The Economic Studies Quarterly
Online ISSN : 2185-4416
Print ISSN : 0557-109X
ISSN-L : 0557-109X
Volume 43, Issue 3
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
  • WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE EX POST ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM
    JAE-CHEOL KIM, BYONG-KOOK YOO
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 193-209
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The present paper examines the welfare effect of ex post rate-of-return regulation. Unlike the traditional rate-of-return regulation on a monopoly, the regulation is mainly for oligopolistic industries and of the ex post nature. At the end of each year, total revenue of the firms as a whole is calculated. If the revenue is greater than the revenue requirement of all firms, a portion of the excess is taxed from the firms according to a certain prescribed rule. On the other hand, if the revenue falls short of the revenue requirement, the agency subsidizes the firms for the shortage. It is shown how the regulation affects social welfare by creating an artificial competitive environment for the firms and by controlling industry cost efficiency. The optimal regulation is also analyzed.
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  • YASUHITO TANAKA
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 210-229
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In this paper I examine the welfare effects of tariffs in international free-entry oligopolies under integrated markets in a two-country world model. I shall show that a small specific (or ad-variorum) tariff imposed by the home country exercises the same welfare effect as a small specific (or ad-variorum) tariff imposed by the foreign country in a free trade equilibrium. These unilateral specific (or ad-variorum) tariffs and reciprocal specific (or advariorum) tariffs make the home and the foreign countries better off if demand functions of oligopolistic goods are concave (or concave or linear). (JEL No. 411, 611)
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  • A New Method to Analyze the N-Country World
    SHIN-ICHI FUKUDA
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 230-245
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze the appropriate stabilization rules among a large number of countries. By decomposing the world system into one aggregate and N-1 difference systems, the paper calculates the desirable monetary rules in the N-country model. we find that the optimal monetary rule is a combination of the global monetary rule and the intervention rule. In general, the derived rule depends on the number of countries and the relative magnitudes of exogenous variances. The paper first analyzes the symmetric world economy and extends the results to the asymmetric world.
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  • FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ECONOMIC WELFARE
    HARUHIKO KOREKAWA
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 246-257
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper considers the issues of gradual reform of not only commodity tax but also factor tax. Using the two-sector model, a simple rule of tax reform is proposed, after the effects of changes of tax rates on the social welfare are examined. This rule, which is expressed in terms of observable economic variables, is applicable however tax rates may be assigned.
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  • AN ANALYSIS OF PRICE EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL OPTIMALITY
    SEONGILL KANG
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 258-265
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper examines the economic role of mandatory disclosure in a noisy rational expectations model. Many theoretical studies of discretionary disclosure suggest that firms never have the incentive to spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal and offer no support for mandatory disclosure regulations.
    This paper, however, derives the paradoxical result that mandatory disclosure may increase the social surplus even when firms have the incentive to spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal. The reason is that mandatory disclosure may increase the cost of disclosing too much information and discourage firms from making this overdisclosure decision.
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  • Kenji Tsuji
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 266-284
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this paper is to make a empirical analysis of the adjustment speed of the bank loan rate. The crucial changes occurred in recent Japanese loan market. The previous studies showed that the adjustment speed of the bank loan rate increased. They estimated the parameters of a linear regression system obeying different regimes. They have a problem in that the regressions arn likely to be contaminated with observations from the other regimes. This paper circumvents this problem by a finding the switching points in time using the simulation method.
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  • [in Japanese]
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 285-286
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [in Japanese]
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 286-287
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (335K)
  • [in Japanese]
    1992 Volume 43 Issue 3 Pages 287-288
    Published: September 18, 1992
    Released on J-STAGE: October 19, 2007
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (345K)
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