If one wants to assess the progress made by the EU as well as its persisting limitations in meeting the challenge of solidarity one EU justice and home affairs, since the Treaty of Amsterdam regrouped under the fundamental treaty objective of the “area of freedom, security and justice” (AFSJ), can be regarded as one of the most interesting domains to explore: It is not only the EU policy domain which has expanded most since the Treaty of Amsterdam in terms of new structures, mechanisms and legislation, but also one in which Member States are exposed to considerable asymmetric pressures which have made solidarity emerge as a key political issue which has even led to special provisions being included in the TFEU. This article explores, first, the main asymmetric pressures in the AFSJ domain in the fields of asylum, immigration, external border management and internal security, looks then at the EU’s legal, political, financial and operational responses to these challenges. It comes to the conclusion that overall solidarity in the EU justice and home affairs domain can today clearly be regarded as a reality, which it was not yet in any substantive sense a decade ago, but also as a still fragile and incomplete one. Its progress seems to depend more on pressures reaching the stage where they can put the sustainability of the AFSJ and hence the interests of most or all Member States at risk―as this was the case during the 2011 “Schengen” crisis―rather than a permanent strong commitment to help Member States affected by serious pressures and capability deficits.
Solidarity in the EU/euro area is today a hot topic. The election of the European Parliament showed in May 2014 that anti-integration parties got remarkable supports in many of the EU member countries and became the top gainers in France, the UK and Greece. The EU looks to be faced with a solidarity crisis.
The first objective of this article is to seek why such a solidarity crisis was raised by analyzing sentiments and actions of solidarity, and solidarity-related integration in the EU/euro area. The second objective is to think how they will be able to find a way out of the crisis.
The most important reason of the solidarity crisis seems to be mass unemployment and economic stagnation in the EU the euro area crisis caused. As the Eurobarometer tells us, a positive image towards the EU of the citizens in the countries hit by the euro area crisis dropped tremendously in the midst of the crisis. The extent of the drop is proportional to unemployment rates and the biggest in southern European countries like Greece, Italy and Portugal.
The euro area responded to the financial and sovereign debt crises by advancing economic integration like creating the banking union, strengthening the SGP. The ECB adopted the OMT. But, these measures focus on containing recurrence of the euro crisis and do not aim at strengthening the solidarity in the euro area.
The EU/euro area has been lacking in solidarity actions. Although western European governments and nations criticized the crisis-hit southern European countries as they caused the sovereign crises, big banks of western European countries gave too much credits to the southern countries before the crisis and ballooned bubbles in housing and national finance. So, the western European countries share the blame for the crises.
Germany, a new hegemon in Europe, is a key country. Only Germany could fill today’s solidarity vacuum, since the country has consistently rejected solidarity actions in the economic stimulus policy. A main stream of German economic policy thoughts is that without whips of crisis, there will be no reform. It has some truth. However, today’s crisis in the EU/euro area is not a cyclical, but structural and sticky one. Without governments’ gigantic stimulus policy, European economic stagnation will continue further for a long time and deflation would come true. And it is of increasing concern that countries in distress may elect governments that reject rational policy outright.
This article demands above-mentioned solidarity actions on the EU level, that can revitalize the euro area economy and change landscape of Europe, even though it will be able to continue for several years, maybe a too short term from German eyes.
The EU aims to create not only an internal free market of good, capital and services, but also the free movement of people in which the citizens from other member states are equally treated. While Asian regionalism refers to a “strategic reciprocity”, the EU tries to correct a gap among nations and to promote democracy at the European level. This is a characteristic of European integration.
The EU introduced EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty and promotes solidarity among citizens, which contributes to European integration. Twenty years after its introduction, the number of EU citizens working in the member states other than their own is gradually increasing. Moreover, the European Parliament which consists of deputies elected from EU citizens, has become more valuable. However, the enlargement to Eastern Europe and the Euro crisis caused a fear that solidarity among Member States and EU citizens will be considerably damaged. Many conferences which I had opportunities to participate in, have been held at Brussels about solidarity and EU citizenship issues. Three topics are significant for the future of the solidarity of the EU.
