Dignāga denied that recollection (smṛti) as well as recognition (abhijñāna) are separate means of cognition (pramāṇāntara) in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In this regard, however, it is questioned whether recollection is not excluded from two means of cognition consisting of perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), or not any means of cognition. It is at least clear that recollection is not perception with the only exception that it is cognition of a recollection itself. On the other hand, recollection is similar to inference in terms of conceptual cognition.

Later commentators such as Jinendrabuddhi or Prajñākaragupta said that inference is nothing but recollection. Even if what Dignāga intended is the same as the interpretation of these commentators, it is safe to say that recollection is not a separate means of cognition. Dignāga’s concept of recollection is highly important in our inquiry into his system of epistemology, because Dignāga emphasizes recollection when arguing his theory of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana) which is one of the most significant theories in his epistemology.

Bhāviveka (ca. 490–ca. 570) refers to Vaiśeṣika thought some six times in his *Hastaratna, a work that is only available in the Chinese translation of Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664) where it is titled the Dasheng zhangzhen lun 大乘掌珍論.Among these six references, three have to do with the issue of sound, i.e., śabda. The so-called Vaiśeṣika arguments of the impermanence of sound are identical and we notice with some surprise that these are not found in the pre-Bhāviveka Vaiśeṣika writings that are currently available. By examining those arguments of sound being impermanent in the *Hastaratna, and related texts in Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan, this essay firstly aims to offer some additional evidence for my previous conjecture on the relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Candrānanda. And, secondly, it also aims to explore the “tradition” that Bhāviveka had received from his Buddhist predecessors, such as Dignāga etc., as well as what differentiates him from them. The ultimate context in which these must be placed is of course the Madhyamaka proof of emptiness within the framework of two-truth theory.

Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (PsP) is the only complete Sanskrit commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK). As a commentary on MMK, PsP cites the verses of MMK sequentially. This paper refers to these as the “basic verses.” Besides them, in order to explain a certain thought or idea, Candrakīrti also freely cites MMK’s verses as his āgama. Among them, some MMK’s verses contain different readings from the basic ones. This paper refers to them as “variant verses.” This paper collects all the variant verses cited in PsP, compares them with six Sanskrit manuscripts, and discusses the possible causes of the noticed variations.

In this paper, I deal with the role of ‘ālaya-vijñāna,’ the deepest layer of mind as the ontological base for living things, in the process from death to rebirth by tracing the descriptions in the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha. Ālaya-vijñāna has various functions and many other names that derive from each of the functions. Those names are as follows: ‘sarvabījaka-vijñāna’ (the mind that possesses all the potentialities called ‘seeds’), ‘ādāna-vijñāna’ (the mind that is attached to the physical body), ‘vipāka-vijñāna’ (the mind that matures into the different nature). How do these three minds work in the process from death to rebirth? By finding out the role of each of the three, I will make clear the overall role of ālaya-vijñāna in that process.

The Tattvārtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi uses the term prajñaptimātra to deny samāropa, and the term vastumātra to deny apavāda. Through a comparison of both terms, I point out that the meaning of mātra in the compound vastu-mātra is a denial of non-existence as the basis of designation, and an acceptance of its existence. When samāropa and apavāda are denied by prajñaptimātra and vastumātra, it is proved that all phenomena have an inexpressible intrinsic nature.Originally vastu was seen to have two meanings, “the basis of designation” and “existence of ultimate reality.” Only when used as a restriction of the “inexpressible” (nirabhilāpya) is vastu seen to take the meaning of “existence of ultimate reality,” yet I point out that originally the word vastu does not have the meaning of “existence of ultimate reality.”

This paper considers the question of internal and external aspects of vijñānapariṇāma, through analysis of the terms ākāra and bhāva. In the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI-19, Maitreya says that ākṛti (=ākāra) exists, but bhāva does not exist (tadākṛtiś ca tatrāsti tadbhāvaś ca na vidyate). This is the basic presupposition in the three-self-natures-doctrine, that there is no conceptualization (upacāra) without its place of dependence (ādhāra). In this case ākāra is the place of dependence of the conceptualization. We should notice that “the place of dependence (ādhāra) of the conceptualization” exists inside of abhūtaparikalpa (vikalpa), but the abhūtaparikalpa falsely envisions the object as “outside itself.”

