A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-b/2b

抄録

In this letter, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 7-round reduced block cipher Kalyna-b/2b, which has been approved as the new encryption standard of Ukraine (DSTU 7624:2014) in 2015. According to its designers, the cipher provides strength to several cryptanalytic methods after the fifth and sixth rounds of the versions with block length of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. Our attack is based on the differential enumeration approach, where we carefully deploy a four-round distinguisher in the first four rounds to bypass the effect of the carry bits resulting from the prewhitening modular key addition. We also exploit the linear relation between consecutive odd and even indexed round keys, which enables us to attack seven rounds and recover all the round keys incrementally. The attack on Kalyna with 128-bit block has a data complexity of 2⁸⁹ chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2^230.2 and a memory complexity of 2^202.64. The data, time and memory complexities of our attack on Kalyna with 256-bit block are 2²³³, 2^502.2 and 2¹⁷⁰, respectively.