Firstly, some member states with background of serious unemployment, try to make stricter rules against the free movement and equal treatment. As the EU has removed the ban of free movement of people from Rumania and Bulgaria at the beginning of 2014, wealthy countries like Germany and the UK have a fear of the “benefit tourism” in which people move to get better social security rather than seek employment.
Secondly, the relationship between nationality and EU citizenship has become more controversial. Citizens of member states are automatically granted EU citizens. And this relation depends on mutual trust among Member States and their citizens. However, at the end of 2013, Maltese government announced that they would sell the nationality at a high price through private company by internet. Thereafter, big debate regarding EU citizenship started among legal and political experts.
Thirdly, European Citizens Initiative was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as a new tool for democratic European policy making. Sharing common policy subjects, the ECI was expected to enforce solidarity among EU citizens. After nearly 3 years experience, it is necessary to review its procedure and outcomes to determine, whether ECI has indeed contributed to citizens’ participation to EU policy-making process.
In this paper, I review 20 years development of EU citizenship and focus on new aspects of the solidarity issues as mentiored above.
Party political forces in the form of the European Political Groups (EPGs) and the Europarties populate the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary landscape at the EU-level. In so doing, they remind us that the European Parliament (EP) is both a legislative and representative body that needs to be renewed every five years. In its legislative guise, where no one political group commands a majority, some form of cross-party solidarity between the political mainstream has always been essential. At the representative level, however, the resonance of this set-up is coming under greater scrutiny. First, because of the intensifying electoral struggle between the political mainstream and the various shades of Euroscepticism which revel in their status as political outsiders. Second, because of the growing belief that such cross-party solidarity is undermining the potential of mainstream party politics at the EU-level to develop linkages with European voters. In a partial response to this dilemma, the mainstream engineered the inauguration of the Spitzenkandidaten (i.e. the ‘indirect’ election of the President of the European Commission) as part of the 2014 European elections. As the guardians of this process, the Europarties would be responsible for selecting a ‘leading candidate’ ― a Spitzenkandidat. She/he would go on to become the ‘face’ of their corresponding election campaign. This, they hoped, would translate into the propagation of a more ideologically charged atmosphere that would help to revitalize democratic participation and raise turnout as voters were presented with the means to differentiate more effectively between the competing mainstream forces.
Despite its limitations, the Spitzenkandidaten innovation signifies an important milestone in the direction of politicizing the European elections and the wider European project that could help to elevate the representative standing of the EP. Whether or not this is the start of a reform trajectory, that takes the process of politicization even further by creating a context conducive to the strengthening of the ideational and organizational nature of party politics at the EU-level, remains to be seen. Without such a course of action though, it would appear that the mainstream runs the risk of giving Eurosceptics a free hand in challenging the basis of the European project.
This paper explains how the EU has strengthened energy policy based on “solidarity” with the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes in 2006, 2009 and Ukraine Crisis. The European Commission succeeded in framing gas disputes as an urgent issue requiring an EU-level solution. As a result, energy solidarity has been one of the fundamental principles in the article 194 of the TFEU and the energy policy has been shared competence between the EU and Member States. European Energy Security Strategy made with Ukraine Crisis in 2014 proposes Energy Union that will pool resources, connect energy networks and unite negotiating power with one voice.
