朝鮮半島核危機の前史と起源―冷戦からポスト冷戦への転換を中心に―

抄録

This article aims to examine the origins of the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula from a historical perspective. For that purpose, the long process of confrontation between North Korea and the United States during the hot and the cold war in the peninsular is reviewed, with a focus on the role of the nuclear weapons both in the military and political context. The juxtaposition of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and the North-South competition is also given particular attention as a systemic factor that facilitated the nuclear proliferation in the peninsula, first as “atoms for peace” and then for military purpose.

North Korean nuclear program was launched with the assistance from the Soviet Union. But soon it became an independent and indigenous project, refusing foreign, even Soviet, interference, causing concerns over its secrecy. Even with its advanced intelligence capabilities, such as spy satellites, the U.S. had difficulties in finding out what was happening in Yongbyon. When North Korea seemed to get closer to the weapons program, the Reagan Administration began to take the “modest initiative” offering diplomatic contact as “carrots” for engagement. On the other hand, the following Bush Administration put more emphasis on “sticks” by demanding IAEA inspection as preconditions for bilateral meetings. American “two-track strategy” was met with North Korea’s own “two-track strategy” of multi-directional diplomacy and accelerated nuclearization. The collision of the two dual strategies, exacerbated by mutual distrust and misunderstanding, led to the outbreak of the crisis in the early 1990s.