Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to consider the details and the significance of Axel Honneth’s reification theory.
Honneth re-examines Gyorg Lukács’s reification theory based on his recognition theory. According to Honneth, the elementary form of recognition has priority over objective cognition ontogenetically and conceptuality, and is a condition of social interaction. Reification means the forgetfulness of this recognition, in other words, a kind of reduced attentiveness to recognition in the course of acts of objective cognition. Based on this concept, Honneth posits three forms of reification, namely reification of other persons, reification of nature, and self-reification, and then he analyzes social factors behind these reifications.
Honneth’s reification theory involves the refining and expansion of the notion of recognition. Especially, Honneth distinguishes the elementary form and the substantial forms of recognition, and in addition, he develops the concept of inner recognition in the relation to self. The features of Honneth’s reification theory are that (1) it suggests a ground of criticism that is immanent in the society; (2) it denies the alternative of genuine praxis or objective cognition. However, its weakness is that it does not sufficiently explain the historical character of reification and its relationship to social structure.
