The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the significance of speech acts in wartime Ukraine, using the voices of Ukrainian writers and poets―their works, essays, and interviews―as a clue, albeit to a limited extent.

First, I would like to discuss the aspect of how the times change languages. As poets Ostap Slyvynsky and Yuliya Musakovska confess, the most serious impact of war on language is probably that it robs people of the language itself, that is, it puts people into a state of aphasia. This is also a clear result of the fact that war destroys people’s sense of time and space, as pointed out by Serhiy Zhadan. In such a situation, where it was necessary to break through linguistic paralysis and semantic stupor, many Ukrainian poets tried to practice by returning to primitive, syncretic poetry, which involved the simplification of poetic language. In Slyvynsky’s words, those poems were “magic,” “ritual,” “therapy,” and “testimony.” War not only deprives people of words, but also transforms them and brings to light what has been hidden behind them. For this reason, Zhadan warns that we will be faced with inconvenient questions such as populism and double standards in each context that we have long ignored and we will enter an era in which we will be at a loss for answers.

Next, I would like to discuss the aspect in which words can change the times. This includes the question of whether words are effective in times of war. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, poetry has returned to a syncretic dimension and become “magic,” “ritual,” “therapy,” and “testimony,” becoming indispensable for people trying to survive extreme situations. As Artur Dron, someone who delivers his own poems from the battlefield, says, “Poetry cannot bring the dead back to life or ease the pain, but it can remind us that none of us are alone.” Slyvynsky states that poetry in wartime is also a record, and although it cannot kill people, it can sometimes serve as testimony and evidence of the crimes of criminals and restore justice. Poets such as Musakovska, Tetyana Vlasova, and Marina Ponomarenko have pointed out another aspect of poetry as a record―it is a means of immediate response, and it can be created anywhere, can reflect chaotic emotions and experiences quickly, and can be a means of disseminating information continuously and in real time about the reality of wartime to foreign audiences.

In the end, I would like to summarize the correlation between the times and words in wartime Ukraine within the framework of this paper, and compare its contents with the famous words of philosopher Theodor Adorno, “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,” and reinterpret it as a message to ourselves who live in the same era.

In 2014, Russia’s occupation of Crimea was accompanied by an extensive information campaign aimed at mitigating international condemnation. A central element of this campaign was the deployment of historical narratives claiming Crimea’s longstanding ties to or belonging to Russia. These narratives emphasized Russia’s role as the legitimate successor to Kyivan Rus and positioned Crimea as a sacred site of Christianization. Furthermore, they portrayed Crimea’s history as predominantly Russian, with the temporary exception of the period leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the 18th century. These narratives were used to support propaganda suggesting that the majority of Crimean residents supported Russia’s attempted annexation, thereby influencing international opinion.

In contrast, since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, scholars have worked to distance Ukraine’s historical narratives from Soviet imperial frameworks. However, Ukrainian historiography has primarily focused on ethnic Ukrainian perspectives, sidelining Crimea as a peripheral topic. This marginalization stemmed from perceptions of Crimea as an “other” rather than an integral part of Ukrainian history. Consequently, the deconstruction of Soviet-era narratives about Crimea lagged behind efforts to reevaluate broader Ukrainian history. As a result, many Soviet-influenced perspectives on Crimea persisted uncritically within Ukrainian society.

Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea served as a wake-up call, prompting Ukrainian society to critically examine Russian-imposed narratives about the peninsula. This led to growing awareness of the colonial and imperialist elements embedded in these narratives. Over the past decade, Ukrainian scholars have actively worked to reconstruct Crimea’s history from a decolonial perspective. This effort has been fueled by increased interest in Crimea’s past and its role within Ukraine’s civic identity. The focus has shifted from viewing Crimea as an external entity to recognizing it as an integral part of Ukraine’s historical and cultural landscape.

