In this paper, we study the determinants of dynamic investment and pricing policy of the imperfectly competitive firm.
Our model of the firm is based on the model formulated by Uzawa in [5], the most prominent feature of which is the "Penrose function" (adjustment costs), but different from his in some points. In particular, we assume, unlike Uzawa, a fixed coefficients technology to analyse "the problem of excess capacity."
It is proved that optimal policy exists uniquely under static expectations with respect to the future values of parameters and some other weak assumptions. The features of optimal solution are entirely different according to whether growth rate of demand (denoted by θ) is high (positive) or not (negative). If θ is high (low), the firm will grow in the long-run at the rate of θ (higher than θ) and may wish to hold excess capacity transitorily (permanently). Optimal price is constant during the periods when excess capacity is held.
Some comparative dynamic analyses are performed with respect to changes of parameters (prime costs, discount rate, θ and so on). The results of analyses are different according to θ being high or not, too.
Finally, the case of no adjustment costs (linear "Penrose function") is analysed in our model and compared with above results.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the structure of the Post-War Japanese money market with the sticky interest rates, and to estimate the influences, on the movements of money supply, of changes in cash currency brought about through the general government deficits and/or the net in-flow of foreign exchange accounts, and of the new issue of the government-bonds that is to be purchased by the private financial institutions such as commercial banks.
As a theoretical basis, an extended theory of "Credit-Expansion" is proposed, which describes the frame-work on the interdependency between credit-behavior of commercial banks and that of the public's liquidity preference by type. Credit behavior of commercial banks is assumed to be of a type of the credit-rationing, the actual basis of which is that the marginal internal rate of return on credit seems to be significantly higher than that of cost of accepting deposites, and that the deposite rates are legally held almost constant at the lower level, reflecting the coexistense of various size of banks in the Post-War Japanese financial markets with the sticky interest rates.
The empirical results are as follows: (i) The estimates for the parameters of equations for the public's liquidity preference by type seemed to be considerably plausible and also stable. (ii) The credit behavior of commercial banks appeared to have the structure of lag-distribution, (iii) The central bank's credit to commercial banks appears to change straight forward with bank-loans, and consequently (iv) An increase in holding of the government-bonds newly issued, by commercial banks, should lead to that of money supply through the gap between the speeds of adjustments of behavior of bank-loans and that of the public's behavior of liquidity preference by type.
This model has been established for the purpose of analysing the mechanism of interdependency between financial and real transactions in our country.

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The aggregation of labor has been considered with emphasis on the order of aggregation in the framework of, what I call, a "multi-level CES function." To investigate the order of aggregation among three factors (namely sex, occupation and education), a rigorous statistical test has been attempted. A test procedure has been performed in the framework of linear constraints on parameters of different equations. At the same time, the estimation procedure which was applied is capable of overcoming the problem of serial correlation and contemporaneous correlation in the disturbance terms, and the result seems to be reasonably successful.
The empirical result seems to indicate that the aggregation of labor proceeds by occupation→sex→education in the Japanese manufacturing industries. One economic implication of this result is that enterpreneurs allocate labor input by education at the first-stage. In other words, they decide how many educated or less educated workers should be hired at the first-stage in order to fulfill the total requirements of labor. Next stage allocates by sex, and the final stage allocates by occupation. This allocation procedure ensures the multi-stage maximization procedure which is one of the conditions for aggregation (or grouping). This is equivalent to say that employer ranks three factors by the order of education, sex and occupation in the hiring process. Also, it was found that the most substitutable factor among them is occupation. Next is education. Substitution possibility between male and female is relatively lower.
There are two remaining problems; one is that there may be an overlap between skill (occupation) and education (possibly sex also) in the actual hiring process. If all the classified labors are aggregated only once, this problem does not occur. So long as the multi-stage maximization is a condition for aggregation, this overlap problem may not be easily handled at least in empirical stages. Second is that we ignored age (or experience) of workers as a factor. Age or experience may be influencial in the hiring process. Technically speaking, this problem does not impose any difficulty. These two are the future subjects to be investigated.

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