, which have been newly confirmed at the National Archives of Japan.

  The author’s research reveals a list of lectures held by the institute in various locations, as well as the publication of shorthand transcripts of lectures and serial publications, highlighting that the institute was more actively engaged in various other activities than has been previously thought. Being so active in this regard, the institute sought to instill in its members, an attitude of thinking and acting for themselves rather than unquestioningly accepting government and military propaganda, as was the case during the prewar and wartime periods, or aimlessly following the mindset and spirit of powerful political figures or people of influence in the government and the military.

  Through these activities of the 20th Century Research Institute, it emerges that the institute attempted to envision and implement what we may call a “postwar period of ideas.” Amidst a climate that prioritized hasty changes in various fields, the activities of the 20th Century Research Institute are noteworthy for being an aspect of the ideological movement in Japan just after the end of the war.

  This paper aims to clarify Alfred Schütz’s theory of freedom in The Meaningful Construction of the Social World with a focus on the moment of “decision” and by examining the influence of Weber and Bergson, whose concepts of freedom are diametrically opposed. How can Schütz reconcile their theories? In the first section, we examine Weber’s theory of freedom, which argues that when we clearly recognize an end and the means to achieve it, we “must” rationally decide what to do. For Weber, such a rational choice is free. Therefore, we call this “rational freedom theory.” Yet, as we show in the second section, Bergson says the opposite, arguing that our decision “emanates” from the totality of our mind, which is “duration.” Thus, we do not know why we decide what we decide. For Bergson, free acts occur accordingly. Therefore, we call this “irrational freedom theory.” In the third section, we interpret how Schütz reconciles these two opposing theories. Schütz builds on Weber’s rational freedom theory and constructs a rational theory of projects, but he also applies Bergson’s irrational freedom theory to the moment the project is chosen, contending that the choice itself involves some irrational factors. Thus, Schütz combines these two theories into a single theory of freedom.

  Marx pointed out that ‘freedom’ in modern bourgeois society has a double meaning; while each person, as a free personality, has the right to dispose of his or her own labour power at will, they are free to starve because they are detached from the objective conditions of labour and reproduction. Many commentators have understood this assertion of Marx’s as a criticism of the fact that freedom in bourgeois society is only a formal guarantee of rights, and have seen Marx’s theory of freedom as a criticism of bourgeois egoism. Such an interpretation, however, results from a failure to engage adequately with the analysis of freedom in Das Kapital and its earlier drafts. Marx criticised the fact that in bourgeois society, being a commodity owner is required as a condition of freedom in order to be free, and that the ownerless, deprived of the objective conditions of labour and reproduction, are necessarily forced and crippled to sell their labour power in order to be free in the commodity economy. This paper aims to illuminate Marx’s idea of the decoupling of freedom and property, focusing in particular on the original manuscripts of Kritik der politischen Ökonomie.

  This study considers Hans Kohn’s concept of polity. There are two distinct interpretations. Some emphasize his coherent inclination toward a multinational society, where each nation has collective politico-cultural rights. Others insist that, in the 1930s, Kohn accepted a civic-national state model in which political ideas function as the most fundamental tie regardless of national identity, at least institutionally. Scrutinizing his discourse on the Austrian empire, this study concludes that the two theses are not contradictory. Kohn insisted that Austria should have been transformed into a multinational federation based on the idea of cultural autonomy, which he tried to introduce in Palestine until he emigrated to the US in 1934. In the US, however, although Kohn continued to lament that Austria missed out on becoming a multinational federation, he never addressed cultural autonomy in his discussions on that country. Instead, he emphasized the “Austrian Idea,” which he believed could have convinced inhabitants of the need for a supra- and multinational state structure. As long as Kohn kept hinting at the multinational federalization of the Austrian empire, he adhered to the idea of a multinational polity. Rather than cultural autonomy, he adopted an idea (i.e., the Austrian Idea) as a silver bullet, which illustrates that the civic-national state model infiltrated his thought.

  Unemployment categories are historical and social constructs. Genealogical studies of unemployment have shown that unemployment did not exist a priori but was created by institutions and discourses. However, further research is needed on how social structural changes have changed the unemployment categories held by individuals. This paper analyzes unemployment categories in France from 1789 to 1914. It focuses on the process by which unemployment changed from a moral issue to a social risk. During the French Revolution and in the économie politique of the 1830s, the unemployed were incorporated into the category of the “false poor” who refused to work and were regarded as lazy. On the other hand, économie sociale criticized classical equilibrium theory based on the overproduction theory and turned the unemployment category into a structural problem. The école de Le Play understood unemployment as the periodic factory shutdown, but solidarisme redefined unemployment as an accidental social risk. This categorical change was related to the economic structure transformations after 1873, especially the development of heavy industry and international market competition. At the same time, scholarly conflicts shaped the way the phenomenon of lack of work was understood.