Information-Theoretic Perspectives for Simulation-Based Security in Multi-Party Computation

抄録

Information-theoretic security and computational security are fundamental paradigms of security in the theory of cryptography. The two paradigms interact with each other but have shown different progress, which motivates us to explore the intersection between them. In this paper, we focus on Multi-Party Computation (MPC) because the security of MPC is formulated by simulation-based security, which originates from computational security, even if it requires information-theoretic security. We provide several equivalent formalizations of the security of MPC under a semi-honest model from the viewpoints of information theory and statistics. The interpretations of these variants are so natural that they support the other aspects of simulation-based security. Specifically, the variants based on conditional mutual information and sufficient statistics are interesting because security proofs for those variants can be given by information measures and factorization theorem, respectively. To exemplify this, we show several security proofs of BGW (Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson) protocols, which are basically proved by constructing a simulator.