But there must be a long way to achieve intended objectives of Energy Union, because creating Energy Union is related to restructuring institutions that had supported stable energy relations between the EU and Russia for more than 40 years. Energy infrastructures (pipelines, storage utilities and so on) and the price formula (long-term contracts, destination clauses, take-or-pay clauses, gas prices linked to oil prices and so on) were the common institutions between two regions. The stable relations have deteriorated by institutional changes in the energy market. The EU promotes internal energy market integration through unbundling and mandatory third party access by the Third Energy Package and the Competition law. The EU’s new liberalised market model with diversification of energy suppliers and energy mix is no longer the one that Russia used to share with the EU. Internal energy market integration reinforced by the energy solidarity principle improves the EU negotiating power with energy suppliers. The EU is building a “wider regulated area” by “exporting” the EU energy regulations and directives to neighbouring countries and even to Russia. Russia is forced to abolish destination clauses, reduce prices and loosen take-or-pay clauses to keep its market share in Europe, although she, depending on the vertically integrated energy companies such as Gazprom, is reluctant to adapt to conditions changing in the European energy market.
Ukraine Crisis is often recognised as the issue of energy security, because Ukraine monopolised pipelines between the EU and Russia. Since 2006, the European Commission has been using Ukraine Crisis to enhance energy security policies of the EU and competence creep in the energy policy. Now Energy Union is officially one of the priorities of the new Commission.
But the EU will be confronted with difficulties in and out. First, creating Energy Union may be with creeping competence of the Commission in the energy policy and may cause dissatisfaction, even opposition to integration from Member States with different energy mix. Second, there are problems of external dimensions of Energy Union. It is difficult to ensure consistency between the energy policy and the external policy of Member States, because they are different both in energy mix and energy suppliers. And Energy Union must set a stable framework to enable the project finances to develop energy resources in Russia and so on, because most of Member States depend on imported energy from them. Energy Solidarity is crucial to overcome these difficulties.
Ukraine after gaining independence in 1991 suffered the longest economic recession among the former Soviet Republics. Its long-waited economic boom in 2000’s was interrupted by the global economic crisis of 2008, followed by an only small recovery and ensuing stagnation. Its poor performance could be explained by, along with other causes, outdated and inefficient industries, notably ferrous metallurgy. This led to a worsening of its balance of payments in 2010’s, forcing the ruling Party of Regions headed by Viktor Yanukovich to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in November 2013. Most Ukrainian citizens, however, said ‘no’ not only to this decision but also to the corrupt Yanukovich administration itself, which ended up with a collapse of the regime in February 2014.
Ukraine has two traditional trade partners, Russia and the EU, with the amounts of trade turnover with them roughly equal. Ukraine tends to export low value-added commodities to markets outside Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), e.g. to the EU, on the one hand and relatively high value-added items, such as machinery and processed foodstuffs, to Russia and other CIS countries on the other hand. Ukraine, having chosen a pro-EU orientation, risks losing markets of Russia, whose government threatens to impose custom duties on imports from Ukraine.
Ukraine’s new administration led by Petro Poroshenko finally signed the Association Agreement with the EU in June 2014. The new administration strives to overcome today’s turmoil by virtue of eurointegration. The immediate effects, however, of creation of a free trade area with the EU, widely proclaimed as a core of the Agreement, on Ukrainian economy should not be overestimated because margins of import duties reduction are rather modest. Structural reforms and adjustments to the EU standards, another aspect of the Agreement with the EU, will be more crucial to Ukraine’s future.
The purpose of this article is to make clear how Britain and continental Europe tried to approach liberalization in the 1950s, and reconsider UK’s relation with Europe through the analysis of the European reaction to the British plan of currency convertibility, ‘Collective Approach to the Convertibility’ proposed in the OEEC in January 1953. Contrary to the fixed rate of exchange under the IMF, ‘Collective Approach’ aimed to achieve currency convertibility basing on floating rate of exchange with major European currencies. The Background of the proposal was insufficient contribntion of IMF to achieve early convertibility, and political difficulty to cut welfare and defence budget drastically. The intention of the British policy-makers to adopt floating rate was to achieve balance of payments equilibrium not by the government policy, but as a consequence of neutral market movement.
