抄録
In recent years, the "Private type MBO" has been noted in Japanese companies. "Private type MBO" means that the company exits from the stock market in order to realize the management of a long-term perspective and shift its fundamental Corporate Strategy. Also, amount of private type MBO has been increasing year by year, as can be seen in previous studies of MBO, which focus on how to influence stock prices and corporate values after MBO (DeAngelo et al, 1984; Kaplana, 1989; Wright et al, 2007); and on the problem of arbitrary profit adjusted by management (DeAngelo, 1986; Perry & Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997; Fisher and Louis, 2008; Tsukioka, 2011). This extensive literature that analyzes the overall trend of the economic effects of MBO, however, does not discuss the differences in MBO types. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to clarify the impact of the relationship between the management team and funds from the point of view of business content and outcome after MBO. As a result of the analysis, "Private type MBO" can be classified into three types. First, the “Performance-led type”, whose funds have strong influences, and puts emphasis on short-term profits, but its management does not take initiative on business. Second, the “Efficiency-led type”, which takes place when the management team is focused on medium- and long-term performance improvement, and on efficiency improvement of existing businesses. They have advantage over existing businesses, so they take initiative on business. Third, the “Innovation-led type”, which puts strength in the short-term perspective, creating a scenario where innovation activities may result in a decrease of the efficiency, while, by cooperative relationship based on the long-term perspective, management and fund build new strengths together.
