This paper compares the teachings of Hakuin Ekaku (1686–1769) with Yongming Yanshou’s (904–976) thoughts on “practice after enlightenment” in the Zongjing lu, with a focus on the following two points.

(1) Although many Buddhist texts such as the Zongjing lu discuss “practice after enlightenment,” Hakuin received the secret method of “practice after enlightenment” from the god Kasuga by means of the Shasekishū (Collection of Sand and Pebbles).

(2) Although Hakuin had read the Zongjing lu, he did not stress its importance. I consider this to be one of the main reasons why the Zongjing lu faded from the consciousness of modern day Japan.

Ŭijŏk’s Posalkyebonso 菩薩戒本疏 is commented using the Yogācārabhūmi 瑜伽師地論 by his contemporary, Sŭngjang 勝莊. But, Ŭijŏk’s ideas of the Religious Precepts and Buddha-nature are different from those of Sŭngjang. Therefore, it is unreasonable to discuss the relationship of influence. His approach is similar to those of Wŏnhyo 元暁 and Fazang 法蔵 in that he used the Yogācārabhūmi to consider the Bodhisattva violation of the precepts as no offence. In particular, his approach is very similar to Fazang’s thinking on the Bodhisattva-culpability. His relationship with Zhiyi 智顗 is likewise discussed because he quoted Zhiyi’s commentary under an alternate name, ‘Gushu 古疏’.

This study examines the thinking on the Religious Precepts in Ŭijŏk’s Posalkyebonso. In doing so, it examines the similarities and differences with post-Zhiyi commentaries. Then, the stude confirms Ŭijŏk’s influence on Táehyŏn 太賢, and reveals the relationship between the two on the Brahmajāla-sūtra.

Zhiyi’s 智顗 Weimojing shu 維摩経疏 and the three major commentaries have different concepts of the ten good deeds. The Weimojing wenshu 維摩経文疏 states that the ten good deeds are the precepts before the ten types of precepts originated from the Da zhidu lun 大智度論. On the other hand, the Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止観 says that the ten good deeds are natural morality, the basis of precepts and the first step of the ten types of precepts. Since three major commentaries were edited by Guanding 灌頂, it is necessary to research their former versions to examine the differences. Both the Yuandun zhiguan 圓頓止観 quoted in Shōshin’s 証真 works and the Zhiguan referred to in Guanding’s Guanxin lunshu 観心論疏 are supposed as the original version of the Mohe zhiguan. In the Yuandun zhiguan, natural morality isn’t included in the ten types of precepts, and their order is also different from that in the current Mohe zhiguan. However, the Guanxin lunshu has the same concept as the current Mohe zhiguan. Therefore, the description about the precepts in the Guanxin lunshu might be different from that of the original Mohe zhiguan. The concept of the ten good deeds in the Weimojing shu doesn’t contradict the Yuandun zhiguan, and that in the three major commentaries would be different from the original. Thus, the characteristic concept of the ten good deeds and natural morality in the three major commentaries might be due to Guanding’s editing.

In preceding studies, Faxian 法詵 (718–778) has been considered as a disciple of Huiyuan 慧苑(673?–743?) who gave Chengguan 澄観 (738–839) instruction in Huayan Buddhism. In this paper, we focused on Faxian’s Fanwang jing shu 梵網経疏, in the process of examining his thought about the three categories of pure precepts 三聚浄戒 and the essence of the precepts 戒体.

Faxian interprets the precepts of the Fanwang jing 梵網経 as the three categories of pure precepts. This interpretation unifies the discussion in Fazang’s Fanwang jing Pusajieben shu 梵網経菩薩戒本疏. In addition, Faxian classifies all the doctrines of Buddhism into five classes of teachings, and assigns the Fanwang jing to the lineage called Zangxing yuanqi zang 蔵性縁起宗, which contains the thought of Tathāgatagarbha and the Dasheng qi xin lun 大乗起信論. This example indicates his awareness, which is different from Fazang’s Fanwang jing Pusajieben shu. Faxian has an interest in the link between Tathāgatagarbha and precepts.

Faxian puts forward two aspects, visible and invisible, of the three categories of pure precepts. The visible moral law is composed of intellection 思 and the invisible moral law is composed of seeds 種子. His conclusion is nearly the same as that in Fazang’s Fanwang jing Pusajieben shu. He updates Fazang’s thought about the essence of the precepts.

Guanding, who is known as inheriting the thought of Zhiyi, regards the Nirvāṇa Sūtra as belonging to the highest rank, which is in fact different from Zhiyi’s hierarchical taxonomy of teachings 教判. Concerning the sūtra’s title, although both of them accept the translation of the expression “摩訶般涅槃那修多羅” as “大滅度,” Guanding uses the word “ji” in the Perfect Teaching 円教 to interpret this “大滅度,” whereas Zhiyi, analytically takes a different approach. Zhiyi refers to only the Lotus Sūtra 法華経 as the Perfect Teaching, which is characterized by “純円独妙,” and this description is also used in the sense of the meaning of “ji” in the Perfect Teaching. On the other hand, Guanding employs both the same description and the word “ji” as applying to the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, which indicates his distinct understanding to the Nirvāṇa Sūtra.

This paper focuses on Zhizang of Kaishan Temple, who was known as one of three great Buddhist monks in the Liang Dynasty. I not only pay attention to Zhizang’s typical identity as a learned monk, especially his later being called a Master of the Chengshi lun, but also emphasize his insistence on the political independence of the saṅgha. Through comparing the surviving fragments of Zhizang’s Chengshilun Dayiji, which were collected by Professor Funayama Tōru, with Zhizang’s other texts, quoted and critiqued by Jizang, I investigate how the Chengshi lun affected Zhizang’s thought, and whether Zhizang could be called a Master of the Chengshi lun.

