Potentialities of we-mode cognitive neuroscience: Comments on Sato’s article

Abstract

‘We-mode’ cognitive neuroscience aims to elucidate the internal cognitive processes of individuals undergoing interactions with others. This is qualitatively different from the traditional ‘third-person’ social neuroscience, i.e., observation of other’s actions that is accomplished by the so-called mirror neuron system, or the ‘theory of mind’ processes. In the we-mode cognitive neuroscience, it is emphasized that the individual must have a representation that is shared with others to perform joint actions. This shared representation would involve the goal of the task, knowledge about the relevant part of the task for which the individual is responsible, and the perspective of others participating in the ongoing task. In this short comment on the article by Sato, I would like to discuss several potentialities of we-mode cognitive neuroscience, i.e., the we-mode mirror neuron system that is under the influence of a ‘higher’ representation of others, and the we-mode ‘theory of mind’ that is endowed with an automatic and implicit representation of others. It appears promising that we can extend the existing framework of the traditional social cognition studies, in which the mirror neuron system and the theory of minds are thought to reflect different functions of social cognition, by pursuing ‘we-mode’ cognitive neuroscience.