At Śṛngeri Maṭha, the center of the Śaṅkaran religious traditions, world renouncers practice ascetic training derived from the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkara, who has been traditionally believed to be the founder of this maṭha. Through their ascetic training, they intend to attain emancipation by deepening human consciousness. According to Śaṅkara, with the metaphorical discourse of “sleep,” the process of deepening consciousness toward emancipation consists of four states: “waking” (jāgrat), “dream” (svapna), “deep sleep” (suṣupta), and “the fourth” (turīya). Regarding human consciousness as multi-layered, the world renouncers attempt to descend into the depth of consciousness called “the fourth”(turīya) from the “waking” state which is the surface of consciousness, passing through the states of “dream” and “deep sleep.” This process can be understood on the basis of the Śaṅkaran religious traditions’ theory of the structure of consciousness, which ranges from the ordinary consciousness to the extraordinary one. This article attempts to clarify how, on the basis of Śaṅkara’s Advaita philosophy, the Jagadguru, the head of Śṛngeri Maṭha, discusses the process of deepening consciousness toward emancipation.

The first Chinese translation of the large Buddhāvataṁsaka-sūtra, the sixty-fascicle Huayan jing 華厳経 by Buddhabhadra, was completed in 421. The second Chinese translation, in eighty fascicles by Śikṣānanda, was completed in 699.

The first Chinese translation lacked two parts in the Gaṇḍavyūha. One part is the episode of Kalyāṇamitra from Tianzhuguang 天主光 to Desheng 徳生 and Youde 有徳. Another part is one passage in the episode of Wenshushili 文殊師利.

Divākara, who came to China in the latter part of the 7^th century, translated the Gaṇḍavyūha in 680. His translation added in the missing parts of the first Chinese translation. This version forms the edition of the sixty-fascicle Huayan jing in the Korean and Taishō canons.

The second Chinese translation also lacked the episode of Wenshushili. This missing part was supplemented by using Divākara’s translation. This version forms the edition of the eighty-fascicle Huayan jing in the Korean and Taishō canons.

The fourth master Daoxin 四祖道信 (580–651), who led the Dongshan famen 東山法門, instructed many monks in the various methods of contemplation, according to their different levels. And his contemporary Niutou Farong 牛頭法融 (594–657) sang the praises of his anxin 安心 state.

The essence of the teaching of Daoxin, the Fayao 法要, is portrayed rather differently in the Rudao anxin yaofangbian famen 入道安心要方便法門 and in the biography of Niutou Farong in the Jingde zhuan denglu 景徳伝灯録. The former teaches gradual enlightenment 漸修, the latter sudden enlightenment 頓悟, which sees one’s true mind as Buddha clearly and moves the mind freely through various scenes in daily life.

With a focus on this problem of anxin thought, this paper examines how these two figures thought about anxin, what the natures of their oppositely oriented philosophies were, and what philosophical changes of early Chinese Buddhism can be detected as the tradition moved from the era of contemplation to the era of Chan.

The Shi moheyanlun 釋摩訶衍論 (abbreviated as Shilun), a commentary on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith 大乘起信論, has the special characteristic of making new words to express its interpretations. This creativity is apparent in the mental deliberation 心量 and consciousness 識 of the second volume, which mentions four consciousness: the 9^th “consciousness of many in a single mind 多一識心,” the 10^th “consciousness of each and every mind 一一識心,” the 9^th “amalavijñāna 唵摩羅識,” and the 10^th “all things are nothing but consciousness 一切一心識.”

However, the Shilun does not give a detailed account of the four kinds of consciousness. Therefore, I examined the connection between mental deliberation and the two approaches 二門, the relationship between “consciousness of many in a single mind” and “all things are nothing but consciousness,” and the position of amalavijñāna by analyzing the interpretations presented in the Shilun commentaries. This analysis showed that the 10 forms of consciousness are limited from the 1^st to the 9^th mental deliberation, so the 9^th amalavijñāna is included in the 9^th ālayavijñāna, and the 10^th “all things are nothing but consciousness” corresponds to the 9th “consciousness of many in a single mind.”

This paper focuses on the Daijō shōkan ryaku shiki 大乘正観略私記 (below, Shiki) of Chinkai (珍海, 1092–1152), a Japanese monk of the late Heian period, and aims at investigating the meaning of the term shōkan (正観), along with his understanding of the thought of the Middle Way (中道) and Reality (実相).

Chinkai claims in his Shiki that the meaning of shōkan is “knowing the teachings 教 and truth 理 clearly.” The teachings refers to all the doctrines that are able to interpret truth, and truth is the truth which is interpreted by the teachings, namely the theory of the non-perception 无所得 of emptiness 空 in the Sanlun school 三論宗.

In Chinkai’s opinion, the teachings represent “breadth 広” and truth represents “depth 深,” and only by learning both could people come to real non-perception, especially based on the ideas of the Two-truths and the Middle Way.

Furthermore, Chinkai takes the eightfold negation of Nāgārjuna as a foundation of the shōkan of Mahāyāna Buddhism. On the basis of this eightfold negation, he refers to the doctrine of the Two-truths as the content of the thought of the Middle Way, and regards the shōkan of non-perception as the origin of Daijō shōkan.

This paper examines the logical stucture of Musō Soseki’s 夢窓疎石 (1275–1351) thought. Musō’s thought centers on the concept of “original endowment 本分,” which means perfect enlightenment being endowed originally in every sentient beings. To match with this original endowment is the aim of Musō’s Zen teachings. In Musō’s view, a practioner should fulfill the fundamental cognition, namely, to realize the fundamental wisdom of original endowment at first, and then he should act out the post-enlightment cognition, using various skillful means to save the unenlightened sentient beings in the secular world. Based on this stucture, Musō expounded his synthetic Zen teachings.