In the seventh section of the tenth chapter of his Mahāyānasaṃgraha (abbr. MSg), Asaṅga deals with the *saṃgraha (bsdus pa) of the dharmakāya by the six dharmas of the Buddha, the first of which is the pure (rnam par dag pa, *viśuddha) dharma of the Buddha (清淨佛法). The aim of the present paper is to make clear what is the *saṃgraha of the dharmakāya by the pure dharma of the Buddha, by comparing the Chinese translations of Vasubandhu’s commentary on the MSg by Zhendi (真諦 Paramārtha), Jiduo (笈多) Hangju (行矩) and others, and Xuanzang (玄奘), the Chinese translation of Asvabhāva’s commentary on the MSg by Xuanzang, and the Tibetan translation of the same commentary by Ye shes sde and others.

In conclusion: 1. There are two interpretations of the *saṃgraha of the dharmakāya by the pure dharma of the Buddha: (1) the *saṃgraha of the attainment (證得) of the dharmakāya (Zhendi); (2) the *saṃgraha of the dharmakāya itself (the rest). 2. In the case of (1), the pure dharma of the Buddha is defined as the Buddha’s merits other than the removal of afflictive and cognitive hindrances, so that it is a means of attaining the dharmakāya. 3. In the case of (2), it is the essential nature of the dharmakāya, so that the dharmakāya is the pure dharma of the Buddha itself. Here we see a reason for Xuanzang having not thought highly of the translation of Vasubandhu’s commentary by Zhendi.

The aim of this paper is to make clear what is meant by the word alaṃkāra ‘ornament’ in the title Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra given to a treatise of Yogācāra Buddhism belonging to its formative period.

The first verse of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra says: arthajño ’rthavibhāvanāṃ prakurute ‘One who knows the meaning [of the dharma] performs arthavibhāvanā’. This shows that the word arthavibhāvanā is used in place of the word alaṃkāra, which is corroborated by the Bhāṣya passage: kam alaṃkāraṃ karoti / arthavibhāvanāṃ prakurute. It is important to note that the word vibhaktārtha is used to refer to the dharma in the third verse of the work in close connection with the word arthavibhāvanā. This suggests that the word arthavibhāvanā is synonymous with the word arthavibhāga ‘the division of a meaning into meanings’. Thus the word arthavibhāvanā means ‘the analysis of one meaning into plural meanings’.

The first verse also says that arthavibhāvanā is performed in order to show (pradarśayan) five meanings integrated with the dharma, which is defined as uttamayānadeśitavidhi ‘that in which vidhi (the word and meaning) of the Supreme Vehicle (uttamayāna) is preached’. Accordingly, it follows that the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is the treatise to ornament the Mahāyānasūtras, that is, to analyze the meaning of the dharma into the five meanings.

This paper aims to show the strong connection between śraddhā and Mahāyānist practice expounded in the first chapter, Dānapāramitā, of the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The common meaning of śraddhā in Buddhist literature is the first step of practice, namely to put one’s faith in the Three Jewels, and purity of one’s mind. On the other hand, there is no difference in the basic meaning of śraddhā in the Śikṣāsamuccaya compared with other texts, but the manner of explanation is unique. That is, it expands the awakening of śraddhā based on the observation of parātmasamatā (equality of oneself and others), avoidance of unfortunate conditions such as akṣaṇa (eight difficulties) by śraddhā, and accumulation of merits by śraddhā and transfer of those merits. From these views, we can see that, in the explanations of śraddhā in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, aspects conducive to the bodhisattva’s practices are emphasized.