On his journey of pilgrimage to India, Xuanzang 玄奘 was detained for more than a month in Gaochang 高昌. During his period of custody, Qu Wentai 麴文泰, the king, requested Xuanzang to expound the Renwang sūtra 仁王経, famous for national protection. Xuanzang accepted this invitation, and spent a month to expound this sūtra. In terms of social atmosphere, both China and Gaochang promoted the sūtra. In the case of the king himself, he both believed in this sūtra and felt the need for Buddhism to alleviate the crisis in Gaochang. In the case of Xuanaang, before his journey to the west, he was already familiar with the sūtra, and had the knowledge to expound it. In the commentary of this sūtra written by Yuance 円測, one of Xuanzang’s disciples, we can get a clue to reconstruct what Xuanzang expounded in Gaochang.

Chan Master Nanquan Puyuan (748–834) developed his own Chan ideas by inheriting those of Mazu Daoyi (709–788). His ideas have attracted much attention, especially with regard to the clarification of Mazu’s ideas. In this paper, the clarification on “the union of function and Buddha nature” of Mazu in the NanquanYuyao is studied. In conclusion, Nanquan’s ideas can be characterized as concentration on the truth which is beyond language, concept, and cognition of function. Because there is no form to the truth, nor has it any name, it is inappropriate to cling to verbal concepts such as “the union of mind and Buddha,” “Neither mind nor Buddha,” “The union of cognition and the truth.” In other words, for Nanquan it was clear that no Buddhist concepts should be clung to. This corrects the mistake that simply equates “cognition of function” with “Buddha nature.” However, this does not necessarily deny “the union of function and Buddha nature.” This viewpoint is then inherited by his disciples, such as Changsha Jingceng and Zhaozhou Congnian. The clarification regarding on “the union of function and Buddha nature” has been an important topic and attracted much attention even in the Song Dynasty.

I previously investigated a series of interpretations of rNgog lo tsā ba, Gro lung pa, rGya dmar ba and Phya pa of the definitions of the Two-truths, especially focused on the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya, i.e., śūnyatā), and elucidated the following points:

1. Sa skya pa’s Madhyamaka thought, the so-called “mTha’ bral dBu mar smra ba,” probably has its root, or at least one of its roots, in the interpretations of Gro lung pa and his master rNgog lo tsā ba’s line.

2. Phya pa and his master rGya dmar ba established their interpretations that regard emptiness (śūnyatā) as the object of cognition by criticizing the interpretation of rNgog’s line, and the interpretation of Phya pa’s line was probably accepted by dGe lug pa in later periods.

3. It was on how to interpret k. 3cd and k. 4 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga that Gro lung pa and Phya pa went their separate ways, and, as a result of their controversies, two different lines of Madhyamaka thought were generated in Tibet.

If the above-mentioned assumptions were correct, Tsong kha pa would have established his own Madhyamaka thought under the strong influence of the interpretation of Phya pa’s line, which was based on *Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thought. This would further make us re-evaluate the prevailing interpretation that Tsong kha pa established his own Madhyamaka thought in accordance with the *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka line under the mysterious instruction of Mañjuśrī with the assistance of the translator Bla ma dBu ma pa.

In this paper, I have investigated the subject of “the meaning of division (dbye ba’i don)” of the Two-truths, which is closely related with the definitions (mtshan nyid) of the Two-truths, and drawn the following conclusions:

1. On this subject, Tsong kha pa introduced two different interpretations of early Tibetan scholars: (1) “gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad” and (2) “ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad”, The former is identifed with Gro lung pa’s interpretation, while the latter is identified with that of Phya pa.

2. Tsong kha pa accepted the latter interpretation of Phya pa’s line as his own, together with the source of Bodhicittavivaraṇa k. 68 cited in Phya pa’s text, and this interpretation was generally accepted by his followers in the dGe lugs pa tradition.

3. On the other hand, the former interpretation of Gro lung pa’s line was generally accepted by Sa skya pa scholars such as Go ram pa and others.

The buddhakāya theory described in chapter 8 of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra has been interpreted as either a threefold or a fourfold embodiment system. However, Dol po pa insists that it is useless to argue concerning the number of buddhakāya; rather than deny a threefold or a fourfold system, he accepts both, depending on the context. In addition, he has commented on and adopted some views of the buddhakāya in esoteric Buddhism, which has no direct relationship with the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. Thus, Dol po pa would like to apply all aspects of the buddhakāya theories, including that of esoteric Buddhism, to his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.

The manuscript called the Bhūtaḍāmarabhaṭṭārakasādhana, a maṇḍalavidhi based on the Bhūtaḍāmaratantra, consists of two texts: the first half is a sādhana manual of Bhūtaḍāmalamaṇḍala named Bhūtaḍāmarabhaṭṭārakasādhana, the second half is an abhiṣekavidhi named Bhūtaḍāmaramaṇḍalopayika. The details of the author, Subhūtipālita, are unknown, but in some of Bu ston rin chen grub’s works, Subhūtipālita is mentioned as a teacher or disciple of Ānandagarbha, an expert in the Yogatantras. Interestingly, there are many similarities between the Bhūtaḍāmaramaṇḍalopayika and an abhiṣekavidhi in the Sarvavajrodayā by Ānandagarbha. Therefore, it seems that there was a close relationship between these two scholar-monks. This paper introduces the sources of the Bhūtaḍāmarabhaṭṭārakasādhana and compares the synopses of the Bhūtaḍāmaramaṇḍalopayika and the Sarvavajrodayā to show that in structure they mostly correspond. However, we can find some differences in the details. This paper also points out that these differences are found in other maṇḍalavidhi texts such as Dīpaṅkarabhadra’s Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi.