The commentaries of Hōnen (法然, 1133–1212) and Ryōe (了慧, 1243–1330) on the Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra developed from Jingying Huiyuan’s 浄影慧遠 (523–592) philosophy and produced in Japanese Pure Land Buddhism a formula for interpreting Dharmākara bodhisattva (法蔵菩薩), who became Amitābha Buddha. However, considering that Hōnen followed Shandao’s (善導) ideas, one wonders why the Jōdo scholar Gizan (義山, 1648–1717) tried to create an interpretation by combining two systems originating from Huiyuan and Shandao.

This paper tries to investigate the way Gizan dealt with the controversy that emerged from the ‘twofold resolve’ (両重発心) which eventually led to doctrinal argument. Apart from his controversial argument, this paper deals with the characteristics of Gizan’s thought: 1. He adopted Huiyuan’s philosophy to elaborate Dharmākara’s ‘multifold resolve’, which would lead to the conclusion that the ‘multifold resolve’ would be impossible without the strength of the absolute other, especially from the viewpoint of manifestations. 2. With the idea of dependent origination in Mahāyāna, he not only explained that Dharmākara initiated his resolve long ago, but also elaborated by means of Kegon philosophy that Dharmākara did it together with sentient beings. Gizan’s interpretation of Dharmākara corresponded to the teaching of Hōnen, the follower of Shandao, and emphasized the spirit of the bodhisattva path full of great compassion.

The Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra of the Korean canon kept at the Kongō-in in Tsutsumi, Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture, has postscripts of the Edo and Koryŏ periods.

This text has been investigated three times so far. First, a survey was conducted by Isao Nakajima in 1943, confirming 333 volumes at that time. Next, a survey was conducted by the Nagasaki Prefectural Museum of Tsushima History and Folklore in 1996, and about 163 volumes were confirmed. However, details are unknown. Finally, a survey was conducted by the Institute for Rice Culture in Waseda University in 2003, and 164 volumes were confirmed from a simple catalog.

We had the opportunity to investigate the volumes in September, 2017. 165 volumes were confirmed, a number different from those obtained by previous surveys. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the postscripts of the Edo period.

As a result, we can conclude that the set had 600 volumes in 1682, 361 volumes in 1943, and finally, comparing the 2003 and 2017 surveys, it is confirmed that there were differences in the number of volumes, perhaps due to errors or a difference in how the paper was counted.

It is highly probable that the “Sŏn master Nang” 朗禅師, mentioned at the end of the Tianshun edition of Bodhidharma’s Treatise on the Four Practices 菩提達摩四行論, is the Silla monk Pŏmnang (c. 630–730), a Dharma successor of the Fourth Patriarch Daoxin 道信 (580–651).

This article aims to explore the role of oral instructions in Tibetan Buddhism as a living religion, based on the author’s extensive fieldwork in India and Nepal. A text is examined: Kong sprul’s (1813–1899) A Golden Hammer of Fine Explanations that Crush Twenty-Three Mistaken Concepts Regarding the Great Madhyamaka of Definitive Meaning (Nges don dbu ma chen po la 'khrul rtog nyer gsum gyi ’bur ’joms pa legs bshad gser gyi tho ba) together with an oral commentary by Khenpo Karma Gendun of the Karma Bka’ brgyud tradition. The text expounds extrinsic emptiness in the context of the Mantrayāna stance of the inseparability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The opponents whose concepts Kong sprul refutes are logicians who argue from non-implicative negation in support of intrinsic emptiness. In the logical context, extrinsic emptiness is what implicative negation points to. Emptiness, which is not nothingness, is synonymized in the text with various other terms, such as the Buddha-nature, primordial wisdom, and the naturally abiding lineage. The commentary interprets it as goodness. Kong sprul expounds Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen as well in the context of the Great Madhyamaka of definitive meaning, i.e. extrinsic emptiness. The opponents’ misconceptions pertain to the Two Truths, the two kinds of negation, and the two chariots of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, and are said to have arisen from a misguided methodology based on textual interpretation. This text is instructive for students of Tibetan Buddhism. Among other things, it clearly testifies to the critical way in which a master’s oral instructions are able to illuminate the interpretation of texts. This clearly points out that the wrong methodology engaged in would lead to mistaken concepts.

Dol po pa’s commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra does not adopt Haribhadra’s interpretation; rather, it often includes quotations from the gNod ’joms (*Ārya-śatasāhasrikāpañca­viṃśatisāhasrikâṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-bṛhaṭṭīkā, attributed variously to Vasubandhu or Daṃṣṭrāsena). However, these quotations are not a commentary on the treatise. Dol po pa criticizes Haribhadra in his commentary for the following reasons. (1) Dol po pa trusts the works of scholars belonging to the Great Madhyamaka, such as Vasubandhu, because they do not contradict the “Maitreya Chapter” in the “Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras.” (2) Dol po pa seems to have attempted to integrate the three gateways and eleven discourses system (sgo gsum rnam grangs bcu gcig) with the eight abhisamaya system. (3) Haribhadra criticizes Vasubandhu, indicating that he interprets the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras from a mind-only perspective. However, Dol po pa considers Vasubandhu to be a Great Madhyamaka scholar, not just a mind-only one. Therefore, Dol po pa opposes Haribhadra’s interpretation.

In short, Dol po pa emphasizes the “Maitreya Chapter,” which could have been a source of his Other-emptiness theory, and this led to Dol po pa’s emphasis of the gNod ’joms as well as his opposition to Haribhadra’s interpretation.

