More Efficient Two-Round Multi-Signature Scheme with Provably Secure Parameters for Standardized Elliptic Curves

抄録

The existing discrete-logarithm-based two-round multi-signature schemes without using the idealized model, i.e., the Algebraic Group Model (AGM), have quite large reduction loss. This means that an implementation of these schemes requires an elliptic curve (EC) with a very large order for the standard 128-bit security when we consider concrete security. Indeed, the existing standardized ECs have orders too small to ensure 128-bit security of such schemes. Recently, Pan and Wagner proposed two two-round schemes based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption (EUROCRYPT 2023). For 128-bit security in concrete security, the first scheme can use the NIST-standardized EC P-256 and the second can use P-384. However, with these parameter choices, they do not improve the signature size and the communication complexity over the existing non-tight schemes. Therefore, there is no two-round scheme that (i) can use a standardized EC for 128-bit security and (ii) has high efficiency.

In this paper, we construct a two-round multi-signature scheme achieving both of them from the DDH assumption. We prove that an EC with at least a 321-bit order is sufficient for our scheme to ensure 128-bit security. Thus, we can use the NIST-standardized EC P-384 for 128-bit security. Moreover, the signature size and the communication complexity per one signer of our proposed scheme under P-384 are 1152 bits and 1535 bits, respectively. These are most efficient among the existing two-round schemes without using the AGM including Pan-Wagner's schemes and non-tight schemes which do not use the AGM. Our experiment on an ordinary machine shows that for signing and verification, each can be completed in about 65 ms under 100 signers. This shows that our scheme has sufficiently reasonable running time in practice.