Do Losses Promote Cooperation? : Experimental Approach with the “Catastrophe Game”

Abstract

A disaster, such as a large earthquake, is a type of “catastrophe.” This study defines catastrophes as abrupt changes that occur from the sudden response of a system to a smooth change in the external condition. The purpose of this article is to identify the cooperative behavior when the catastrophe, the timing of which is ambiguous, occurs using the “Catastrophe Game” modified from the public goods game.

Our results show that (1) we could not observe the effect of advance notice of a catastrophe. On the other hand, (2) we found all victims' cooperative behavior after the catastrophe in the “Total Catastrophe Game”, in which the catastrophe occurred for all players. Similarly, we found (3) victims' cooperative behavior and (4) non-victims' cooperative behavior after the catastrophe in the “Partial Catastrophe Game”, in which the catastrophe occurred for a portion of the players.

We observed the same human behavior with respect to the occurrence of disasters as that of disasters in the frame of the experimental game. This study implies that advance notices and forecasts do not provide a sufficient effect to prevent a decrease in human behavior. Therefore, the problem exists for future research as to why people tend to cooperate when catastrophes occur and the identification of the type of information that is crucial for advance notices and forecasts to change human behavior.