Hardly any Sanskrit manuscripts of Buddhist scriptures remain in India proper today, even though such manuscripts have been discovered in surrounding regions. Tibet in particular is one of the richest treasuries of precious Sanskrit manuscripts from as early as the 8th century. While these materials are currently studied mostly in order to clarify Indian Buddhism, their historical aspects (e.g. their origins in India, their transmission to Tibet, their preservation in Tibetan monasteries) are yet to be clarified. Currently, almost all of them are preserved in Lhasa, but they were once preserved in various monasteries outside Lhasa, though we do not know the relevant details. The present paper investigates two examples that show their preservation at monasteries in the medieval period, focusing on the Sanskrit manuscripts once preserved at gCung Ri bo che and at sPos khang tshogs pa. Those preserved at gCung Ri bo che are mentioned by Tāranātha in his autobiography. He mentions a Sanskrit manuscript of the Suhṛllekha from this place, which might be identified with that currently preserved at ’Bras spungs monastery. In sPos khang there were once three bundles of Sanskrit manuscripts, as mentioned by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and dGe ’dun chos ’phel, of which one bundle (a paper manuscript of verses of the Madhyāntavibhāga, Dharmadharmatā[pra]vibhāga, and Abhisamayālaṃkāra) was produced in Ya tse and presented to Tibet in the 14th century.

The oldest extant catalogue of Tibetan Buddhist works, almost all of them being translations, is the dkar chag lDan/lHan dkar ma. In it is registered the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (SP), one of the most important and well-known Mahāyāna texts. Its size is noted as 3,900 ślokas (stanzas) and 13 bam pos (volumes). Several other texts are also noted as of the same size, that is 3,900 ślokas and 13 bam pos, including the Mahāparinirvāṇa-Mahāsūtra (MPM) and the Sūryagarbha-sūtra (SG). However, the extents of the texts as we now have them are considerably different, especially between the former (SP) and the latter two (MPM and SG)—they have, e.g. in the sDe dge edition, 359, 300 and 308 pages, respectively. Why is this so? In my opinion, this shows that the present SP is not the original but has been enlarged later. If this is correct, what was the original or former (unchanged) text? I surmise that it would have omitted the last six chapters, and, probably, the latter half of the eleventh chapter as well, as suggested by the contents of Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation.

The *Guhyatattvaprakāśa (gSang ba’i de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba, hereafter GTP) was authored by Kr̥ṣṇācārya, who founded one of schools in the Saṃvara cycle, and expounded the niṣpannakrama as well. It is a well-known fact that this work is intended to be compatible with the Guhyasamāja tradition and the Saṃvara cycle tradition. Further, in the GTP, passages parallel with the Saṃpuṭodbhavatantra (hereafter SPU) are identified. Although its importance is understood, research on the GTP has not been carried out so far, as the original Sanskrit text is not yet discovered.

This paper presents a Tibetan critical edition of a passage in Chapter 2 of the GTP which consists of four chapters together with a reconstructed text. Many parallels are found in the SPU (I–iv), and here I offer the text of the GTP after comparing available Sanskrit manuscripts of the SPU and the Tibetan translations.

The Buddha Akṣobhya 阿閦仏 is one of the early Mahāyāna Buddhas who presides over the Eastern Pure Land, known as Abhirati 妙喜. In Vajrayāna Buddhism, he became one of the Five Wisdom Buddhas in the Diamond Realm 金剛界五仏, located in the east, and his image is made in the form of the gesture named bhūmisparśamudrā 触地印, with the right hand pendant toward the earth. This hand gesture also symbolizes the Buddha Śākyamuni’s enlightenment when defeating King Māra. Therefore, we assume a connection between the Buddha Śākyamuni and Akṣobhya, although this has not been clarified so far. The description of bhūmisparśamudrā for Śākyamuni, touching the ground with the right hand, can be found in old Buddhist texts. In the case of Akṣobhya, we find no description of a “hand” but only of a “leg” in the Akṣobhyavyūha. In this paper, I make a comparison between the texts and the iconographies of both Śākyamuni and Akṣobhya and examine the reasons why this difference has arisen.

This paper argues that the concept of sexual-yoga in the Āmnayamañjarī is influenced by Vajrapāṇi’s Laghusaṃvaraṭīkā (LTṬ). Vajrayāna Buddhists, specifically in the anuttarayoga stage, declared that their whole basic doctrine is based on and interrelated with rāga (kāma) caryā. Firstly, this paper elucidates the interpretation of aṣṭasamaya, the eight major applications of vows in the Cakrasaṃvaratantra, construed by Vajrapāṇi in his LTṬ. He applied the analytical concept of ‘inner and outer’ to this topic. He proclaims that in the case of ‘inner,’ emission of seminal fluid (bindu) must be prohibited unconditionally for the achievement of both mundane and supramundane accomplishments. In the case of ‘outer,’ however, practitioners should be allowed the emission of bindu for the experience of enjoyment and physical hygiene. Secondly, this paper argues that this important description by Vajrapāṇi in his LTṬ is cited in chapter 5 of Abhayākaragupta’s Āmnāyamañjarī.

Two leading Vajrācārya Paṇḍits in the modern Newar Buddhist society, Badrī ratna (N.S. 1053–1136) and Ratna kājī (N.S. 1054–1119) were born in the same monastery, Mantra-siddhi Mahāvihāra, in Kathmandu City. They had been close friends in their youth, working together towards the study and propagation of Newar Vajrayāna Buddhism. Later in adulthood, however, they were separated due to different views on the succession of Cacā, the Newar Buddhist ritual dances. The dancers are, so to speak, the archetype of Sādhana meditators. The Vajrācārya priests monopolize the right to perform the ritualized Sādhana, Kala-a-pūjā, for their clients. So the dances have been transmitted from father to son only among the Vajrācārya families. Being afraid of the decline of Newar Buddhism, especially of the ritual dances, Ratna kājī decided to open the traditional dances to non-Vajrācāryas, including foreigners. Ratna kājī said to me that anyone who performs the dance under his instruction could gain the mysterious identity with Buddhist deities or the Buddha, which he has experienced. Theoretically, this means that non-Vajrācāryas can perform the Kala-a-pūjā. Badrī ratna was dead set against him, saying that he should not break their traditions. Badrī ratna aimed for the restoration of the prestige of the Vajrācārya priests as his lifework.