The Mahāvastu cites Early Buddhist texts and shows when they were recited. In the Mahāvastu, handed down by the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādin, the Exalted one recited the Ratanasutta, included in Mahāsūtras, in order to dispel evil. On the other hand, in the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin, the Exalted one recited mantras. This shows that the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin shares the same tradition as the Theravāda, and the Mūlasarvāstivādin has a hint of Esoteric Buddhism. I compared the Sahassavagga with the Sahasravarga. In the Mahāvastu, the Sahasravagra is recited to show the advantage of Buddhism and convert outsiders. Concerning verse 109 in the Sahassavagga included in the Dhammapada, I compared five versions of texts, and looked into the process of bifurcation.

The Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra (Jinguangming jing 金光明経) is known in East Asia particular for its idea of protecting and stabilizing the country. Some previous research insists that the chapter Devendrasamayaṃ nāma rājaśāstra parivarta (Zhenglun pin 正論品) presents the fundamental theory of the political thought of this text. This paper shows that the chapter Caturmahārāja parivarta (Sitianwang pin 四天王品) has another view of royal authority and theory of protecting the country.

In chapter 1 of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu defines impure dharmas (sāsrava-dharmas) as dharmas to which leakages (āsravas) cling (samanuśerate). The problem here is that the verb anu-śī- (Chi. suizeng 随増), which originally means “to cling to,” is associated with the conception of sāsrava, although there is no etymological relation between the two. In this paper, I will examine how Vasubandhu forms the definition of sāsrava-dharmas with a focus on the contextual use of anu-śī- in Sarvāstivādin doctrine.

In Sarvāstivādin literature, the *Dharmaskandha (Chi. Fayun zu lun 法蘊足論) first uses anu-śī- to define the three realms. Then, the *Prakaraṇapāda (Chi. Pinlei zu lun 品類足論) uses anu-śī- to build a relation between the three realms and their corresponding contaminants (anuśayas) as follows: all the contaminants of the desire realm cling to the desire realm; all the contaminants of the form realm cling to the form realm; and all the contaminants of formless realm cling to the formless realm. According to Sarvāstivādin doctrine, the three realms are equal to the dharmas bound to the three realms, and these dharmas are equated with the sāsrava-dharmas. This suggests that dharmas to which contaminants cling are indirectly identical to sāsrava-dharmas.

From this investigation, I conclude that Vasubandhu forms the definition of sāsrava-dharmas by connecting directly dharmas to which contaminants cling with sāsrava-dharmas, and substituting leakages for contaminants.

In Buddhism some schools accept the concept antarābhava, while the others do not. The most comprehensive discussions about this concept are found in the Mahāvibhāṣā. The present paper is a summary of the discussions. Among them, the most interesting topic is whether the antarābhava exists or not. It can be judged as the starting point for the later development of the concept. For several related important concepts are proposed there. Incidentally, the explanations of this concept in the Abhidharmakośa are extracted from the exhaustive discussions in the Mahāvibhāṣā.

There are two types of dhyāna: dhyāna-upapatti and dhyāna-samāpatti. The first of these, dhyāna-upapatti, is a state in which the meditator is reborn into one of the seventeen heavens. The state of dhyāna-upapatti expresses itself concretely, and it is thus relatively easy to understand. In contrast, dhyāna-samāpatti is the state in which the meditator enters rūpa-dhātu-samāpatti within this world. Until now, it has not been very clear how to describe what kind of state this is. Therefore, I considered the state of dhyāna-samāpatti and related issues. My results show that dhyāna-samāpatti is a state in which one enters dhyāna while one’s body resides in the kāma-dhātu (realm of desire). However, the two schools, Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivādin, maintain different opinions about the āśraya (basis) in the rūpa-dhātu (realm of form). The Sarvāstivādin school considers the āśraya within the state of dhyāna-samāpatti to be avijn͂apti-rūpa (unexpressed form). On the other hand, the Sautrāntika school does not recognize that there is a state of avijn͂apti-rūpa (unexpressed form), and the school assumes that the body in the kāma-dhātu (realm of desire) becomes the āśraya, and the rūpa (form) in the rūpa-dhātu (realm of form) comes to vipāka-rūpa (full maturation) through samādhi. I believe that the Sautrāntika school assumes that the state of dhyāna-samāpatti refers only to the world of mental structures, thus meaning that the rūpa-dhātu is separated from the physical body. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādin school assumes that rūpa (avijn͂apti-rūpa) becomes the āśraya (basis) in the world of mental structures, so I believe that the Sarvāstivādin school considers the physical body not to be separated from the rūpa-dhātu.

