This paper presents an axiomatic model of random limited considerations under attribute-based inferences. To characterize the model, this paper takes the framework of preferences over menus. The key axiom characterizes a model of random consideration sets, which is an extended and generalized version of the reference-dependent choice model of Ok et al. (2015) in the sense that (i) consideration sets are formed under attribute-based inferences randomly, and that (ii) reference points themselves can be chosen from menus. The two extensions make it possible to allow for not only the Attraction Effect, but also the Compromise Effect.

Policymakers have begun to use happiness as a policy tool. International comparisons of happiness have been launched like those in the World Happiness Report. Happiness by each country was explained by six factors in the Report. However, the differences in happiness between countries were caused not by the six factors but by residuals. The purpose of this study is to explain that the differences are caused by culture, namely, the concept of ideal happiness (11 scales) as a projection of current happiness.

The results in Japan showed that many Japanese evaluated unhappiness positively and then chose the mid-point as their ideal happiness. Then, current happiness was adjusted by taking account of the individual gap between the current happiness and the ideal happiness. When the cluster analysis was conducted with the distribution of the adjusted happiness and those of happiness in Europe, the Japanese were categorized in the same group as people in the happiest countries like Denmark. As a result, if we use the same method as the ones in this paper, we cannot say that Asians are less happy than others. Rather, we can interpret that Asians are as happy as the Nordic population and Latin Americans.

This paper estimates the effects of childhood experiences of wearing school uniforms at a public elementary school for 6 years on behavioral traits in adulthood. The school uniform experience can be endogenous if preferences and characteristics of the school and parents are involved in the decision of schools to implement school uniforms. To examine the effect of school uniforms, we exploit the exogenous variation in the expansion of the apparel industry across regions which the Japanese government used as a catalyst in stimulating the economy and the regional variations in prefectural governors’ initiatives for enhancing regional profitability, both of which are found to affect the adoption of school uniform policies. We first find that the childhood experience affects the formulation and development of an individual’s personality traits that are characterized by self-esteem and self-efficacy. Second, it increases reciprocal inclinations, inequity aversion, pro-social tendencies, and preferences for the government’s redistribution policies. We discuss the reasons behind the consequences of school uniforms on noncognitive traits and social preferences, with a focus on an individual’s perception of similarity with others formulated by the childhood experience as an important determinant that affects the behavioral traits.

This study compares the effects of the amount of feedback information in a public goods game with a centralized punishment institution where each player is required to contribute a certain amount, and those who under-contributes must pay a fixed fine. We compare two different amount of feedback information—one where only the aggregate level of contribution and own payoff is provided, and the other where the individual contributions and profits of the other players are also provided—under two different strength of penalty—one where it is barely deterrent to make players contribute as required (weakly enforceable punishment), and another with stronger penalty (strongly enforceable punishment)—in two by two design. Although it is a dominant strategy to contribute as required in both punishment institutions, we find a significant decline in the contribution in the weakly enforceable punishment institution when the feedback is provided at the individual level. In the other three treatments, the average contribution is stable across the periods. These results are consistent with the theoretical analysis using the finite population evolutionary stable strategy.