The relief of “Dīpaṃkara Buddha’s Prophecy,” which was excavated near the Swāt Valley and now owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, portrays the scene of purchasing a flower from a young flower-selling girl. The girl’s left hand holds a bag containing money received from a man who represents Śākyamuni in a previous life, and her right hand holds two lotus flowers. Since the girl has a bag of money, we understand that the image portrays the moment after she has been paid for the lotus flowers, and two lotus flowers are assumed to have been retained by the girl in order to throw them at the Buddha. On the other hand, in the Buddhist literature that preserves the narrative of “Dīpaṃkara Buddha’s Prophecy,” only the Sanskrit Mahāvastu and Divyāvadāna depict the girl as throwing lotus flowers on the Buddha. In the Chinese translation literature, after the character who would later become Śākyamuni bought five lotus flowers, the girl handed over the remaining two lotus flowers to him, or the girl had only five lotus flowers to begin with, so the person who throws flowers at the Buddha was only this individual who would later become Śākyamuni, that is, the bodhisattva. Thus the Metropolitan Museum of Art relief is based on the same narrative scheme also preserved in the Mahāvastu and Divyāvadāna.

It is well known that Satkari Mookerjee proposed a theory about the three-stage development of the apoha theory. However, the famous three stages including the view of the positivist (vidhivādin) and that of the negativist (pratiṣeḍhavādin) were not explained by Mookerjee, though they are proposed in a modified version offered by Yuichi Kajiyama. I reexamine the three-stage theory and reinvestigate Dhamottara’s apoha theory.

In this paper, I consider two meanings of the term ālambana in Sthiramati’s commentary (Triṁśikābhāṣya=Tbh) on the Triṁśikākārikā. In the beginning of Tbh, Sthiramati says ālambana is imagery “inside” of cognition. From this point of view ālambana means paratantrasvabhāva in the trisvabhāva. On the other hand, in the second half of Tbh, Sthiramati says ālambana is “outside” of cognition, that is parikalpitasvabhāva in the trisvabhāva. The question is whether Sthiramati’s commentary is contradictory. The purpose of this paper is to consider the reason why Sthiramati uses the term ālambana to express two meanings.

Niḥsvabhāva is generally regarded as a concept unique to the Mahāyāna. But an interpretation of niḥsvabhāva common to Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna appears in the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya. This interpretation is replaced with an interpretation which is associated with the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa of dharma in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya, and this interpretation in turn, which is expressed through a dharma-dharmin construction, is regarded as the original meaning of the “sarvadharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ” quoted from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and so on in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

In this paper, I point out that this interpretation means that the Yogācāra has a concept that the Śrāvakayāna, which approves of svabhāva, also can accept, namely the niḥsvabhāva in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. Yogācāra sources quote “sarvadharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ” from these Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, and interpret this to mean “dharmānāṃ niḥsvabhāva-tā/-tva.” Although the former appositional expression, which means all phenomena are niḥsvabhāva, cannot approve of svabhāva, the latter dharma-dharmin expression, which implies the existence of dharmin and niḥsvabhāva-tā/-tva as a property of dharmin, can approve of svabhāva. Thus, the common niḥsvabhāva interpretation approves of svabhāva.

In chapter four of the Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV), the thirty-seven dharmas leading to enlightenment (saptatriṃśad bodhipakṣadharma) are explained. They describe a training method that was also practiced by Buddhist monks during the early stage of Buddhism. This paper deals with the five faculties (indriyāni) and the five powers (balāni) of the thirty-seven dharmas leading to enlightenment. The explanation of the five faculties and the five powers in Yogācāra can be seen in Yogācāra works such as the Śrāvakabhūmi (ŚBh), the MAV and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (MSA). This paper compares the interpretation of the five faculties and the five powers in the Yogācāra context. Special focus is given to the fact that the MAV and the ŚBh show different interpretations about the relationship between the five faculties/the five powers and the traditional practice of the four wholesome faculties (warmth, summit, patience and the highest worldly wisdom). That is to say, it is pointed out that regarding the common theme of the five faculties and the five powers in the śrāvaka’s path of cultivation, the MAV possibly has transmitted the teaching that is expressed in the ŚBh, which is clearly different from the theory of the Sarvāstivāda.

The Madhyamaka school followed the doctrine of śūnyatā taught in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, and understood that it denies the existence of real nature. Conservative Buddhists and the Yogācāra school, however, criticized the Madhyamaka position as a sort of nihilism. Therefore, we can assume that these Buddhists considered Mādhyamikas’ understanding of śūnyatā to be wrong (or misunderstood). Under such circumstances, how did the Madhyamaka teachers choose who could be instructed in śūnyatā, and how should it lead the trainee toward the Madhyamaka’s understanding of śūnyatā?

In studying these questions, I would like to take note of Candrakīrti’s (ca. 600–650) concept of adhimukti. In his usage, those who have adhimukti are qualified to be instructed in the doctrine of śūnyatā. However, those who lack adhimukti would misunderstand the meaning of śūnyatā even though they listened to the doctrine. Thus, Candrakīrti believes that one must obtain adhimukti to correctly understand the śūnyatā theory. In this paper, I would like to examine by which texts his concept of adhimukti is inspired, and why he introduced the concept in his system.

Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Chapter 18, verse 9, discusses the characteristics of reality (tattvasya lakṣaṇam). In the Prasannapadā (PsP), Candrakīrti comments that while the characteristics of reality for the Nobles (āryas) are taught in MMK 18.9, the characteristics of reality for ordinary people (laukika-tattvalakṣaṇa) are taught in MMK 18.10. However, it is not clear what laukika-tattva is in the contexts of the PsP ad MMK 18.10.

In this paper, I first discuss Candrakīrti’s two types of teachings of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda), focusing especially on the concepts of idaṃpratyayatā and idaṃpratyayatāmātra. Second, I compare the views of the Nobles and ordinary people based on the discussion of the two-truths theory in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya, with respect to idaṃpratyayatā and idaṃpratyayatāmātra. Finally, I reconsider laukika-tattva in the contexts of the PsP.

This paper examines a textual problem in the second koṭi (controversy) of the ṣaṭkoṭika vāda (six-fold controversy) in the Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti ad Vigrahavyāvartanī k. 2. Johnston and Kunst’s edition (JK) has been read as the most common edition of the Vigrahavyāvartanī(-vṛtti). JK make a partial emendation of the second koṭi of the ṣaṭkoṭika vāda based on the Chinese translation of the Vigrahavyāvartanī(-vṛtti), the Huizheng lun (廻諍論). However, previous researches conducted to interpret the meaning of the ṣaṭkoṭika vāda do not consider the validity of JK’s emendation.

The first interpretation of the ṣaṭkoṭika vāda is that it is an objection by a realist depending on the assumption that “emptiness cannot negate the svabhāva of all things” refers to the Śūnyatāvādin’s statement (sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyāḥ). Nevertheless, according to JK, contrary to this assumption, the second koṭi derives the conclusion that “the statement cannot negate svabhāva” from the reason that “it is not empty.”

To discuss this doubtful emendation, I compared the two ṣaṭkoṭika vādas, i.e., the Chinese translation on which JK depends and the Sanskrit manuscript. As a result, it became clear that logical context of the Chinese translation is different from that of the Sanskrit original not only in the second koṭi but also for the whole ṣaṭkoṭika vāda. Therefore, it is difficult to adopt only a part of the second koṭi from the Chinese translation and apply it to the Sanskrit edition. Hence, JK’s emendation is not valid, and previous researches according to JK also should be reexamined.

In chapter 13 of Nāgārjuna’s main work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, he explains his concept of śūnyatā. However, there is a problem with verses three and four. Should we read those two verses as Nāgārjuna’s, or opponent’s? Based on commentaries, recent research takes the stance that verse three and the first half of four are not Nāgārjuna’s own. On the other hand, I point out that it is possible to reinterpret those verses as Nāgārjuna’s in light of examples taken from the Vigrahavyāvartanī.

In this paper, I reexamine the validity of this interpretation from the explanation of the word ‘‘non-essence (asvabhāva)’’ in verse three. According to this new interpretation, we can understand all verses of chapter 13 to be Nāgārjuna’s.

In Abhidharma texts, karman is classified into three types: kuśala, akuśala, and avyākṛta. According to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, in addition to those, another three types of karman—puṇya, apuṇya, and āniñjya—are further introduced as presented in sūtras.

In the Āgamas, puṇya is explained in a variety of ways, such as something that should be increased, or that should be accumulated towards the next cyclic birth, or that should be thrown away when entering the monastic life. This study analyses how puṇya, a word with such a broad meaning, is explained in the Abhidharma literature.

In this paper, among the six cultivations spoken of by the so-called Sarvāstivādins of the Western Region (西方諸師), I examine the background of saṁvarabhāvanā. Generally speaking, there are four cultivations for the Sarvāstivādins. Notably, however, scholars of the Sarvāstivādins of the Western Region argued that there are six cultivations. As a result, it is clear that they made their theory based on some sūtras in the Six Senses (ṣaḍāyatana) chapter of the Saṁyukta-Āgama.

In this paper, I examine dhyāna in the stage of the catvāri kuśala-mūlāni (四善根, “four roots of good,” below CKM) of the Sarvāstivādins. It is generally accounted that the nature of CKM is prajñā (慧), but it presumes dhyāna practice. What did the Sarvāstivādins think about the element of dhyāna at this stage of applied practice? By focusing on this theme, I think we can dicover the characteristics and diversity of complex Abhidharma ideas.

Firstly, it is mentioned the CKM’s basis is rūpāvacara. The Sarvāstivāda says that this prajñā is bhāvanāmayī (修所成). The bhāvanāmayī prajñā is the third of the three prajñā (三慧), the previous two being śrutamayī (聞所成) and cintāmayī (思所成). The Sarvāstivāda defines each of these according to their sphere of applications as, respectively, name (śrutamayī), name and sense (cintāmayī), and sense (bhāvanāmayī). On the other hand, Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, held that cintāmayī refers to thinking about the truth and bhāvanāmayī is the wisdom based on samādhī, and he distinguished between the two.

Secondly, in the theory of the darśana-mārga divided into three parts (順三分), the CKM is the nirvedhabhāgīya (順決択分, conducive to certainty) , and is the stage of defining the truths. The previous (second) stage, mokṣabhāgīya (順解脱分), the stage of planting the seeds of nirvāṇa, is manaskarma. The Sarvāstivāda defines these as śrutamayī and cintāmayī. This three parts theory only explains cause and effect, and does not speak of a continuous training in dhyāna and prajñā.

The Sarvāstivāda tries to interpret both practical training and causal thoery in the same framework of śruta, cintā and bhāvanā. Therefore I think there may have been a difference in the definition of these three wisdoms.

It has been so far pointed out that the first Chinese translation of the Guhyakādhipatinirdeśa (Tathāgataguhya-sūtra) translated by *Dharmarakṣa includes many place and ethnic names including country names along the Silk Road. This paper compares the place and the ethnic names listed in the Sanskrit manuscript of the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra and in its first Chinese translation with the ethnic names in the parallel narrative in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā. As a result, it can be speculated that the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra was established in Northwest India.