In the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya Chapter IV (karma-nirdeśa), we read: “When tīvra-paryavasthāna or ghanarasa-prasāda raises vijñapti, avijñapti occurs in karma-patha.” Within this context, I focus on the word “tīvra.” “Tīvra” is an adjective which has the meaning to express strength, and in this case it is a keyword indicating the opportunity to generate “avijñapti.” However, in previous research this point has not been fully clarified.

In this paper, I focus on how tīvra relates to the occurrence of avijñapti. Also, I consider the meaning of tīvra and examine what it means for its qualifying word. Consequently, I confirm that kleśa or prasāda can be a cause to bring about avijñapti if it is in a state of tīvra, and the repeatability which is the meaning of tīvra is expressed as strength. Moreover, I point out the possibility that the repeatability of tīvra is related to the habituation of avijñapti.

In this paper, I examine the range of meaning of the phrase saṃyojana-bandhana-anuśaya-upakleśa–paryavasthāna (結縛随眠随煩悩纒), a stock phrase used by the Sarvāstivāda school. My study is based mainly on early Sarvāstivāda texts. The results are as follows. First, this phrase as a whole is used as a general term for defilements (kleśa). Moreover, the five synonyms of defilements constituting the phrase play different roles in different ways of grouping defilements. In other words, the defilements in the phrase are not arranged as the representative name of a group of defilements but are arranged in one phrase with each having unique significance.

The Three Treasures “tri-ratna (三宝)” is an important concept in Buddhism. Buddhist refuges in buddha, dharma, and saṅgha are absolutely essential acts. But there are not many discussions about ratna in the Abhidharma. This is because, as in the meaning of “abhi­dharma,” the most preferred meaning in Sarvāstivāda doctrine is to explain the Truth “satya (諦)” based on dharma. In the gradualist theory that shows the steps to enlightenment, the stage of insight “darśana-mārga” from Pṛthagjana to Ārya is one of the most highly stressed points, and the most important training is seeing the Four Nobel Truths. There are thus few discussions about ratna.

But in the Mahāvibhāṣā, there are some fragmentary descriptions concerning ratna. On the darśanamārga stage, determining the satya is a “dṛṣṭi (見)” while determining ratna is classified as Faith “śraddhā (信).” Here I clarify when and how Faith can arise in Sarvāstivāda doctrine.

Firstly, the three refuges is simple karma, and they have nothing to do with the arising of Faith. Secondly, a small amount of Faith arises as the tipping point of the four wholesome roots stage that is an additional practice. Thirdly, immaculate Faith arises in ratna and śīla in the darśanamārga, and this is called the four actualizations of purity.

From the above, we can suppose another gradualist theory, one of Faith toward ratna separated from satya.

There are various conflicts and attack-defense scenarios in Indian fairy tales. Regarding Jātaka tales, the most famous Indian fairy tales in Japan, edifying stories are presented to children as World literature and as Buddhist fairy tales. To clarify the morality and edifying aspects of the Jātaka, I analyze the stories based on Game Theory. To compare them, I also analyze stories from the Brāhmaṇas and Japanese fairy tales. As a result, the morality and edifying aspects of the Jātaka stories simply reflect the players’ behavior and attack-defense strategy.

Studies examining Sri Lanka’s Buddhist literature have primarily focused on its Pāli literary works. But during the Polonnaruwa period (1017–1235), Sri Lankan authors began to produce Sinhalese works, which then flourished in the Dambadeniya period (1220–1345), a period that came to be known as the golden era of Sri Lankan literature. In considering new Buddhist forms of Sri Lankan literature after the eleventh century, research on these Sinhalese literary works is mandatory.