Ukraine’s response to Russia’s aggression has also catalyzed broader changes in its national identity. The concept of a civic Ukrainian identity has expanded beyond ethnic definitions, encompassing diverse groups, including the Crimean Tatars. This inclusivity has heightened interest in the history of the Crimean Khanate, which is now being framed as an integral component of Ukraine’s historical narrative. In educational contexts, Crimean entities are no longer portrayed as foreign but rather as part of Ukraine’s shared heritage.

The ongoing reconstruction of Crimea’s history signifies a departure from ethnocentric historiography. While elements related to Russia and its colonial legacy are gradually being scrutinized or rejected, this process has also encouraged a more inclusive understanding of Ukraine’s multicultural past. If successful, this integration of Crimea’s history into Ukraine’s national narrative could serve as a model for incorporating the histories of other ethnic minorities. Such an approach would demonstrate the adaptability and inclusiveness of Ukraine’s national historiography, contributing to a broader understanding of its complex and diverse identity.

In summary, Ukraine’s efforts to decolonize Crimea’s history and integrate it into its national narrative reflect a broader transformation driven by resistance to Russian aggression. This process not only redefines Ukraine’s relationship with Crimea but also challenges longstanding imperial narratives, fostering a more inclusive and pluralistic vision of Ukrainian history and identity.

Since the beginning of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian culture has undergone significant transformations. During the third term of the Putin administration in the 2010s, particularly after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the divide between left-wing and right-wing intellectuals deepened. The full-scale invasion has made this division decisive. Many intellectuals and cultural figures taking an oppositional stance have left the country, using primarily online platforms to openly criticize the regime. Meanwhile, within Russia, where liberal intellectuals and media have been shut out, a new patriotic culture symbolized by the alphabet letter “Z” is emerging.

This paper focuses on the “Z culture” emerging in Russia following the invasion, particularly on the patriotic poetry trend known as “Z-poetry,” analyzing the activities of poets associated with this movement and the content of their works. It also examines the post-invasion statements of war-supporting intellectuals, such as patriotic writer Zakhar Prilepin and St. Petersburg thinker Alexander Sekatsky, considering their perspectives on Russian society and culture during wartime and their visions for the future.

Since Russia openly launched military operations on the entire territory of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia and Ukraine have entered into their own wartime periods, and many different actions by the nations have been observed. When observing the two countries, it is difficult to accurately grasp the facts on the battlefield, and both countries provide information that differs from reality, but the conditions involved are different. Although reporting on the facts on the battlefield in Ukraine is also restricted, many facts within the country can be critically examined. In Russia, spreading anything that differs from the authorities regarding military operations has become a criminal offense, and information is also being disseminated with the intention of manipulating public opinion and the views of intellectuals, so there are more conditions that prevent accurate understanding of information originating from Russia. From 2014 to 2021, Russia began to use many coercive measures, such as occupying the Crimean Peninsula, getting involved in the Donbas conflict, and intervening in the politics of Western countries, but it limited the intensity of violence and used many diplomatic measures. Ukraine began to reform its system to counter Russia, which violated its sovereignty, but the entire population did not solidify in its stance to confront Russia. When Russia began its military operation in February 2022, it clearly expressed its desire for Ukraine to become unified under Russia, but it was unclear how to achieve this through military operations. Later, it became clear that the aim was to quickly establish a pro-Moscow government in Kyiv, through military shock and traitors within the Ukrainian authorities, but this plan did not match the reality of Ukraine and failed. Russia decided to continue the military operation and increased its control over the Luhansk Oblast, but suffered heavy losses, including numerous military failures, and has made progress little by little in compensation, but has not achieved its goal even after 33 months. During this wartime, it has not only harmed residents on the battlefield, but has also engaged in highly violent actions that go beyond the purpose of seeking Russia’s security, such as obstructing humanitarian aid, abducting children and forcing them to be educated as ethnic Russians, and allowing illegal acts by combatants to harm Russian citizens. Furthermore, through the disruption of grain exports, violation of norms regarding nuclear weapons, and the degradation of UN Security Council resolutions, Russia has continued to present the threat of undermining the functioning of the international order, even if it goes against the wishes of China, the Middle East, and African countries. Ukraine has notably demonstrated the improvement of social cohesion, the maintenance of civilian activities, diplomatic success in gaining international understanding and support, and tactical success in attacking Russia’s vulnerabilities with organizational operational capabilities, including new technologies. Nevertheless, eradicating corruption is facing troubles, and it is extremely difficult to chart a path to recovering Ukraine’s rights in the midst of war.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the partial mobilization in September 2022, those who left Russia have come to be known as “relocants”. In March and September 2024, the author conducted interviews with relocants in Uzbekistan. This study focuses on their behavior and consciousness regarding cultural transplantation―specifically, what aspects of their culture they introduce to Uzbek society and how they perceive the influence of their presence.