In his commentary on the Heart sūtra (abbr. PHT), Vimalamitra criticizes Dignāga’s theory about the authenticity/reliability of the first reciter (saṃgītikartṛ), according to which a reciter is regarded as reliable if he expresses the four items: 1. teacher, 2. audiences as witnesses, 3. time, and 4. place. Among the two elements of criticism by Vimalamitra about this theory, the first is that the witness cannot fulfill his role because those who cannot visit the witness cannot obtain his testimony. A similar argument is also found in his commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom in 700 Stanzas (abbr. SPT). Atiśa’s commentary on the Heart Sūtra, which is a kind of sub-commentary to PHT, also includes this argument. However, one sentence therein seems to have a textual problem. While comparing the PHT and SPT, I tried to emend the text and read the sentence clearly. As such, this paper is the first to point out that the abovementioned dispute is cited in Jñānavajra’s commentary on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which is on the one hand a valid counter-criticism to Vimalamitra/Atiśa and on the other hand will serve as a support to my emendation of Atiśa’s text.

What is the “Subhūti-parivarta” referred to in Chapter 2 of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (ASP)? In this article, I consider the understanding based on the commentaries of the Prajñāpāramitā such as the *Bhagavatyāmnāyānusāriṇī-nāma-vyākhyā (BhĀA, D 3811; P 5209). More than half a century ago, Mitsuyuki Kajiyoshi pointed out that the “Subhūti-parivarta” mentioned in Chapter 2 of the ASP refers to the first chapter. He presumed that the “Subhūti-parivarta” referred to there was the original form of the Prajñāpāramitā. According to the BhĀA, it was understood that “Subhūti-parivarta” refers to the first chapter of ASP. It is also an understanding based on the *Āryaśatasāhasrikā­-pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-bṛhaṭṭīkā (D 3808; P 5206). However, it became clear that BhĀA does not understand the “Subhūti-parivarta” as the Prajñāpāramitā’s original form.

Samādhi sūtras is the categorical name referring to sūtras which are titled with the name of a Mahāyāna samādhi. Each sūtra is supposed to explain a meditative technique that generates an altered mental state. In fact, however, many Samādhi sūtras do not have any description of such a state. In this paper, we take up the Śūraṃgama-samādhi Sūtra (Śgs) and conclude that it also has no description of a technique and its samādhi does not involve meditative practice. On the other hand, the entire sūtra is dedicated to expounding the mystical powers of the Sūraṃgama-samādhi. Thus, the samādhi in the Śgs consists only of this power aspect. Focusing on this, we can find an interesting example that sentient beings raise the intention to achieve enlightenment after seeing the samādhi’s power. This example indicates that the Śgs tries to evoke faith in the Mahāyāna by means of showing the power of a Mahāyāna samādhi. Finally, I argue that the purpose of the composition of the Śgs is not as a meditative manual but in order to encourage sentient beings toward the Mahāyāna.

The bodhisattva described in the 5th stage (sudurjayāpañcamībhūmi) of the Daśabhūmikasūtra has a characteristic that he positively acts to remove pain (duḥkha) from all living things in the world (sarvasattva), while he observes all existence as emptiness (sarvadharmaśūnyatā) in the next, 6th stage.

In the present paper, four phrases of the text— ‘equality (samatā)’; ‘being conversant with the truth (satyakuśala)’; ‘bringing benefit to the whole world (sarvasattvahita)’; ‘means to bring to maturity (upāyaparipācana)’— are taken up and examined.

1) samatā means equality between oneself and others. 2) being satyakuśala helps the bodhisattva to lead each sattva to the truth, and at the same time, he learns the skill to enlighten them. 3) sarvasattvahita is his final purpose, because he wishes to take away the pain of all beings through his great mercy. 4) by upāyaparipācana he helps all beings in various ways.

The study concludes that the bodhisattva in this text is described as living in this secular world. Thus, to ascend to the next 6th stage, he need to purify all beings in the world as himself.

The present forms of the root kram are ˚krāma-^ti in the active and ˚krama-^te in the middle, respectively (Goto 1987: 116–120). In Pāli literature the form (˚k)kama-^ti is fairly common. The active forms are frequently attested in the Mahāvastu.

The forms are different in editions of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra. The root kram is regularly inflected as ˚krama-^ti in the metrical portion and ˚krāma-^ti in the prose portion, with some exceptions. However, the ˚krama-stem is almost consistent in the Kashgar manuscript, both in metrical and prose passages.

We can conclude that ˚kram was conjugated as ˚krama-^ti in the original “Lotus Sūtra,” as the Kashgar manuscript shows. For example, Kashgar IV: 114b3–4 prakrrameya might be the original reading, and its parallel, Gilgit A 47,30 apakrameta (= B 230, 12, KN 111, 2, WT 103, 15), is a Sanskritized form. The very characteristic form at Gilgit A 101,18 upasaṃkrāmante, is a result of hyper-Sanskritization. Editions read XXI^p atikrameta. This should be judged as pseudo-BHS because early manuscripts give BHS atikramet. We should examine in detail the grammar behind the formations before re-editing the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra.