The Mahāmantrānusāriṇī (MN) is a Buddhist scripture associated with the Pañcarakṣā, a unit of five dhāraṇī. This dhāraṇī sūtra has two versions, an A version (MN-A) and a B version (MN-B).

In the MN-A, Buddha bestows the MN on Ānanda, who subsequently practices it. Moreover, in the MN-B, after the Buddha responds to Brahman, he preaches the MN to Ānanda. The main point in common between these two versions is preaching the dhāraṇī for the purpose of quelling plagues. However, many other contents of the MN-A differ from those in the MN-B. For example, the MN-A is set in Vaiśālī, but the MN-B is set in the Jetavana.

On the other hand, the MN-B is similar to the Mahāmāyūrī (MY) rather than to the MN-A. For example, both are preached in the same place, and both are described as being protected by knowing the names of many rakṣasī, etc. In this paper, I present the key features of the MN-B in the Tibetan translation.

In his Apoha Theory, Dignāga argues that when two words stand in a hyper-hyponym relationship (sāmānya-viśeṣa relationship), each word does not exclude the other, and that the meaning (artha) of the hyponym includes the meaning of the hypernym. Using symbolic logic, the author of the present paper has formalized the meaning of a word on a given group of words each of which has a definite extension. A result of formalization is that the negation in the negative compound behaves like a negation in intuitionistic logic, rather than a negation in classical logic, in which the law of double negation holds.

The present paper introduces two implication-free propositional subsystems of Gentzen’s LK (classical logic), one of which is equivalent with Gentzen’s LJ (intuitionistic logic), and names both systems “Apoha logic”. The present paper shows that in relation to Dignāga’s three-part-inference, we can, under some logical conditions, deduce in Apoha logic the double negation of the proposition (pratijñā) from the premises–––the inferential reason (hetu) and the negative concomitance (vyatireka)–––whereas in Apoha logic we cannot necessarily deduce the proposition from the premises.

It is well known that Dignāga’s syllogism consists of three members, namely thesis (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta). Dignāga rejects the Naiyāyika’s theory of the five-membered syllogism, and does not regard application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana) as members of the syllogism, as he considers these to be of no value. According to him, hetu and two types of dṛṣṭānta should be stated to show the three characteristics of a correct probans, that is, pakṣadharmatā, sapakṣasattva, and vipakṣāsattva. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya (-vṛtti), Dignāga explains that pakṣa, stated to show the object of reasoning, is not nessesary for a proof. However, he cannot completely abandon the statement of pakṣa, and states a pakṣa in his syllogisms.

Dharmakīrti’s syllogism drastically differs from Dignāga’s, as illustrated by a typical example as follows: “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot, etc. And sound is produced.” Dharmakīrti’s syllogism consists of two members, vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā, and he never states a pakṣa. The statement of pakṣadharmatā may be regarded as hetu. However, unlike Dignāga, who states it with an ablative case as a reason, such as kṛtakatvāt, Dharmakīrti directly shows it, such as śabdaś ca kṛtakaḥ. The statement of vyāpti may be regarded as the dṛṣṭānta. Unlike Dignāga, who states two kinds of dṛṣṭānta, Dharmakīrti states only one kind. Moreover, the order of the two members is changed, with vyāpti stated first, and pakṣadharmatā stated second.

From an historical perspective, Dharmakīrti and his followers regard the statement of pakṣadharmatā in their syllogism as hetu, even though it seems to play the role of upanaya. By making the statement of pakṣadharmatā, the general rule established is applied to the subject of concern. Such a statement is nothing but upanaya, and some logicians of other schools point out that the statement of pakṣadharmatā stated in Dharmakīrti’s syllogism should be regarded as upanaya, not as hetu. Therefore, Dharmakīrti’s syllogism structually resembles Aristotle’s syllogism in that vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā correspond to the major premise and the minor premise, respectively.

When describing the sākārajñānavādipakṣa, i.e., the thesis of those who hold that cognition is endowed with images, Kamalaśīla explicitly states that manifold images (ākāra) are unreal (asatya) and not absolutely true (pāramārthika). His statement can be interpreted as a negation of the theory of citrādvaita common to the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras from the higher perspective peculiar to the Yogācāras, particularly in relation to the asallakṣanānupraveśopāya in which grāhya is denied. In other words, this statement should not be taken as an expression of the alīkākāravāda, i.e., the view that images are false. Therefore, we do not have to abandon our common presumption that the sākārajñānavāda is equivalent to what is later called satyākāravāda. Kamalaśīla’s statement is acceptable in the well-established framing of our theoretical understanding. The value of asatya can vary according to whether the contrast is between parikalpita and paratantra, or between paratantra and pariniṣpanna. The issue that Funayama 2007 raised can be solved in this way. Otherwise, we would have to completely give up our common understanding, because what Kamalaśīla calls sākārajñānavāda would correspond to the alīkākāravāda.

The term ālokasaṃjñā is used in several different passages in the Yogācārabhūmi and there are studies related to each. In this paper, I rethink the meaning of ālokasaṃjñā seen especially in the context of the meditation on the impure (aśubhabhāvanā) in the Śrāvakabhūmi, and consider its originality through comparison with other treatises.