This paper focuses on two Sinhalese prose works: Butsarana and Daham Sarana, written for the purpose of paying homage to the Buddha and dharma, respectively. Both works use the idea of the bodhisattva, through the retelling of many Jātaka stories, to explore the values of the Buddha and dharma. In considering the features of bodhisattva thought as presented in Sinhalese literature, comparisons will be drawn with related Pāli works and their commentaries.

Westernized Buddhist studies began in Japan after the Meiji restoration. Most of them were philologically oriented and rare studies have been made from the view of practical meditation.

Monks have been teaching Buddhist insight meditation, and “Mindfulness” meditation based on insight meditation has been growing more popular in the U.S. and Japan since the 1980’s. But the term “Mindfulness” seems to be interpreted and used arbitrarily by teachers. Buddhist scholars should commit to “Mindfulness” meditation movement from a Buddhist context.

Mindfulness means to label any object as it is; this object means any phenomena or feeling occurring in one’s mind. Practitioners keep labeling as many objects arising in their mind as they can. For example, “sound, sound, pain, pain, pain.” They have no time to think of those objects, because they are too busy concentrating on labeling. An object arises and disappears momentarily and another arises in no time. Therefore practitioners must be mindful of occurring objects in their mind. When one is mindful of objects occurring in one’s thoughts, one’s mind becomes very clear and awakened. This is called “awareness.”

When practitioners realize that these objects are momentary, impermanent, and thus with no value, they reach enlightenment. But long before that, they can feel joy, lightness and “awake-ness” by their concentration. Such change of mind and body benefits practitioners’ lives. Thus “Mindfulness” meditation has become popular.

In previous studies, there is a tendency that thullaccaya has been thought as an attempted crime of pārājika and saṃghādisesa. However, when examining relevant examples in the Vinayapiṭaka, the thullaccaya should not be understood as an attempted crime with emphasis placed on whether the result is fulfilled or not. It seems to be more appropriate to understand it as a crime that can be applied widely when problems arise in any of the various conditions that constitute a criminal act, that is, objects, distinction on the objects, intention, or any defects in the result.

In this paper, I discuss the adequacy of the view point of the meaning of saddhā (skt. śraddhā; faith, belief, etc.) which K. R. Norman points out in regard to Dhp 97. Norman has a tendency to divide the meaning of saddhā into good and bad, and regards the latter as ‘desire.’ But saddhā in Dhp 97 does not have the meaning of ‘desire.’ It is difficult to define the meaning of saddhā as does Norman, which I argue through examining usages of saddhā concerning non-Buddhists in the Pali Canon.

In this paper I examine the meaning of the expression nāmarūpassa avakkanti, focusing on the syntax of ava-√kram in the Pāli Canon. I conclude the following. Although it is difficult to get an unequivocal understanding of the expression because of the characteristics of the Pāli Canon, the syntax of ava-√kram strongly suggests that the expression refers to conception that is “the descent of nāmarūpa-” (the genitive is subjective). However, there remains the possibility that it does not mean conception, but “the descent of nāmarūpa- [into a living being].” While we cannot exclude the possibility that the expression means “a descent [of viññāṇa- or something which is not referred to] into nāmarūpa-” (the genitive is objective), this is not supported by the syntax of ava-√kram. This paper also contains a brief comparison of Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese parallels.

It is Rajasthan from where most Punjabi Śvetāmbara Jains’ ancestors migrated when they settled in Punjab and Pakistan, though at different periods. The migration history indicates a close relationship with their original regions and gotra deities based on caste/gotra formation.

The gotra deity, who is related to the social caste/gotra system, seems to appear in various dimensions. The origin of gotra deity worship seems ambiguous, however, as the ritual illustrates the various religious elements and regional sources.

It is characteristic for the Punjabi Osvāl Jains to worship an ancestral gotra deity (dādī/bābā) as kula deva/devī. Some gotras have quite a close relationship with the gotra deity who is daily and regularly worshipped by family and clan members.