From the respondents’ answers, we identified examples of cultural transplantation in six key areas:（1）volunteer activities,（2）consumer lifestyles,（3）café culture, （4）relocant communities,（5）IT technology, and（6）education and other cultural fields. The findings indicate that relocants primarily bring with them the lifestyle of Russia’s modern middle class, which is more aligned with Western culture than with uniquely Russian traditions. Because their cultural influence is not distinctly Russian, it may be more easily accepted in Uzbekistan. Relocants understand that, to be welcomed by Uzbek society, they must respect local culture, avoid adopting a Great Russian mindset, and appreciate the residency opportunities granted to them.

Relocants are also aware that rising rents and prices negatively impact the residents of Tashkent. However, they take pride in their perceived role in accelerating economic development. At present, no major conflicts have arisen, largely due to the relatively small number of relocants in Uzbekistan and the prevalence of remote workers, who have limited direct interaction with the local population. However, as relocants continue to stay in Uzbekistan for the long term, it will be necessary to monitor whether tensions emerge.

Those who remain in Uzbekistan are individuals who have achieved economic independence, successfully adapted to Uzbek society, and possess the financial means to afford freedom in speech and consumption. In other words, they represent a middle-class group capable of surviving in a foreign land, often referred to as “Global Russians.” Given the substantial outflow of talented individuals from Russia, the impact of this brain drain is severe.

In 2022, prominent Russian anthropologists debated the status of the term etnos (этнос, ethnos) in contemporary Russian society in the journal Ethnographic Review (Этнографическое Обозрение). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concept of etnos has been regarded as a symbol of the primordialist soviet approach to ethnic groups, and has been criticized by the constructivists, including V. A. Tishkov, the former director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of Russian Academy of Sciences, who wrote a sensational book named Requiem to etnos in the early 2000s. However, in the discussion of Ethnographic Review, D. V. Verkhovtsev showed that the term etnos is frequently used in contemporary Russia, based on Internet statistics, and in response to his article, Tishkov and other leading scholars contributed articles to the journal. According to Verkhovtsev, the constructivist position did not necessarily become dominant, and the use of the term etnos, associated with the primordialist theories formed by Iu. V. Bromlei and L. N. Gumilev during the Soviet era, was expanding in the public sphere and in official documents outside ethnology.

It can be said that the commentators who participated in the controversy of the Ethnographic Review basically agreed with Verkhovtsev’s argument, and they also followed the factors he identified as the causes for the popularity of the term etnos. In particular, there was a consensus among all the participants that the public support for the primordialist understanding of ethnic groups represented by etnos theories is rooted in an institutional foundation, which has been working since the Soviet era. Moreover, the conflict between “constructivism and primordialism” or “ethnicity and etnos” in the contemporary Russian academic sphere does not necessarily reflect a purely academic aspect. Rather, the very composition of “ethnicity vs etnos” itself reflects the divergent ways of recognizing and adapting to the new conditions and the degree of adaptation to the reorganized academic hierarchy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the debate of the Ethnographic Review, even if the Soviet style of ethnic theory was scientifically rejected by the constructivist enlightenment, it was not denied that there existed a reality in which people needed Soviet etnos theory at a level different from academic recognition, namely, in their daily educational and institutional practices. Today, almost 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its etnos theory remains alive and well in daily life, although the theory itself is already dead academically.