Firstly, ālokasaṃjñā is a method for a practitioner to brighten his mind by grasping external light before he observes impure objects. And secondly, it is one element of aśubhabhāvanā to keep objects clearer and brighter in his mind while repeatedly performing śamatha and vipaśyanā meditations.

Ālokasaṃjñā as the preparation for aśubhabhāvanā is taught in the Chinese translation of the Smṛtyupasthānasūtra, and the method with śamatha and vipaśyanā is seen in the Dharmaskandha. Regarding the process of aśubhabhāvanā, there is no explicit similarity with other texts, although the Vibhāṣā and the Abhidharmakośa indicate the meditation on pure objects and Dhyāna Sūtras speak of visualization of luminous bones. Thus, we can see that ālokasaṃjñā in the process of aśubhabhāvanā is an idea unique to the Śrāvakabhūmi. The Samāhitabhūmi and the Bhāvanāmayībhūmi do not mention ālokasaṃjñā with aśubhabhāvanā. However, the latter text considers ālokasaṃjñā to be a mental act to form the clear vision/memory of dharmas obtained by śamatha and vipaśyanā, and this suggests the influence of the Śrāvakabhūmi.

In the Mahāyānasaṅgraha, Asaṅga refers to the spiritual awakening called āśrayaparāvṛtti, the conversion of the individual ontological base. For the sake of this awakening, one must hear Buddha’s instruction in the beginning. By hearing that, śrutavāsanābīja, the spiritual potential for awakening, is impressed on one’s ontological base called dharmakāya, the primordial body of Buddha. From this potential, manojalpa (mind’s talk), the Buddhist rational consciousness, occurs. And from this consciousness, nirvikalpajñāna, the Buddhist wisdom without differentiation, occurs. This wisdom leads us to āśrayaparāvṛtti which converts the ontological base from ālayavijñāna, our secular ontological base, to dharmakāya. After this awakening, we obtain sarvajñajñāna (omniscient wisdom), the highest Buddhist wisdom. On tracing this kind of process of wisdom’s development, I make clear the structure of āśrayaparāvṛtti in the Mahāyānasaṅgraha.

Previous researches have pointed out that Kamalaśīla, a Mādhyamika, engages the criticism of the inference system of Bhāviveka, and defends Bhāviveka. Because of this, it can be said that when Kamalaśīla proves the absence of Self-nature, his standpoint is basically the same as that of Bhāviveka. However, is this true? I consider the point through the proof of being not from no cause.

Candrakīrti criticizes Bhāviveka’s explanation of ahetu as *kuhetu. Kamalaśīla does not defend Bhāviveka on this point, and Kamalaśīla himself does not explain ahetu as *kuhetu. Because of this, Kamalaśīla does not explain ahetu as *kuhetu as does Bhāviveka, and in regard to this point, Kamalaśīla does not always hold the same standpoint as does Bhāviveka.

The Tathāgataguhya-sūtra, which is quoted in the Prasannapadā and so on, includes the Buddha’s biography from the time of his asceticism to his “turning the wheel” of the doctrine. This paper points out that the Buddha’s biography taught in the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra corresponds with that in the Lalitavistara, based on a comparison of their Sanskrit texts.

The enlarging of Buddhist Scriptures essentially ceased in Pāli Buddhism after the initiation of commentaries on the scriptures. Conversely, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, adding words to the sūtras continued even after this initiation of commentaries. The purpose of the present study is to identify some factors that allowed Buddhists to add words to the descriptions of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. First, I argue that the descriptions that urge Buddhists to transcribe the sūtras and give them to others might make it difficult for Buddhists to stop changing words in the sūtras. Second, I argue that Buddhists might not have stopped enlarging the sūtras because enlargement is not prohibited in the sūtras, even though forgetting and losing only one word in the sūtras is forbidden.

The Śālistambasūtra is one of the Mahāyāna sūtras devoted to the subject of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), and is preservd in its entirety in one Tibetan and five Chinese translations (T 708–712). Although the full Sanskrit text of the sūtra is no longer extant, a large number of fragmentary Sanskrit texts are preserved in various Mahāyāna works. Many western scholars have tried to reconstruct the original Sanskrit text on the basis of the Tibetan translation. There is, however, no attempt to consider the historical change of the philosophy and the textual relationship among the Chinese translations. This paper aims at this attempt from the philological and philosophical points of view.

A closer examination of the texts reveals the following:

(1) The earliest Chinese translation (T 708) by Zhi Qian 支謙(A.D. 195?–255?) does not contain the structural elements characterizing Mahāyāna sūtra literature.

(2) The other Chinese translations, aside from that by Zhi Qian, can be classified into two groups: (a) those belonging to the Madhyamaka school (T 710 and T 712); (b) those belonging to the Yogācāra school (T 709 and T 711).

(3) Consideration of the texts of the Tibetan and the Chinese translations convinces us that the original Sanskrit text translated into Tibetan is akin to that translated into Chinese by anonymous translators (T 712). It is interesting to note that there are many similarities of diction between the Sanskrit text reconstructed on the basis of the Tibetan translation and the fragmentary Sanskrit text quoted in Śāntideva (685–763)’s Śikṣāsamuccaya, which suggests that the original Sanskrit text translated into Chinese by the anonymous translators (T 712) dates to somewhere between the seventh and the eighth century CE.