The Punjabi Osvāls of the Śvetāmbara Jains include, under the one umbrella of Śrī Ātmānanda Jain Sabhā, the Mūrtipūjakas of Tapā Gaccha and Kharatara Gaccha as well as some Sthānakavāsīs. Their identity encompasses a variety of influences and recognised socio-religious spheres of the Punjabi Osvāls and, moreover, the Śvetāmbara Jains.

Among the Indian religions, Hinduism and Buddhism treat earth, water, fire and wind as inanimate elements. However, in Jainism, these elements are treated as living entities. In the past, this Jain view of the elements was interpreted as showing that Jainism was animistic in outlook. Subsequently, however, many scholars have argued against this interpretation.

In this paper, I will first outline the existing scholarship that argues that Jainism is an animistic religion. Then, I will survey research critical of this view. Likewise, the view that Jainism must be old because it is animistic can also frequently be found. However, this view is based on the theory of the evolution of religion that has become the target of much criticism in recent years and therefore requires reexamination.

Next, I examine the counterargument by J. C. Jain. On the basis of the three points, I clarify the way in which his interpretation offers a valid counterargument to earlier scholarship.

The aim of this paper is to examine the transmission of Utpaladeva’s lost Vivṛti preserved in the margin of the manuscripts of the Pratyabhijñā.

It is certain that the Vivṛti was already fragmentary when Śaṅkarakaṇṭha made marginal annotations on the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī in the seventeenth century. Bhāskarakaṇṭha, whose master’s father was Śaṅkarakaṇṭa, does not mention the passages from the Vivṛti in his Bhāskarī, a commentary on the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, it is probable that he did not have even fragments of the Vivṛti. In the Vyākhyā, a South Indian commentary on the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, to date we could not find any fragments of the Vivṛti. It is likely that the Vivṛti was not transmitted to South India when the considerable literature of the Pratyabhijñā was brought from Kashmir to South India.

The School of New Logic (Navya-nyāya) does not accept the semantic theory of suggestion (vyañjanā) proposed by the Dhvani School of poetics, which postulates the semantic power of the poet’s words to suggest an unstated poetic senses that are revealed only to competent readers. This paper reviews the argument against suggestion given by Jagadīśa, the 17th-century New Logician, in his Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (vṛtti to verse 24). He examines the two types of suggestions—lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā and abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā—and reduces the first type to metaphorical signification (lakṣaṇā), and the understanding based on the second type to a kind of perception. The theory of suggestion assumes the symmetric communication of poetic senses between the poet and the competent reader, but Jagadīśa’s reductionism of suggestion severed this communication. The reader is freed from the job of restoring the poet’s message, and has the liberty to interpret and relish poems without restraint. This form of liberal poetics conforms with the liberal epistemology of testimony presented by Gaṅgeśa and adopted by Jagadīśa.

It is doubtful that the rendering of varṇa as “phoneme” has sound grounds, though many scholars, including the author, have used this rendering. The author has made multilateral investigations about the usage of the term “varṇa” in Indian theories of grammar. The conclusion is that it is roughly proper to interpret the term “varṇa” as “phoneme.”

The Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad shows many metrical deviations. In 1924, Johannes Hertel made a critical edition of the Upaniṣad only on the basis of the metrics, but without investigating manuscripts. His text has been used uncritically by some scholars until today, although its reliability is questionable.

Within my doctoral dissertation, I edited a text of the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad, which is based on the study of manuscripts and prints. Language, meter, and philosophical ideas have also been analyzed for this edition.

This paper discusses the reason behind the metrical problems in the text. One result of the study shows that metrical deviations sometimes occur when the Upaniṣad quotes some words or passages from other texts including the Āpastamba-Śrautasūtra of the Black Yajurveda and Paippalāda-Saṃhitā of the Atharvaveda. This demonstrates that the preceding texts had a great influence on the composition and development of the Upaniṣad.

