2013 年 23 巻 1 号 p. 21-27
The information available to the public following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident was found to be confusing. In particular, expert opinions were varied on safety and danger with regard to the effects of low-dose radiation exposure, which perplexed the public. Politicians and the mass media insisted that the irrational behavior of the public caused unnecessary damage. However, the public was unable to understand the radiation health risk; therefore, it was natural that feelings of uncertainty intensified affective reactions, which in turn invited chaos. The public worried about food and water contamination in spite of the low levels of monitoring data. This is the reason the government set very low regulation values for radioactivity in foods and drink without consideration of the principle of optimization that the International Commission on Radiological Protection had recommended. Although the concept of optimization is very important for understanding and managing risks after the disaster, the government and many scientists did not explain this adequately. I believe that the provision of various kinds of information on risk and the socioeconomic effects of various activities could enhance the interest of the public on radiation risk and its management strategy, and contribute to the understanding of the concept of optimization.