A Strengthened PAKE Protocol with Identity-Based Encryption

抄録

In [2], Choi et al. proposed an identity-based password-authenticated key exchange (iPAKE) protocol using the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme, and its generic construction (UKAM-PiE) that was standardized in ISO/IEC 11770-4/AMD 1. In this paper, we show that the iPAKE and UKAM-PiE protocols are insecure against passive/active attacks by a malicious PKG (Private Key Generator) where the malicious PKG can find out all clients' passwords by just eavesdropping on the communications, and the PKG can share a session key with any client by impersonating the server. Then, we propose a strengthened PAKE (for short, SPAIBE) protocol with IBE, which prevents such a malicious PKG's passive/active attacks. Also, we formally prove the security of the SPAIBE protocol in the random oracle model and compare relevant PAKE protocols in terms of efficiency, number of passes, and security against a malicious PKG.