The “Devendrasamaya-parivarta” is the 12th chapter of the Sanskrit Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra, a Mahāyāna text composed in India in the 4th century. Kanaoka [1980], an authoritative study on the Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra in Japanese, argued that this chapter expresses two views on the authority of kings, the theory of the divine right of kings of Brahmanism and the Buddhist concept that good karma in previous lives leads to positive rewards (the throne). This study also deduced that the chapter advised sovereigns to govern using the dharma of Bodhisattva doctrines. The present paper determines that the “Devendrasamaya-parivarta” is based on the Buddhist concept of “Sow evil and reap evil.” Moreover, through a comparison of the usage of dharma in the Ratnāvalī by Nāgārjuna, which expresses instructions for the government by a Bodhisattva king, this paper demonstrates that the dharma here is akin to the examples in Jātakas and that it is not the dharma of Bodhisattva doctrines.

This article investigates whether the donors mentioned in the sixth varga, Dānapāramitā, of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra (the 12th sūtra of the Mahāratnakūṭa Collection) are lay or monastic bodhisattvas. Firstly, it is pointed out that the list of donated items appearing in this varga is found in the Four Chinese Āgamas. In the Four Āgamas the donors of the donated items, identical to the ones listed in this varga, are lay bodhisattvas, so it is inferred that the donors in this varga are also lay bodhisattvas. Secondly, given the fact that only secular items are emphasized in this varga, and that an example is given of a weaver named Sūtracunaka who achieved enlightenment by his donation, it is clarified that the donors mentioned in this varga are lay bodhisattvas.

The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is certainly one of the most popular early Mahāyāna sūtras and, compared to what is considered as the tradition, has a quite unique narrative style and a story setting. Just like the unorthodoxy of this sūtra, bodhisattvas depicted in the story are not only many and various but also very unusual and remarkable. Surprisingly, and despite its popularity, hardly any prior studies have shed light on this topic. There are few previous researches that discussed the bodhisattva doctrine expounded in the sūtra. Their focus, however, is placed mainly on Vimalakīrti himself as the ideal of a Mahāyāna bodhisattva.

Therefore, in this paper, it is intended firstly to outline such diversity of bodhisattvas, including those from other Buddha Lands, and secondly to examine the two bodhisattva types (mudrā) of this world described in the text, by comparing them with the four stages of bodhisattva development seen in the early Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.

The Cāndravyākaraṇa, the Sanskrit grammar text consisting of the Cāndrasūtra by Candragomin (ca. 5^th c.) and its commentary Cāndravṛtti by Dharmadāsa (ca. 5–6^th c.), is called “Buddhist Grammar” by modern scholars. It aided Buddhists to study Sanskrit grammar. Previous studies have tried to point out the work’s Buddhist characteristics. However, this approach is open to question. This paper examines whether the authors composed their work by considering grammatical arguments found in Buddhist literature. The paper also focuses on the argument regarding the usage of the Ktvā suffix in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Vasubandhu (ca. 4–5^th c.). He provided an etymological interpretation of the word pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), and discussed the validity of using the Ktvā suffix against grammarians. To justify his interpretation, he followed the suggestions by Kātyāyana (ca. 3^rd c. B.C.). Accordingly, it seems important for Buddhists to study Kātyāyana’s suggestions. However, Candragomin and Dharmadāsa did not prescribe them. The commentator Ratnamati (ca. 10^th c.) noted them as a supplementary explanation in his Cāndravyākaraṇapañjikā. This leads us to presume that the authors attached less importance to Buddhist arguments in composing their work. For this reason, we should be careful in designating the Cāndravyākaraṇa as “Buddhist Grammar.”

I have been researching some of the Sanskrit fragments in a private collection in Virginia, USA since October, 2011. My research has revealed that some of these fragments belong to the Vinayavibhaṅga, some to the Saṃyuktāgama, and so on.

Some folios still remain stuck together in a fragment numbered F 22.3 + G 14.4 + G 19.1. From that an issue arises; the A-side of the fragment belongs to Sūtras 907–908 of the Za-ahan-jing 雑阿含経. On the other hand, its B-side has two possibilities: it could belong to Naissargikā Pāyattikā 18 in the Vinayavibhaṅga, or Sūtra 911 of the Za-ahan-jing. The text of the B-side corresponds more accurately to Naissargikā Pāyattikā 18 than to Sūtra 911. Thus, it is possible that the side could belong to Naissargikā Pāyattikā 18 in the Vinayavibhaṅga.

Thus, both sides of the same fragment could belong to different texts. This is the case with fragments 2627/1.3 (Sūtras 482–483 of the Za-ahan-jing and the Bhaiṣajyavastu in the Vinayavastu) and G 16.2 (the Apannakasūtra in the Dīrghāgama and the Bhaiṣajyavastu).

The actual circumstances of sutra recitation in Sectarian Buddhism have not yet been elucidated. In this paper, I examine sūtra recitation in the Divyāvadāna, focusing on svādhyāya- and √paṭh-. As a conclusion, sūtra recitation in the Divyāvadāna means the fundamental practice of studying Buddha’s teaching, and confession of belief in Buddhism. Besides, in the Dharmarucyavadāna (chapter 18), there is a scene depicting the gratification of Śākyamuni Buddha as a karmic result (vipāka) of recitation of the words of Kāśyapa Buddha. In the Mākandhikāvadāna (chapter 36), the waiting maids of Queen Śyāmāvatī, viz., Buddhist laywomen, recite and write down the words of Buddha on a daily basis.