More than fifteen years ago, Schopen (2004, 492) revealed his concern about a certain understanding widespread among scholars of the history of Indian Buddhism, writing, “[t]he historical development of Indian Buddhism used to be presented as simple, straightforward, and suspiciously linear. It started with the historical Buddha whose teaching was organized, transmitted, and more or less developed into what was referred to as early Buddhism. This Early Buddhism was identified as Hīnayāna ... , Theravāda ... , or simply ‘monastic Buddhism.’ ... A little before or a little after the beginning of the common era this early Buddhism was, according to the model, followed by the Mahāyāna ... ” A similar apprehension has recently been expressed in slightly different terms by Harrison (2018, 8–9). It is certainly surprising that scholars’ basic frame of reference for the history of Indian Buddhism is more or less what it was in the late 19^th century, despite all of the progress recently made in this field. Developments in the particulars of the subfields of Indian Buddhist history have not entailed comparable developments in the broader frame of reference, despite the fact that such a frame is what allows us to identify and synthesize the details of our field. This paper attempts to address this problem by focusing on three points: first, it reexamines the current state of affairs of materials for the reconstruction of the history of ancient India; second, it reevaluates the status of Pāli materials as historical sources; and third, it reconsiders the concept of ‘canon’ in Buddhist studies.

At the beginning of the Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta and its parallels (hereafter MPS), the Buddha expounds the Vajjī’s Seven Conditions for Non-decline (Satta aparihāniyā dhammā) and the bhikkhus’ Seven Conditions for Non-decline of groups of six to eight. The various “seven sets related to practice” found therein have only been vaguely understood as something added later, and have so far hardly been researched. However, analyzing them in detail, we can see they are arranged from the initial stage of concentration (jhāna) to profound concentration. Moreover, when referring to other parts of MPS, we find that these sets are implicitly based on the path of practice, namely, the thirty-seven bodhipakkhiyā dhammā.

In this paper I examine the circumstances of sūtra recitation in the Jātaka, focusing on sajjhāya-, āha and saṃ + khubhati. In the Cullakaseṭṭhijātaka (Ja No. 4), sajjhāya- connotes study and practice of religious training. Again, in the Chaddantajātaka (Ja No. 514), sajjhāya- is used to indicate sūtra recitation on the occasion of the funeral. In the Kumbhajātaka (Ja No. 467), āha is used in the scene where the Śākyamuni recites the Dhammapada in order to guide laywomen. In the Cullakaseṭṭhijātaka (Ja No. 4), saṃ + khubhati appears where a Buddhist monk recites the Tipiṭaka in gratitude for the layman’s act.

In the parable of the son’s flesh, found only in the Saṃyuttanikāya (SN) 12.67 (PTS ed. vol. 2, 97–100) of the Pāli Canon, a husband and wife, in circumstances of extremity, kill their son and eat his flesh to survive. In this paper, I indicate the existence of an alternative version of this parable, in which the son was not killed but died, in the commentaries Papañcasūdanī (vol. 1, 211–213) and the Sāratthappakāsinī (vol. 2, 104–105). The reason why the son’s cause of death differs between the Saṃyuttanikāya and the two commentaries can be understood in two ways: (1) the commentaries simply relate an actual event (bhūta- attha-) of the parable. They narrate using the aorist, whereas, the SN uses seyyathāpi and the optative. (2) There was a taboo against killing children in the Theravāda tradition. The relevance of the second observation becomes clear in the course of this paper.

In this paper, basing myself upon the descriptions of the Vinayas and the historical distribution channels of spices, the pungent taste of India before the introduction of chili is explored. In the case of udara-vāta-ābādha (pain caused by the wind dosa in the belly), eating tekaṭulā-yāgu (gruel made of three pungent ingredients) is relatively common in the Vinayas. The ingredients of tekaṭulā-yāgu are pepper, Indian long pepper, and ginger. yāgu was cooked from cereals such as rice, sesame and beans. In addition, yāva-jīvika includes pepper, Indian long pepper, and ginger, which is common to the Vinayas. In modern India, clove and cumin are used as curry ingredients as one of the pungent tastes, but they do not fall under the Vinayas.

The aim of this paper is to examine how the Pratyabhijñā works were transmitted in South India by focusing on the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinīyākhyā, a South Indian commentary on the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī.

The Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinīvyākhyā considers the Pratyabhijñā works Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī to represent the seed-mantra sauḥ, quoting with approval the Parātriṃśīkā, which teaches the seed-mantra sauḥ, and Parātriṃśikālaghuvṛtti, ascribed to Abhinavagupta in South India. This shows that the Pratyabhijñā works were accepted as a commentary on the Parātriṃśikā in South India.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the meaning of two terms: sāpekṣa and nirapekṣa (anapekṣa) in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS) 10.7. The clarification is based on the interpretations of the terms in the Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti, a commentary on the VS, and by the commentaries on the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (PDhS) acknowledging its use of the VS 10.7 as the basis of its own view: “conjunction (saṃyoga) is without any requirement, when producing a substance (dravya).”

The terms sāpekṣa and nirapekṣa in the VS 10.7 have been translated by scholars into “those [threads] requiring [conjunction],” and “those [threads] not requiring [conjunction],” respectively. This paper shows that sāpekṣa means those [threads] requiring [action], i.e., a thread requires action as cooperative cause for producing a conjunction with the other threads. Following the conjunction, a product (cloth) is produced. On the other hand, nirapekṣa means those [threads] not requiring cooperative cause except conjunction, i.e., since conjunction has already occurred between the threads, they produce a product (cloth) without any requirement. The interpretation of nirapekṣa presented in this paper becomes suitable as the basis of the view of the PDhS.

Raghunātha, a fifteenth-century Nyāya scholar, composed a short treatise called Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa, in which he criticized the Vaiśeṣika’s category system accepted at the time and claimed the necessity of radical revisions of the system. Among a number of targets of criticism stands the reductionism of “moment” of kṣaṇa. Traditionally, Vaiśeṣika holds that people refer to a motion of a substance when they delimit time and measure moments. Raghunātha, however, does not think that a motion of a substance helps us measure moments, and postulates the existence of kṣaṇa, which is a momentary entity and irreducible to any of the known categories. In this paper, I survey the history of the controversy between reductionism and anti-reductionism of kṣaṇa in Vaiśeṣika, focusing on Vallabha, Vardhamāna, and Raghunātha, and present the close relation of Ragunātha to Vardhamāna. Based on this historical survey, I further examine the philosophical significance of postulating kṣaṇa as a new category. The most significant point may be that the metaphysical necessity for postulating kṣaṇa is derived from the Vaiśeṣika’s popular theorem of causality that the diversity of causes prohibits the uniformity of results.