Among the verses in the hymn that found a place as X 102 in the latest layer of the Rigveda, there is a narrative of a person named Mudgala who, along with a woman named Mudgalānī, wins a horse chariot race with a bull cart. The image depicted is that of the bull, towing a cart. This hymn contains materials for later literary references of the chariot driven by Mudgala.

There are several cases in which the actor or the subject of the action is not specifically shown in the constituent verses of this hymn; therefore, there are variations in the interpretation, which have not been highlighted in translations and articles until recently. The common point of these studies is the premise that the cart is two-headed (a bull on one side and a club on one side), from which an allegorical interpretation is advanced.

However, the one-bull cart remains well-known at that time, namely, the cart of Mudgala, who is regarded as a sort of a saint in the context of Atharvaveda XI 3,9. On the other hand, the name also means a kind of bean, namely, the mudgá (Vigna mungo) combined with the suffix -la.

In this paper, I assume that the cart on which Mudgala mounted was a one-bull cart and that the priest outside the hymn prays for a two-horse chariot in front of him. Based on this working hypothesis, I present a translation of the hymn with a focus on the structure of cattle carts and horse chariots.

Not all the verses of the hymn constitute one story or allegory such as the verses that hint at the restoration of reproductive ability. This hymn proves to be a form of prayer that includes vulgar and complex symbolisms (e.g., Mudgala is a symbol of two testicles [two wheels], whereas Mudgalānī symbolizes the scrotum, etc.) and is chanted by the priest, who is the narrator, for the client’s victory in the current chariot race.

We see an example of head-worship with the practice of placing animal-heads under the fire-altar (Agnicayana). In this paper, I address the question why the heads were placed, and I also discuss how head-worship was regarded in ancient India.

According to the Taittirīya-Saṁhitā and Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā≈Kapiṣṭhala-Kaṭha-Saṁhitā, the severed human head should be made fit for a sacrifice through specific ritual procedures, because the head is impure now that it is bereft of the prāṇas. In the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, Prajāpati–who had severed animal-heads and placed them under the altar—made bricks from the mud and water gathered from where he had let the remaining trunks float, reconsidering that they were also needed. These descriptions seem to reflect rather negative feelings over the severed head.

It is also noteworthy that the head is usually not employed at the animal sacrifice, considered to be used for Asura’s sacrifice, and as far as this research shows, the desire to have a head in the yonder world is mentioned only at the Agnicayana. This might be connected to the fact that the Agnicayana is performed for the purpose of being reborn in the heavenly world, and that using severed heads is peculiar to the Agnicayana among the Śrauta rituals.

The night in which the moon, in conjunction with the sun, is invisible from the earth and the full moon night played an important role in Ancient India. It forms a basis of Vedic rituals to stay these two nights around the sacred fires with religious observance, above all fasting, and to perform the next morning the New and Full Moon Sacrifices. The Upavasatha originally means ‘staying overnight around the sacred firesʼ, so that it should have started from sunset. In the later ritual system, however, it was extended to the whole ritual procedures in the preceding day of the New and Full Moon Sacrifices, thus from sunrise.

About the 5 century B.C. it seems to have been deeply rooted in the life of people to stay the new and full moon nights (as well as a waxing and waning half-moon nights) with control of instinctive desires, and thus it was adopted even in Buddhism and Jainism which denied Vedic rituals: Pāli uposatha-/posatha-, BHS upoṣadha-/poṣa­dha-, Amg posaha-. The Uposatha for the Buddhist monks and nuns is a ceremony of reciting the precepts (Pāli Pāṭimokkha/Pātimokkha, BHS Prātimokṣa) in an assembly at the new and full moon nights and seems to have been inherited from the Vedic Upavasatha. For the Buddhist laypeople, on the other hand, the Uposatha takes place on the 8th, 14th, 15th days of a half month. On these days, from early morning till the next morning, 8 constituents of Uposatha (8 moral behaviors) are practiced, among which special importance was laid on fasting, as is seen in the prose narratives of the Jātaka.