In his article, “The Doctorinal Canonization of the Kathāvatthu” (IBK, Vol.63, No.3, 2015, pp.1243–1249), Toshifumi Shimizu investigated a discussion about the Kathāvatthu in the Aṭṭhasālinī, and concluded that, in order to accept what was spoken by the Buddha’s disciples (sāvakabhāsita) as “the word of the Buddha,” Theravādins required three conditions: (1) being based on māṭikā demonstrated by the Buddha, (2) corresponding to sabbaññutañāṇa, and (3) being retroactively approved with anumodanā given by the Buddha. However, his argument is not reasonable. The Aṭṭhasālinī explicitly mentions the reason why the Kathāvatthu composed by Moggaliputtatissa is buddhabhāsita as that, after the prediction of the Buddha, Moggaliputtatissa, following the summary (māṭikā) established by the Buddha, expounded it with the method given by the Buddha. The commentator compares it with the Madhupiṇḍikasutta of the Majjhimanikāya. In this sutta, the Buddha gives his disciples a brief discourse, and later Mahākaccāna expounds it to them in detail. That is finally confirmed by the Buddha saying, “I would have explained it in the same way that Mahākaccāna did. Such is exactly the meaning of this. Receive it as it is.”

It is noteworthy that the Pāli commentator did not intend to establish a general principle to regard sāvakabhāsita as buddhabhāsita, and also the Pāli commentator, in spite of his exertion to regard the Kathāvatthu as buddhabhāsita, agrees that what the Pāli tipiṭaka called “Buddhavacana” (the word of the Buddha) consists not only of buddhabhāsita, but also of sāvakabhāsita, and so on. Thus acknowledging a text to be buddhabhāsita is not equivalent to its canonization. Relating to the canonization of the Kathāvatthu, we may rather note that Moggaliputtatissa was pre-approved with the Buddha’s prediction and was entrusted as a successor by the arahats at the second council to purge the saṅgha by holding the third council with this work.

The aim of this paper is to introduce the meaning of the word Samasīsin, and to clarify its usage in Pāli Buddhist literature. According to the Pali English Dictionary, this word Samasīsin is simply endowed with the meaning “one who simultaneously attains an end of craving and of life.” This paper shows how this word is explained in Abhidharma materials and Pali Buddhist Commentaries.

The significance of this word is found in the consideration of the suicide problem in Buddhism. It is worth discussing as a theme because the usage of the word Samasīsin gives a logical explanation to the obtainment of arhatship by monks who committed suicide.

In my preceding paper (Okano 2018), a new critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the SGK (“the Verses of the Six Realms of Existence”) was published, together with its Tibetan, Pāli, and Chinese texts. In the Chinese Tripiṭaka, there are five texts that are closely related to the SGK. In that paper, I showed details of correspondence of the SGK with those five important parallel Chinese texts. The five texts are as follows: (1) the Liuqu lunhui jing (六趣輪廻経 No. 726), (2) the Foshuo liudao qietuo jing (仏説六道伽陀経 No. 725), (3) the Fenbie yebao lüe jing (分別業報略経 No. 723), (4) the second half part of the Fenbie shan’e suoqi jing (分別善悪所起経 No. 729), (5) a long quotation in the Da zhidu lun (大智度論 No. 1509). It is well known that texts (1) and (2) are Chinese translations of the SGK. The relationship between the SGK and the Chinese texts (3) and (4) has not been studied so far, but their elucidation has great significance for the study of the SGK. Texts (3) and (4) seem to be two different Chinese translations of the same Sanskrit work, which is probably “a sister recension” of the SGK and belongs to the Sarvāstivādins.

This paper concentrates on comparing the contents and structure of text (3) and the SGK. My aim is to clarify commonalities and differences between these two recensions of the SGK, which I believe derived from a common source, the Ur-SGK.

The Pātimokkha consists of prohibitive rules, with the exception of the sekhiyā section, which is a guide to etiquette in daily life. The Suttavibhaṅga, the old commentary on the Pātimokkha, also comprises prohibitive components. There is little mention in the Pātimokkha and Suttavibhaṅga of what monks can do; therefore, it is difficult to know which behaviors, in relation to clothing, food, and housing, are acceptable based on these texts.

This is also true of the Dantapoṇasikkhāpada, which I discuss in this paper. While the Dantapoṇasikkhāpada prohibits monks from eating anything other than alms food, the Suttavibhaṅga focuses on providing a precise explanation of this prohibitive rule. However, when we refer to the monastic texts more widely, the acceptable ways of acquiring food that do not conflict with this rule become visible to us. For example, in the Bhesajjakkhandhaka, we can find an exception to the rule. In addition, the Samantapāsādikā (Sp)’s commentary on the rule includes numerous cases related to how monks should acquire food.

In this paper, I will examine the legitimate methods of food acquisition based on these texts. This paper is only a first step undertaking a more complete body of research; consequently, the results of the examination will be limited to the following four points:

1) It is essential for monks to receive (paṭiggaṇhāti) food from others in order for them to eat. According to Sp, receiving food is acceptable under the following five conditions: a) the food is sufficiently small and lightweight for it to be lifted by a man of average body strength; b) both the donor and the recipient are in close proximity (hatthapāsa) to each other; c) the donor demonstrates an attitude of offering (abhihāra) (e.g. by bowing to the recipient); d) gods, people, or animals donate food with “body” (kāya), “what is connected with body” (kāyapaṭibaddha), or “releasing” (nissaggiya); e) the monk receives the food with “body” or “what is connected with body.”

2) According to the Suttavibhaṅga’s commentary on the Dantapoṇasikkhāpada, collecting food for the purpose of eating it oneself is a dukkaṭa offense, but according to the Bhesajjakkhandhaka, collecting food for oneself is permissible when it is extremely difficult to obtain. However, consuming food that has not been received from “one who makes things legal” (kappiyakāraka) is not permissible.