However, the European Payments Union was already established in Europe as a reaction to the slow progress of convertibility under the IMF. If the major European currencies resume convertibility under the ‘Collective Approach’, the EPU necessarily must be dissolved, but such a case would be disastrous not only to keep balance between welfare states, rearmament, and liberalization, but also to the various projects concerning European integration.
Some policy-makers like the governor f the Bank of France, and German Economic Minister Erhard was keenly interested in the British plan, but on the part of the government, they were fearful of the impact ‘Collective Approach’ would give to the welfare policy, defence policy, and European integration. For them, convertibility problem was not just an market problem, but social and political problem.
The episode of ‘Collective Approach’ shows that although the UK and Europe had common concern for the slow progress of convertibility led by the IMF, their desired prescriptions were different. No European governments were prepared to accept British way of convertibility, because of the social and political impact, and damage to the European integration. It is a paradox that the UK, sceptical of European integration, was constrained by European integration in achieving sterling convertibility in the 1950s.
In a prolonged economic crisis, failure of multiculturalism has been repeatedly argued in Europe, and this perception of failure has been reinforced by the intermittent upsurge of international terrorism during the past decade. In this context, the emergence of civic integration policy has been often argued as a proof of European retreats from multiculturalism. This “civic integration” which requires immigrants to integrate into host society spread rapidly across European countries as a new policy model, and was also exported to the EU by several Member States. This “Europeanization” of civic integration has often interpreted and criticized as a typical example of “uploading” effort of control-minded national governments to legitimize their restrictive domestic policies.
In this article, I intend to modify this intergovernmental interpretation on the diffusion of the civic integration model by conducting two sets of case analyses in two different levels. Firstly, in domestic level, political processes on the adoption of civic integration in the Netherlands and those in Germany will be comparatively analysed. Compared to the Dutch case where a rise of far-right party and a politicization of immigrant issues at the beginning of 2000s pushed a deep transformation of immigrant integration politics and policy, an introduction of German civic integration was led by left wing Red-Green government without strong influence of far right party. This article argues that the difference in party politics constellation between two countries generated a subtle divergence in nature of their civic integration, from liberal to restrictive.
Secondly, in European level, this article assesses how European institutions have reacted to the insertion of civic integration into the EU. Despite the EU’s lack of strong formal competence, the European Commission and the CJEU has gradually limited discretions of Member States to take restrictive measures in immigrant integration policy. On the one hand, the CJEU has reduced national margin of discretions by issuing a series of judgements. On the other hand, the European Commission has invited national governments not to take excessively restrictive measures by actively exploiting the court’s Jurisprudence. As a result, the European institutions have gradually defined a possible range of civic integration by cutting down room for restrictive policy.
From those two observations, this article argues a limitation of intergovernmental understanding on the European convergence towards civic integration policy.
EU competition policy has long been a case study for European integration and Europeanization research, while there is a growing scholarly interest in the external regulatory power of the EU in this area. Yet, the existing literature has insufficiently addressed the issue of whether this policy discriminates third-country based companies operating within and outside the union on a nationality basis. Nor does it link this issue to the wider debate on potential tensions between two major goals of this policy, namely the promotion of competition in the single market and the enhancement of international competitiveness of European companies. In this light, on the one hand, the article explains the increasing importance of international competitiveness in EU discourse, and on the other hand, it presents an initial empirical finding that despite this, EU competition policy has been largely neutral in terms of the nationality of firms. In addition, the article develops an original model, ‘stringent competition policy’, in order to theoretically explain the puzzle of the nationality blindness of the policy even vis-à-vis third-country based firms, while contrasting the model with a neomercantilist idea of strategic competition policy. Regarding methods, this study uses multiple sources, both EU and non-EU, in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of making excessively pro- or anti-EU arguments. It also employs the method of inductive and yet theory-informed hypothesis generation. The model of stringent competition policy proposed in this article draws on the theory of the regulatory state, and sociological institutionalism, as well as empirical observations. The former helps to understand how the supranational institutional setting and the market integration ethos of the EU have shaped its peculiar conception of competition and competitiveness underpinning its competition policy, which centers on the maintenance of a level-playing field rather than the creation of European champions through the discrimination of non-EU based companies. Based on this model, the article hypothesizes that the supranational institutional setting of the EU assures nationality-blind competition policy, even when non-EU based firms are concerned. Overall, the article contributes to the literature on the international dimension of EU competition policy by providing a new theoretical framework tailored to the analysis of the nationality-based (non-) discrimination issue. While the article examines several concrete competition cases, mainly, but not exclusively, in the area of merger in order to build and illustrate the two competing models, they should be subjected to further empirical inquiry in future research.