A sun-worshiping group called Maga-brāhmaṇa appears in some Sanskrit texts. The religion of the Maga is similar to Hinduism. However, some of the customs of the Maga show a kinship with ancient Iranian religion. Therefore, the Maga is considered an ancient Iranian religious group that migrated to India.

The religion of the Maga and their Iranian origin have been studied mainly on the basis of two Purāṇic texts, the Sāmba-purāṇa and the Bhaviṣya-purāṇa. It is also known that a few Buddhist texts have short references to the Maga.

In this paper, I point out the difference between the Purāṇic and Buddhist sources in the reference to the Maga. This difference does not mean that the Maga in Purāṇic and in Buddhist sources are not different groups, but that the Purāṇic and Buddhist texts refer to the same group in different eras.

The Rājataraṅgiṇī, a Kashmiri royal chronicle written by Kalhaṇa in the 12^th century, consists of eight taraṅgas (“waves,” i.e. chapters). In the 19^th century, there was a debate about the authenticity of the last two taraṅgas. The debate seems to have been closed by G. Bühler and A. Stein, who asserted that one and the same Kalhaṇa wrote all eight taraṅgas. Shortly after this discussion was over, it was revealed by an incomplete manuscript that the eighth taraṅga had been revised for political reasons, and the text on which Bühler and Stein had based their assertion was a revised recension. By examination of this newly found manuscript, a question arose about the authenticity of the eighth taraṅga, which was full of rhetorical defects. Apart from textual credibility, it should be noted that the Rājataraṅgiṇī is a kāvya governed by the śānta-rasa (sentiment of equanimity), as declared in the first taraṅga. It is the seventh taraṅga which ends with the tragic death of King Harṣa, that is more suitable for the concluding chapter of a kāvya bearing the śānta-rasa, rather than the eighth taraṅga which ends with a eulogy dedicated to the king of the time. In the 19^th century, scholars’ discussions concerning the Rājataraṅgiṇī were focused on the authenticity of its seventh and eighth taraṅgas. Now, however, the issue should be revisited as a question about the authenticity of the eighth taraṅga.

The term “dharma” is used in documents in ancient India to mean “justice,” “law,” or “virtue.” In contrast to dharma as an idea, in the Mahābhārata Dharma is a god with a body and mind, embodying the concept of “Dharma as god.” Dharma acts as the father of Yudhiṣṭhira, the oldest of the five sons of King Pāṇḍu (the Pāṇḍava) in the main story of the Mahābhārata. Dharma subjects Yudhiṣṭhira to three trials.

This work focuses on trends evident in stories of the three trials of Yudhiṣṭhira. First, these stories have a common structure. Second, the stories relate the three trials in sequence. Third, ānṛśaṃsya (mercy) is described as the highest value. In stories of the three trials, ānṛśaṃsya is esteemed and described as specific behavior. Fourth, Yudhiṣṭhira chooses to act of his own will rather than following the recommendations of others. These trends are common to stories of the three trials.

With reference to the āśramas, there are 3 different views, namely, samuccaya, vikalpa and bādha. First, in the samuccaya, life is divided into 4 āśramic stages and fulfilled by passing through all the stages one after another in sequence. Among them the stage of householder (gṛhastha) is generally regarded as the nucleus in the Vedic tradition. Second, in the vikalpa, the āśramas are considered as 4 distinct ways of life. After the completion of the brahamacarya stage, one may have an option to become a householder or to renounce. Lastly, in the bādha, gṛhastha is considered as the only āśrama.

The Jābāla-Upaniṣad discusses a few important questions with regard to saṃnyāsa. Through a conversation between King Janaka of Videha and Yājñavalkya, the 4th chapter, where its own original view on āśramas is found, speaks of the time to resort to saṃnyāsa and the qualification for saṃnyāsins. In this paper, I examine the contents in this chapter and confirm the following points: 1) bādha is not mentioned at all; 2) samuccaya is indicated in the first part of the conversation; 3) vikalpa is also indicated as an alternative to samuccaya; 4) it is suggested that the person may enter saṃnyāsa before or during brahmacarya. In conclusion, while the Jābāla-Upaniṣad is within the mainstream of the Vedic tradition, it also presents a new point of view on the āśramas.

It is a highly developed way of thinking of the Upaniṣads that death is observed as an extension of sleep. When a man sleeps, the vital functions around breath suspend, when he wakes they activate, and they take their departure (from his body) towards the next world when he is dying. The breath is a marker identifying his state of being dead or alive. Now, the consecration (dīkṣā) in the Agniṣṭoma has descriptions of “sleep” in which the consecrated sacrificer who has been awakened from a temporary sleep says the mantra claiming a secure return of the vital functions, including the breath. The Śathapatha-Brāhmaṇa, however, in opposition to the mantra, proclaims that the breath will not take departure from the sleeping (living) sacrificer, and it shows, as it were, the embryonic phase of the theory of the vital functions around sleep and death which held sway in the era of the Upaniṣads. Furthermore, this mantra is applied to another ritual called Sāvitra-Cayana, a variation for the piling up of the fire-altar for the Agnicayana of the Taittirīya lineage. It acts as a mantra preventing “death” and ensuring the recovery of the vital functions from “death.” Therefore, the mantra can be considered a good example of the Vedic way of thinking of the vital functions as mediators between sleep and death as this developed from the Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣads, i.e. from ritualistic thought to philosophy in general.