3) It is permissible to collect food to give to others and for purposes other than eating. However, it is necessary to receive food from others when they change their minds and want to eat it themselves.

4) Because the Sp’s commentary on the Dantapoṇasikkhāpada does not address the pros and cons of “gleaning” (uñcha), it is uncertain whether this practice contradicts the Dantapoṇasikkhāpada. However, the possibility exists that the Dantapoṇasikkhāpada permits monks to glean.

In Middle Indo-Aryan verbs, middle endings are merged into active endings, whereas the passive (-ya-/-ī̆ya-) stem and the causative (-e-/-pe- etc.) stem function as the middle (voice). In this paper I report new, additional instances of a function of the middle shown by the passive stem.

The Old Indo-Aryan verb prati-muc means “to put something on something (active), to put something on oneself (middle).” In this case, a function of the middle is indirect-reflexive (or affective). In Pāli, prati-muc has the passive form paṭimucca-ti as opposed to the active form paṭimuñca-ti. At Saṃyutta-nikāya I 24, the passive form appears in “so veraṃ paṭimuccati <he harbors hostility>.” Although scholars have not pointed out this instance so far, paṭimuccati is appropriate for an indirect-reflexive middle from the viewpoint of meaning. Buddhagosa’s commentary also supports this opinion by supplementing the reflexive pronoun “attani.”

Jātaka IV 285 (parallel VI 148) is another example. In this instance, although the manuscripts contain the verb “paṭimuccatu <suffer!>”, the European editor reads this as “paṭimuñcatu.” This alteration arises from a misunderstanding. If we consider paṭimuccatu to function as an indirect-reflexive middle, there is no need to alter the original reading. Accordingly, knowledge of this phenomenon affects textual criticism.

In this paper, I discuss the various meanings of inner pasāda (Skt. prasāda) in the Pāli canon.

Pasāda has the basic meaning of “to calm” and “to be pure”, and also means “joy,” “satisfaction,” and “faith,” etc. The latter meanings derive from the fact that pasāda can represent positive feelings depending on the context.

In the discussion, I point out the possibility that pasāda as “faith” can be explained from the perspective that “doubt,” which is an antonym of “faith,” becomes “calm down” and the mind is “purified”.

Conventional translation assigns two meanings to kāma in the Suttanipāta, ‘desire’ and ‘the objects of pleasure’. In this study, I analyze these two meanings, the two sides of kāma, as follows. On one side is the mechanism of the person wanting something, and on the other side are the things made into wanted objects by this mechanism. Based on this reasoning, I inspect the meaning ascribed to kāma in every instance in the Suttanipāta.

Based on this, I found that most uses of the word kāma in the Suttanipāta indicated things were considered objects of desire through the mechanism of wanting something. In addition, I found that this meaning is related to kāma used in the plural form.

This paper examines a notable expression often seen in the Early Upaniṣads and Early Buddhist texts, which consists of the four verbs; to see (√dṛś), to hear (√śru), to think (√man), and to discern (vi-√jñā). This examination mainly deals with Chapter VII of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, in brief comparison to Chapter V of the Suttanipāta, as both of these texts contain abundant examples of the four-verb expression. The examination of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad shows both positive and negative uses of the four verbs. The positive use takes the four acts as referring to understanding objects through religious learning or practice. The negative denies any objectification in the light of the concept of ātman, which extends over this whole world including the agent and all objects. On the other hand, the Suttanipāta consistently discourages one from doing the four acts. In conclusion, this comparative examination helps to understand how the Buddha could develop the idea of an-ātman by criticizing the four acts.

Because the Chinese translations of the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya and Mahīśāsaka Vinaya lack any equivalent of the term “being a compassionate one” (kāruññatā), which expresses the motivation for the Buddha’s first sermon in current Pāli texts, and because Śākyamuni had no consideration for others leading up to attaining his enlightenment, the phrase “ca ...... sattesu ca kāruññataṃ paṭicca” was likely added by later generations. This shows that compassion as a motivation behind the Buddha’s first sermon cannot be traced directly back to Śākyamuni himself. Therefore, it is understood that the Buddha’s first sermon is not based on compassion.

Between the two motives of “Brahmā’s entreaty” and “kāruññatā”, the latter only holds any significance when occurring after Brahmā’s entreaty. Therefore, it is likely wrong to treat the idea of having compassion towards others as the same as recognizing Brahmā’s entreaty when trying to understand the motivation behind the Buddha’s first sermon. However, if one were to explore the intentions of the authors of the Pāli texts, I suppose Buddhists who understood the motive of “ca ...... sattesu ca kāruññataṃ paṭicca” were critical of the motivation behind the Buddha’s first sermon expressed by the Brahmā’s entreaty and held a negative view of its significance.

Jain Literature preserves major versions of the Rāma and Kṛṣṇa stories. Vimalasūri and other Jain authors wrote many Jain Rāma stories. The authors also referred to Kṛṣṇa stories in their works. But Kṛṣṇa was almost always one of the characters in Neminātha hagiographies.

Jain narratives brought in the Rāma and Kṛṣṇa stories as an essential part. There remains much work about the Jain Rāma story from the 5th century. Jain authors seem to have been keen to portray Rāma as Baladeva, who does not kill anybody and will reach enlightenment. Therefore, the role of killing Rāvaṇa shifted to Lakṣmaṇa in order that Rāma observe ahiṃsā. But other murders by Rāma were often overlooked by authors, although the ahiṃsā of Rāma was the most crucial element for the story.

Because of the inconsistency among Jain Rāma stories, this paper investigates the peculiarity of Rāma stories in Jain works, comparing them to the Kṛṣṇa story, which is very close to Neminātha.