Eurosystem has faced various bad situations since 2008 and taken easing policy-whatever it takes. Eurosystem cut down monetary policy rate quickly in 2008 to 2009, then supplied liquidity more than market’s demand to restore financial system stability. Eurosystem has kept easing stance since then. Periphery European countries could take independent monetary policy from Eurosystem on their own in orthodox economic theory, but it seems that periphery countries have been affected from Eurosystem’s easing stance. This paper shows interaction monetary policy implementation between Eurosystem and six European countries divided two groups; the first group included Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden and the second one included Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. This paper adopt compering instruments by instruments approach.
First group faced capital inflow from euro area as a capital flight and suffered from currency appreciation against euro. Although their economic performance have been better than euro area, they were obliged to accommodate their monetary policy stance with Eurosystem. Especially, Switzerland and Denmark introduced negative interest rate policy against to currency appreciation.
Compared to the first group, second group, considered confidence was lower than euro area, had to defend certain exchange as a grwp where rate threshold because share of euro denominated loans held firms and household was too high. Notwithstanding tightening policy was needed, the second group also accommodated their monetary policy with Eurosystem.
Turning into policy instruments, some policy instruments introduced by periphery countries affected Eurosystem. Targeted longer term refinancing operation (TLTRO) introduced by Eurosystem is affected by Funding for Growth Scheme and long term operation introduced by Hungary National Bank which purpose is to increase bank lending to firms, not to restore financial system stability. We can also find easily a common characteristic: Lending Facility of Denmark and special LTRO of Eurosystem (Bazooka LTRO), which maturity is three years and liquidity supply amount is unlimited.
I wade the following finding; periphery countries cannot take independent monetary policy stance freely in Europe at least even if they choose any currency regime and if their economic performance is better or worse than euro area, although there is interaction at instruments level.
This paper aims to examine the institutional framework on EU’s Banking Union project through political economy approach. Current Banking Union consists of three pillars, namely, SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism), SRM (Single Resolution Mechanism) and a Common DGS (Deposit Guarantee Schemes). The SSM has already started from 4 November 2014. Then, the swift implementation and negotiation are implementing in 2014-15 for constructing the SRM. In addition, the Common DGS shall be also tackled with as another common backstops in protect for people’s deposits.
In Genuine Economic and Monetary Union launched in 2012, the current Banking Union project is substantial in context of the history of European Monetary Integration. In needs for the ‘weakening’ the link between banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis among Eurozone member states, the solution through the Banking Union is beneficial and inevitable. However, there are some obstacles to make the banking regulation single. As far as the structural aspect, ⑴ there are differences of financial systems in member states, ⑵ there is an inconsistency between continental European style and British style on banking regulation and supervision.
In part Ⅱ, we find the reasons and urgent needs for SSM and SRM through the trace of Eurozone crisis after US sub-prime mortgage loan problem and Global Financial Crisis. And we examine the framework and development on SSM, in particular, through the viewpoint of French and German financial systems. In addition, we suggest expectations and challenges for the implementing of SRM as a next stage. There are four tools; ⑴ Sale of business tool ⑵ Bridge institution tool ⑶ Asset separation tool and ⑷ Bail-in tool. We cannot overlook that these tools contain the traditional ones such as bridge institution as a ‘bail-out’, so we should think about the mixed type both of ‘bail-out’ and ‘bail-in’ on the analysis of SRM.