The realization of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova contains unending fascination in terms of Border Studies. The Republic of Moldova involves a de facto independent state named as Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic（PMR, or Transnistria）. The PMR “Constitution” defines the left bank areas of Nistru River as the PMR territory and proclaims the state border between Moldova and PMR. The “territory,” however, includes areas under the control of Moldova, or areas where the “Constitution” does not define. Therefore, the unnatural border is not equivalent to the border line that PMR insists on. Under such circumstances, Moldova must exercise state sovereignty on the complicated areas and may face with difficulty in characteristic boundary issues.

Since the establishment in 2005, EUBAM（EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine）has extended the influence on the boundary concept in Moldova as well as the unrecognized state. EUBAM is not an international arbitration organization to deal with border issues between Moldova and PMR. EUBAM is a technical advisor which updates border control system with the EU standard and improves monitoring skills to cross-border activities depending on requests from Moldova and Ukraine. It seems less effective for the solution of boundary issues, but the reality is different. The EUBAM standpoint has brought results, which diplomacy by conventional manners could not achieve for decades.

This paper, referring to disputes concerning effective sovereignty, analyzes the establishment process of EUBAM and the diplomatic achievement aimed at the solution of Transnistrian conflict. Additionally, it discusses boundary issues which have newly risen since the outbreak of Ukrainian War.

This article focuses on the Soviet/Russian narrative concerning the war against Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1945, which has been called the “Great Patriotic War” in the USSR and today’s Russia. This narrative portrays the armed conflict and the role of the invaded nation as follows: the atrocious enemy suddenly attacked us, the peace-loving Soviet people, but we fought back and finally defeated the invaders at the cost of countless lives of our compatriots, saving our motherland and the whole world from the evil. This mythical version of the war memory has its powerful influence over modern Russia – not only the official rhetoric around Russia’s invasion into Ukraine but also the spontaneous national identity among the ordinary people, as shown by the poll results for many years before the full-scale invasion. Therefore, analyzing the Russian tradition of remembering the events on the Eastern Front of WWII is crucial for understanding how it influences Russia’s politics and its society.

This article aims to examine the basic plot of the “Great Patriotic War” narrative and its shift in emphasis after the Soviet-German war through content analysis of official speech texts. To accomplish this goal, the study analyzes the texts of four wartime speeches and two Victory Parade speeches in 1945 and 1965 using quantitative text analysis and frame analysis. Previous works on this theme using frame analysis have not adopted the methods of quantitative analysis. However, content analysis benefits significantly from combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches. In this article, the quantitative text analysis is conducted by software “KH Coder,” and the frame analysis is based on following twelve frames: “war sufferings,” “atrocious enemy,” “peace-loving Soviet people,” “friendly nations,” “fighting,” “victory,” “patriotic/holy war,” “heroes,” “saving people of the world,” “wartime leader,” “contribution to the Allies” and “new threats.” Besides these frames, the author examines the roles of different values（“traditional/universal” and “revolutionary/socialistic”）in the speech texts.

The analysis results allow us to draw the following conclusions:

1. The “patriotic/holy war” frame is prominent through all the texts.

2. The “war sufferings,” “atrocious enemy” and “peace-loving Soviet people” frames are highly noticeable at the beginning of the war.

3. While the “traditional/universal” values are overwhelmingly dominant during the war, the “revolutionary/socialistic” ones revive in 1965.

4. The subject for praise switches from Stalin in 1945 to the “heroic Soviet people” in 1965.

5. The Cold War significantly influences the 1965 speech text: now the U.S. is seen not only as a friend in the war against Hitler but also as a “new threat” against world peace.

6. The content of Stalin’s speech at the military parade on November 7, 1941, more closely resembles that of his speech celebrating the victory over the Third Reich in 1945 rather than that of the other two speeches in the first year of the war.

Exploring speech texts that represent the “Great Patriotic War” narrative by quantitative text analysis reveals minor shifts in the unchanged, if seen from afar, narrative. This would help us deeply understand the mechanism by which one of the Soviet-era mythical narratives survived the collapse of the communist regime and enjoys today’s unrivaled status as the core of Russia’s national identity.