This paper considers votive offerings to vastu-devatās who are invoked at the building site, focusing on the architectural theory of the Mayamata.

Even though the Mayamata and the Manasara are both classified as Hindu architectural theses, they are very different in their descriptions of votive offerings, and it consequently seems that there is no direct relationship between the Mayamata and the Manasara. Therefore the Mayamata is considered to have its own originality. And even in the area where the Mayamata was compiled, it was no longer respected at the end of the 20th century. In ancient times, consecration of the site was to be done correctly as described in the architectural thesis as a pre-architectural ritual, but later it became obsolete; only the name was left, and it was superseded by other rituals.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Kashmirian Nyāya scholar, uses the two terms “totality” (sāmagrī) and “connection” (saṃsarga/saṃsṛṣṭi) to establish his new definition of pramāṇa and respond to the refutations of opponents in the first chapter of his Nyāyamañjarī. As Marui (2014) has suggested, Jayanta’s new definition of pramāṇa being a totality differs conspicuously from the traditional ones given by Naiyāyika scholars. The two terms are actually keywords to understand Jayanta’s new theory in a clearer way. This paper tries to determine the difference between the two terms by analyzing several key passages where they occur. The conclusion is that the term totality is used to describe the state of assemblage or aggregate which possesses pre-eminence (atiśaya) with regard to its constituents, while connection is a kind of mutual relation among the constituents of a totality, which possess expectancy with regard to a result not belonging to the same totality.

This paper discusses the incompatibility between satkāryavāda and the accumulation theory. According to the classical Sāṃkhya system, especially in the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa, the five elements (bhūta) are respectively generated from the five tanmātras. To explain, the ether element (ākāśa) is generated from the sound (śabda) tanmātra; the wind element (vāyu) from the touch (sparśa) tanmātra; the fire element (tejas) from the color (rūpa) tanmātra; the water element (ap) from the taste (rasa) tanmātra; and the earth element (pr̥thivī) from the smell (gandha) tanmātra. According to most commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, however, the properties of the wind and the following elements are acknowledged to be accumulative; more specifically, the wind element possesses sound and touch; the fire element possesses sound, touch, and color; the water element possesses sound, touch, color, and taste; and the earth element possesses sound, touch, color, taste, and smell. This accumulation theory is theoretically incompatible with satkāryavāda, which is a representative doctrine of the classical Sāṃkhya system, according to which effects potentially preexist in their causes before their production.

This incompatibility cannot be resolved in the commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā; on the contrary, a difficulty of the accumulation theory is inadvertently exposed, especially in the commentary Yuktidīpikā. In the Yuktidīpikā each tanmātra is considered a pure element as a kind of “universal,” whereas these five tanmātras themselves also accumulatively possess their own property/properties. This difficulty suggests that the accumulation theory was originally incompatible with satkāryavāda.

In fact, a close examination of the accumulation theory in the Mokṣadharma section of the Mahābhārata (12.224.35–39) shows that the accumulation theory can effectively function under the scheme of the element generated from the preceding element. Under this scheme, which is totally different from that in the classical Sāṃkhya system, the ether element generates the wind element; the wind element generates the fire element; the fire element generates the water element; and the water element generates the earth element. This affinity between the accumulation theory and this scheme can be corroborated by Śaṅkara’s commentaries on the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara in his commentary on Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.1, according to which the elements are generated from particular elements one by one, much more persuasively expounds the accumulation of the property than in his commentary on Praśnopaniṣad 6.4, according to which the elements are generated from prāṇa all together in no specific order. Taking everything into consideration, we can surmise that the accumulation theory is incompatible with the evolutionary scheme in the Sāṃkhya system, by which we conclude that this theory is one of the key concepts in determining the date when satkāryavāda was introduced or was modified.

One of the words used to refer to a bodhisattva in Mahāyāna Buddhism is satpuruṣa (P. sappurisa). This word, meaning “good man,” is found already in early Buddhist texts, especially in verses. For example, in very early texts such as the Dhammapada it refers to the Buddha, and this usage is reflected in the Mahāvastu and other biographies of the Buddha.

Again, in the Sappurisa-sutta in the Majjhimanikāya, sappurisa refers to an outstanding monk who neither boasts about himself nor looks down on others, while in the Dīghanikāya and Saṃyuttanikāya it refers to a “stream-enterer.” This tradition of equating the satpuruṣa (sappurisa) with someone who is still on the path of training was also carried over in Abhidharma texts of the Northern tradition, such as the Mahāvibhāṣā and Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. At the same time, there are also instances, such as the Sappurisa-sutta in the Aṅguttaranikāya and some suttas in the Saṃyuttanikāya, in which this term refers to a lay Buddhist householder who gives alms to practitioners.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the satpuruṣa, who had been depicted either as a renunciant such as the Buddha and his disciples or occasionally as a layman, came to be used synonymously with kulaputra and bodhisattva and was also depicted in certain circumstances as a lay bodhisattva. This term is not found very often in early Mahāyāna scriptures, but subsequently seven bodhisattvas starting with Bhadrapāla developed into a tradition of sixteen satpuruṣa. That is to say, with the organization and popularization of Mahāyāna Buddhism the position of satpuruṣa also changed. These changes in usage mirror changes in the meaning of bodhisattva.

In this paper, focusing on the concept of satpuruṣa, I examine examples of the usage of terms such as bodhisattva and kulaputra through a comparison ranging from early Buddhism to Mahāyāna Buddhism. By doing so, I hope to clarify one aspect of how the transmission of Mahāyāna Buddhism evolved.