And in part Ⅲ, we shed light on the harmonisation of banking supervision in EU and its effect on international standard constructed by FSB (Financial Stability Board). Particularly, we try to focus on EBA (European Banking Authority) in London which would play an essential role between Eurozone and Non-Eurozone as an institution of ESAs(European Supervisory Authorities).
Lastly, we suggest the common concept between European Banking Union and FSB’s Key Attributes to harmonise the regulatory and supervisory policies in advanced economies. So the elements in Banking Union would be the key basement in international standard in future.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the present condition of the Milk Quota System (Additional Levy System) in EU and consider its policy effect on the dairy farm structure, by taking the case of the dairy sector in the United Kingdom (particularly England and Wales). The Milk Quota System was introduced as the policy dealing with surplus raw milk in 1984, and its aim is to attempt to achieve the market equilibrium of supply and demand of raw milk by using the way of the control of the overproduction. The Milk Quota System is going to be abolished on March 31, 2015, because EU is willing to promote the market-oriented dairy policy.
In England and Wales, the trading quota market (buying system and leasing system) was effectively worked, where permanent transfer or temporary transfer of allotted quota to each dairy farm were traded across the regions. Dairy farmers who have the will to boost milk production buy or lease additional quota from farmers outgoing from the dairy sector or downsizing production. Because the both of buying system and leasing system of quota had an effect on the dairy sector, on the one hand numbers of dairy farm have been declined, on the other hand farm size based on milk cow numbers have been expanded and milk yield per cow grown more remarkably by selective breeding. In short the structural improvement of the dairy sector have made progress to a high degree and so they have developed their productivity and competitive power.
After the abolishment of the Milk Quota System EU dairy sector will take a more active entrance into the world market of milk products as market strategy against a background for the trend of trade liberalization. When the dairy sector consisted of a lot of technically efficient dairy farms in England and Wales choose their future course, they will have access to the world market to promote the sector, too. In conclusion the dairy sector in England and Wales will be able to obtain the fruits of its sustainable development in future.
The ECJ judgments in the Viking and Laval cases constitute part of the sometimes so-called ‘Laval-quartet’ decisions; they involve relation between the right to take collective action including the right to strike and European fundamental economic freedoms such as freedom of establishment (now TFEU Art. 49) and freedom to provide services (now TFEU Art. 56). At first sight, Viking and Laval are notable because they recognize the fundamental right to take collective action by means of the general principles of Community law; no previous legally binding provisions in Community law had explicitly laid down such a right. Nevertheless a more striking feature of the decisions is that the Court subordinates the workers’ fundamental social right to economic freedoms, as labour lawyers correctly point out.
Instead of seeing this only as a fatal challenge to ‘Social Europe’, Ryosuke Amiya offers a unique perspective influenced by Christian Joerges: the EU’s ‘social’ element has two different dimensions, one involving individual social rights and the other involving collective rulemaking by the social partners. The latter is what is at stake in those judgments of the Court. In essence, Amiya concludes that the ordo-liberal concept that provides an unfavorable view of intermediary organizations like trade unions makes it harder to reconcile the role of collective rulemaking with the construction of the European internal market.
The following analysis is indeed based on that view, but at the same time it aims to propose a further and consistent clarification. It starts by clarifying through legal analysis the point at which the Court’s decisions in Viking and Laval must be criticized. It should also be pointed out that the European social dialogue defined in the Treaty suggests an inconsistency in the argument that there is generally difficulty in collective rulemaking in EU law. Thus it concludes that the notion of ‘collective rulemaking’ can be divided into two models: a corporatist model and an autonomous collective bargaining model. It seems that the EU has difficulty accepting the latter within the internal market project.